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Terms of Reference  
 
In March 2011, the Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University was commissioned by North 
East Access to Finance (NEA2F) to undertake a major piece of independent academic research to 
explore both the demand and supply sides of SME access to finance in the North East of England.  
The aim of the research was to gain insight and understanding into the challenges faced not only by 
the SME sector but also by the key suppliers of finance to that community, specifically the banking 
sector and Business Angels.  Thus we do not take a position on what we think is right or what a best 
practice approach might be but rather reflect, as accurately as possible, the information that was 
shared with us.  The research project commenced in May 2011 and was completed at the end of 




The impact of the financial crisis of 2008 is as long lasting as it was deep and as this report is drafted 
in Spring 2012, the events that emanated from the US and subsequently evolved into a broader 
sovereign debt crisis, threatening the stability of the European Union and indeed the continued 
viability of the Euro, continue to unfold. 
 
The inevitable demands for reform to financial regulatory structures is resulting in tighter monitoring 
and control of our financial institutions, which has had an impact on the banks‟ overall appetite for 
new business.  There can be little doubt that there has been a fundamental change in the lending 
landscape, as has been borne out by our research findings. It is claimed that the greatest impact of this 
crisis has been felt by the small and medium enterprises throughout the UK (e.g. Forum of Small 
Business 2009; Forum of Private Business 2009) and results from this work suggest that the North 
East region was no exception in this respect. 
 
The Newcastle Business School‟s most recent Business Barometer (published in The Journal, 11th 
April 2012), indicated that almost half of all businesses are still suffering from the impact of 
recession, however 41% of businesses report that they are now beginning to recover, evidenced by 
just over half of respondents expecting a moderate increase in turnover during the coming 12 months 
which is mirrored by those businesses reporting an increase in their order book as compared to the 
position six months ago. Whilst these statistics reveal some mildly positive news, respondents were 
still concerned about future reduction in consumer demand, the availability of finance and associated 
credit constraint. 71% of respondents report a business climate of uncertainty as they have been 
stating in each of our biannual reports since 2008. Whilst the survey that underpins the Barometer 
canvasses the opinions of the largest firms operating in the North East region, the concerns that they 
raise apply equally to the SME sector.  Considerable effort and attention has been paid to those 
attempts to support bank lending in general and to the SME sector in particular.  However, while it is 
reported that “there has been much comment that banks are not lending enough” (British Bankers‟ 
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Association, 2010, p. 2) it is also stated that “Banks argue there is weak demand from business for 
loans” (The Telegraph, 14th November, 2011); this juxtaposition is also apparent from the results of 
this study. 
 
Overall Findings  
 
This research study consisted of three discrete components; one focussed on banks, one on the SME 
community and one on Business Angels
1
.  Some strong findings emerge from the various parts of the 
research, and are discussed in more detail within the summary findings for each component; the 
overarching findings are as follows:  
 There is, in the North East, a perception the environment around finance and support is very 
complex, which inevitably makes finding suitable, high-quality support more difficult for SMEs. 
At the time the research was undertaken
2
 we found 106 finance interventions and 37 support 
interventions offered by a wide range of public, private and third sector organisations that were 
available to SMEs within the North East region. 
 There is evidence of variation in the quality of support provided in the region and evident 
dissatisfaction with some current providers. 
 Business Angels suggest they do not see a sufficient number of high-quality investment 
opportunities being presented to them, whilst a number of SMEs note they will in the future 
require access to external growth finance. 
 Networking is highlighted as being crucial for SMEs as a means of finding both support and 
finance.  Networking is also important for Business Angel investors as a way of sourcing 
investment opportunities.   
 Banks indicate they would always consider good, well constructed business plans/proposals and 
are particularly encouraging of those prepared in conjunction with external advisers.  The 
important role of these advisers also emerged from amongst the Business Angel community. 
However their lending criteria have changed. Though banks are committed to SME lending 
through the Task Force and Project Merlin, specific sectors are approached with greater caution 
and associated appetite for lending into these (unspecified) areas is limited. From the SME 
perspective some „fashionable‟ sectors are seen to receive preferential treatment. 
 There are different views from the banks and the SMEs over the operation of the system of 
Relationship Management.  Banks place great emphasis on the importance of relationship 
banking, whilst SMEs perceive it is no longer in operation.  
 There are different perceptions from banks (a lack of demand from SMEs) and the SMEs (forced 
stagnation) over demand for and availability of credit. 
                                                          
1
 Please refer to the section on „Conduct of the Study‟ for information on methods employed and response rates. 
2
 A desk review of all existing finance and support interventions available to the SME community was 
undertaken in June 2011 at the start of the research project. 




Summary Findings from Banks 
 
1. All of the banks interviewed place great emphasis on the importance of relationship banking 
suggesting it is fundamental in their approach to SME finance providing a means of ensuring their 
position in this market. They were more willing to stand by their more loyal customers in the 
event they experience difficulties. That said, generally the larger SMEs have a dedicated bank 
Relationship Manager who has sector knowledge and experience.  However the micro SMEs 
appear to be managed over the telephone from a remote location or a Head Office which deals 
with generic enquiries but with specialist knowledge of the operational area. There was evidence 
from the banks of SMEs approaching and obtaining finance from more than one relationship 
bank. 
2. Demand for debt financing is perceived by the banks to be low but whether this is influenced by 
the economy or by their perception of banks‟ attitudes to lending is difficult to establish. Most 
banks feel that businesses are streamlining and adopting a more conservative approach to 
business.  
3. In general, all banks still have lending targets to meet and these are increasing. They were 
supportive of and committed to Project Merlin, although one was sceptical of the impact it was 
having on the SMEs. The banks seek to differentiate themselves on the basis of quality of service 
(including speed of decision turnaround) and sector specialisation.  Relationship Managers noted 
that specific (but unspecified) sectors were, however, approached with greater caution and that 
appetite for lending was limited in some (unspecified) areas. 
4. Credit decision-making employs a „subjective judgemental technique‟ although for the initial 
screening of the businesses, statistical techniques such as credit scoring are used (loans under 
£100k proceed through an automated credit scoring process).  
5. Banks acknowledged they are paying greater attention to the detail of business proposals.  The use 
of advisers (such as accountants) is viewed as positive as it improves the disclosure of 
information and by implication the quality of the proposal which is seen as helping in the 
decision-making process (although presumably this can be in either a positive or negative 
direction). 
6. The banks note increasing sophistication in the proposals being received but that there is pressure 
on SMEs to become „more savvy.‟ 
7. The main characteristics that are considered to be most important for the assessment of 
creditworthiness are: project viability; business acumen; sources of repayment; applicants‟ 
financial strengths and weaknesses and; ability to repay.  
8. The two most frequent reasons for proposals being rejected were identified as a lack of quality 
and/or sufficiency of collateral as well as the lack of a prior track record of the firm/owner
3
. Just 
under half of survey respondents noted that about one third of proposals would not get taken 
forward to the credit committee.  Just under half of Relationship Managers responding to the 
survey had experienced decision overrides with some stating this had an impact on their loan 
portfolio. 
                                                          
3
 It was separately pointed out to the research team that the most likely reason for declining a proposition would 
be lack of quality of proposal rather than concerns over available collateral (e-mail exchange dated 13/02/12). 
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9. Profit margins for lending are seen as historically low whilst risk is perceived to have increased.  
The general consensus from the banks is that the supply conditions were too liberal pre-2008 and 
that banks have simply returned to their more traditional lending practices of some 20-30 years 
ago. In consequence, the banks implicitly demonstrate a more conservative attitude to lending. 
10. Loan to value ratios have increased in some instances, largely reflective of the requirement 
towards greater provisioning, with half of respondents noting a change in lending criteria. 
11. Some banks felt that there was a need for greater transparency of lending criteria, although they 
maintained that terms and conditions of products were always provided. 
12. The banks were hopeful but also concerned for the future of SME finance as any improvement in 
the economic situation could result in an increase in base rates placing additional stress onto 
businesses.  Many of the banks have adopted new strategies in the current economic climate in 
order to support SMEs.  For example, some banks deliver workshops, employing role models, 
ambassadors and experts to help SMEs develop proposals.   
 
Summary Findings from Business Angels 
 
1. Business Angels in the North East are not purely interested in financial gain but also have a 
strong interest in supporting others and doing something that is of personal interest to them. 
2. The interviewees appeared to suggest that money is available for investment which is 
currently not being utilised. 
3. Business Angels investing in a business tended to be attracted to a combination of factors, 
most prominently the following: 
a. The quality and personality of the people running the investee business. 
b. The specific business concept relating to their individual investment preferences. 
c. The quality and „understandability‟ of the business plan, as well as the management‟s ability 
to present and defend it. 
4. More experienced Angels highlighted: 
a. The importance of the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team in making an investment decision 
and working with them post-investment. 
b. The importance of their thorough due diligence, which seems to develop over time and 
through „learning from mistakes‟. 
5. Challenges identified by the Angels included: 
a. Insufficient high-quality investment opportunities. 
b. Dissatisfaction with the way that the angel market (i.e. networks, groups and individuals) 
interacts with intermediaries in the region (e.g. Venture Capital funds, accountants, banks, 
lawyers).  
c. A financial environment in the North East that is highly complex, confusing and constantly 
changing. 




Summary Findings from SMEs 
 
1. Banks‟ relationship management systems are perceived to be no longer in operation. 
2. SMEs are experiencing difficulties in gaining bank finance for new but also established 
businesses. Almost 80% of SMEs responding to the survey have faced difficulties in raising 
capital; some were unable to raise any finance at all. Therefore, many were faced with forced 
stagnation as they had to put plans on hold or defer projects. 
3. A large number of SMEs will, in the near future, require access to external growth finance, which 
suggests many (if not all) may soon be affected by potential difficulties in finding funding sources 
suitable for their growth intentions.  
4. Banks are perceived to over-emphasise personal guarantees and over-recommend to SMEs that 
they use alternative funding sources. 
5. In the last 12 months, SMEs used bank finance, especially overdrafts, more than any other 
funding source.  
6. More than one third of survey respondents were unaware of the suitability of various funding 
providers, which may possibly indicate demand-side reasons underlying their inability to raise 
capital. 
7. SMEs noted that advice and mentoring are crucial to the sector but the value placed upon that 
information depends upon the provider. The most useful support providers were consultants, 
business mentors and other specialists (e.g. HR or marketing); the least useful were identified as 
banks, local authorities/councils and enterprise agencies or partnerships. 
8. There is a perception that „fashionable‟ businesses (e.g. green businesses) receive preferential 
treatment. 
9. There was a general call for awareness, communication and transparency of support and finance 
sources to be improved. 
10. Networking and business contacts are considered key for sourcing relevant information and 
support. Just under one third of participants openly claimed to be unaware of what funders need 
from a funding proposal. Almost two thirds of participants thought finding the right business 




The overall research findings suggest a gap exists in available support for SMEs/entrepreneurs to 
understand the precise requirements of credit providers and Business Angels when considering 
potential investment opportunities.   The key messages emanating from the study are: 
 The need for clarity, transparency and simplicity in sources of finance and support for 
SMEs/entrepreneurs;  
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 The requirement for a „one-stop-shop‟ of information to overcome the perception of „disjointed 
initiatives‟; 
 The considerable value SMEs and Business Angels place  upon personal contacts and networking;  
 The expressed desire for mentoring/support to be delivered by actual SME-owner/managers who 
have been successful in the process, rather than by government agencies or public service 
workers;  
 SMEs appear to require finance training from an appropriate provider, customised to address their 
specific needs, consisting of a „hands-on‟ approach, explaining precisely what is being sought by 
both banks and Business Angels. In addition to being efficient it also has to be cost effective. 
 
Research Team and Ethics 
 
Dr Jackie Harvey, Professor of Financial Management, Newcastle Business School  
Dr Stephanie Macht, Principal Lecturer, Newcastle Business School 
Dr Satish Sharma, Senior Lecturer, Newcastle Business School 
Dr Angie Johnson, Research Assistant, Newcastle Business School 
Ms Sue Regan, Research Assistant, Newcastle Business School 
Mr Craig Wood, Research Assistant, Newcastle Business School  
 
The remit of the study, conducted in accordance with the University‟s guidelines on research ethical 
conduct, was independent and objective in approach, with the intention that all participants would feel 
able to contribute openly and honestly.  In light of this objective, the main data collection activities 
were undertaken by three different research assistants who were specifically engaged for the duration 
of the project.  
 
It would not have been possible to undertake this project without the willing participation of the 
banks, SMEs and business angel communities.  In accordance with our ethical procedures no 
individual or organisation is identifiable within the report; however, we are profoundly grateful to all 
of our participants for their time and engagement with this study. 
 
Conduct of the Study 
 
The first part of the research involved undertaking an extensive review of key literature within the 
field.  This was used to identify themes that could be developed into strands of enquiry in the 
subsequent interviews and focus group as well as informing questionnaire content.  A mixed methods 
approach was employed whereby both qualitative and quantitative data was collected through 
interviews, a focus group and questionnaires. The approach to data gathering commenced in May 
2011 when initial access was negotiated through NEA2F to representatives of banks operating within 
the region as well as to the gatekeepers of both SMEs and the Business Angel community.   
The original intention was for the majority of the data (apart from the research with Business Angels) 
to be collected from surveys, however, as the work got underway it became apparent that a major 
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contribution from this work would be the deep, rich qualitative data that the researchers were 
obtaining from interviews, particularly from the banks.  The approach was therefore adjusted so that 
interviews were conducted with senior representatives (Directors and/or Senior Managers) from all of 
the banks operating in the North East region. (A total of 11 interviews were conducted). 
We requested these contacts cascade a questionnaire throughout their respective organisations to their 
Relationship Managers (RMs). A total of 51 individuals contributed to the survey. Although a smaller 
than anticipated sample, the information that emerged from the survey did enable us to add valuable 
additional data to the information obtained from the detailed interviews and thus it is considered this 
part of the work represents a valid contribution to the overall findings. 
The purpose of the Business Angel (BA) element of this study was to explore the opinions and 
experiences of the Angels operating within the North East region, specifically with regard to their 
investment motivations, deal flow, criteria, training needs and key challenges.  For this part of the 
study it was important to gather in-depth data from Business Angel investors with various levels of 
experience as angel investors. In order to gain access to this group, there was a need to first discuss 
the research with gatekeepers, in an attempt to obtain their support in accessing individual investors 
and with the study as a whole.  Thus initial informal interviews were arranged with the managers of 
all the Business Angel intermediaries operating in the North East.  Through a combination of 
introduction from intermediaries and researchers‟ searching through their own networks, a total of 36 
Business Angels were identified and approached. From these approaches, 12 semi-structured 
interviews eventually took place with a range of representatives of the main types of angel investor. 
In order to gain access to SMEs for participation in both a focus group interview and a subsequent 
survey, a number of SME and entrepreneurship networking groups/intermediaries were contacted. 
Through various intermediaries, the senior representatives of ten local SMEs were invited to take part 
in the focus group with eventual attendance by seven. The participants were purposefully selected to 
deliberately diverge according to a variety of factors, so the focus group would ultimately include a 
mix of new and established SMEs of differing sizes from a range of industry types and locations.  
This same group were also asked to pilot the resultant questionnaire. 
The networking groups and SME intermediaries were asked to promote the questionnaire to their 
members or make the link available to them via newsletters and/or their own websites. The vast 
majority of intermediaries were very forthcoming and supportive of the research. Unfortunately, the 
response rates for surveys with SMEs are generally known to be very low (Newby et al., 2003) and it 
became necessary to undertake a variety of measures aimed to increase response rates.  Ultimately, we 
achieved a total of 119 responses.  
 
1. Banks - Interviews and Questionnaires 
 
The underlying rationale for this study was to investigate the changing demand for, and supply of, 
lending in relation to SME access to finance, subsequent to the credit crisis.  This area of the study 
involved eight of the principal representative banks within the North East region.. In order to conduct 
the study, a total of 11 interviews were conducted with the Area Directors and/or Senior Managers 
within the banks and these took place over the period July to September 2011.  
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The purpose of the interviews was to gather information on a combination of generic themes initially 
identified from previous research conducted by ICAEW (2011) and from existing literature (i.e. 
Berger & Udell, 2006; Thampy, 2010).  An additional scoping meeting with one of the banks then 
ascertained the appropriateness of the questions in the context of day-to-day organisational practice.  
These approaches identified areas which would be common to the banks, irrespective of their size, 
strategy and sector focus.  These common characteristics or themes concerning SME lending are 
shown in Table 1.  The findings from this part of the research are classified in terms of these overall 
themes. 
All participating banks were sent ethical guidance which highlighted the anonymity and 
confidentiality of their responses.  In addition, the interview questions were sent to interviewees prior 
to the meeting.  The purpose of this was twofold; initially it was a pre-requisite to gaining clearance 
from the corporate office of the bank; secondly, it enabled the bank to identify the most appropriate 
person to participate in the interview.  All respondents had access to the questions for preparation 
prior to the interview.  After a series of negotiations with the banks and the interviewees, an 
appropriate date, time and location was agreed. All banks were asked to approve the recording of the 
interviews.  This agreement was voluntary and only one bank declined but agreed that the interviewer 
could take notes. All banks were allocated a code in order to maintain anonymity and the interviews 
were either recorded or notes were taken, depending upon the preference of the interviewee.  Both 
notes and transcripts were then coded according to the themes identified above. 
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Table 1 Common Characteristics of SME Lending 
 
Broad Area Sub Area 
SME Classification Turnover 
Sector 
Trends in SME demand for credit 
post 2008  
 
Change in banking paradigm  
Quality of proposals/sophistication of 
customers  
Role of accountants/ financial advisors 
Attitudes Confidence  
Outlook  
Trust (relationship)  
Transparency in lending 
Credit decision-making process Dealing with the diversity of SMEs 
Dealing with information asymmetry  
Triggers for non-performing loans and support 
interventions 
Level, sophistication and assessment of credit 
control  
Additional support for SMEs 
 
Coaching, mentoring, guidance and 
professional advice  
Dealing with rejections 
Initiatives 
 
Project Merlin, the task force Enterprise 
Finance Guarantee (EFG) 
Improving demand and market share 
 
Unique selling proposition (USP) 
Targets  
 




The themes that emerged from these interviews, together with the literature review that had been 
undertaken at the start of the work, informed the questionnaire.  This was developed with the aim of 
involving a wider range of Relationship Managers in the research. Following the interview with the 
Directors and/or Senior Managers within each bank, we requested that the questionnaires be 
distributed to their Relationship Managers (RMs).  A copy of the interview question prompts and the 
final questionnaire are included as Appendices 2 and 3. 
The purpose of the questionnaires was to harvest information concerning the supply and demand 
aspect of SME lending in order to complement the information obtained from the interviews with the 
Area Directors and Senior Managers through additional quantitative information and also qualitative 
information concerning day-to-day experiences. 
Again, all participating banks were referred to the ethical guidance sent prior to the interviews 
reassuring anonymity and confidentiality of all responses. The questionnaire was developed using 
SurveyMonkey which was identified as the most expedient process for collecting data, as it would not 
interfere with the day-to-day organisational practice of the employees.  The questionnaire included 39 
questions across the following themes: 
 Demographic information 
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 Portfolio Information 
 Credit Decision-Making Process 
 Assessing Creditworthiness of SMEs 
 Rejections and Overrides 
 Attitudes and Perception of SME Behaviour 
 Competition and Initiatives 
 Future of SMEs 
The participation of the Relationship Managers was not random as the link for the questionnaire was 
forwarded to these respondents through our contacts within each of the banks.  Unfortunately, as 
discussed in the findings and analysis section of this report, the response rate to the questionnaire was 
somewhat disappointing and despite two follow-up requests made to all the senior contacts within the 
banks the level of response remained lower than had been anticipated.  The survey eventually 
received a total of 51 responses, although the response rate to individual questions was lower than 
this.  
 
2. Business Angels - Interviews 
 
The purpose of the Business Angel (BA) element of this study was to explore the opinions and 
experiences of BAs within the North East region, specifically with regard to the following topics: 
1. Business Angels‟ investment motivations and amounts available for investment.  
2. Sources of deal flow and investment criteria. 
3. Training needs of experienced and inexperienced Business Angels. 
4. Key challenges of Business Angels in the North East region. 
For this part of the study, it was important to gather in-depth data from Business Angels with various 
levels of experience as angel investors, in order to obtain a detailed insight into these investors‟ 
investment criteria, as well as perceived challenges and training needs. Therefore, four distinct types 
of BAs were identified: 
 Prospective BAs, who were yet to make their first BA-type investment; 
 Novice BAs, who had made one or two investments to date and as such were still rather 
inexperienced; 
 Experienced BAs, who had made a few investments as a BA to date and as such were fairly 
experienced investors;  
 Highly experienced BAs, who had made many BA-type investments to date and could be classed 
as proficient investors. 
Overall, in order to achieve data saturation, it was estimated that between ten and 20 Business Angels 
should be sufficient, whereby it was hoped that the sample could include investors from each 
category. However, the field of BA research is a difficult one for sampling purposes as the Angel 
community is commonly known as an anonymous or invisible population. This means that there are 
no directories or publically accessible lists of high net worth individuals who qualify and self-certify 
as Business Angels. Thus, researchers cannot make use of random sampling techniques, but instead 
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must resort to a combination of convenience sampling (i.e. using only those respondents who are 
conveniently available to the researchers) and other techniques, which rely on intermediaries, in order 
to access angel investors.  
Generally, the following intermediaries are available for accessing Business Angels: 
 Business Angel Networks (BANs) are introductory or matching services, which are membership 
organisations that allow high net worth individuals to join and benefit from introductions to fund-
seeking entrepreneurs, investment advertisements and networking with other Business Angels. 
Members of BANs make their own individual investment decisions, independent from the 
decisions of other members and network managers. 
 Business Angel Syndicates – or Angel Alliances are groupings of high net worth individuals, 
generally with fewer members than BANs, which also enable investors to network, view 
investment opportunities and be introduced to fund-seeking entrepreneurs. Similar to BANs, 
individual BAs also make their own investment decisions, independent from syndicate managers‟ 
and other members‟ decisions. 
 Syndicated Funds are compiled from Business Angels‟ capital.  In contrast to the other two types 
of intermediaries, these are managed and organised like any other investment fund; high net worth 
individuals invest their personal capital into the fund and the fund manager makes investment 
decisions on the BAs‟ behalf, by investing money from the fund on a portfolio basis. In such 
syndicated funds, the participating BAs often do not get involved in the decision-making process 
and thus cannot invest independently from the fund manager and the other members. 
 
In addition to these common Business Angel intermediaries, other networks (e.g. the networks of 
accountants, lawyers or entrepreneurial forums) can also be used to access angel investors, but they 
are more likely to contain members from outside the Business Angel community therefore 
approaching these individuals tends to result in less well targeted access negotiations. 
 
Intermediaries that specifically deal with Business Angels (i.e. BANs, syndicates and syndicated 
funds) tend to guarantee confidentiality to their members. Therefore, they generally do not provide 
direct contact between their member-investors and any external entrepreneurs or researchers.  These 
intermediaries can therefore be referred to as „gatekeepers,‟ through which access to Business Angels 
must be negotiated. 
 
Therefore, in order to gain access to Business Angel investors, it was necessary to discuss the research 
with gatekeepers first, in an attempt to obtain their support with accessing individual investors and 
with the study as a whole; thus, initial, informal interviews were arranged with the managers of all 
Business Angel intermediaries operating in the North East. These informal interviews were carried 
out between 16
th
 June and 8
th
 July 2011. Each informal interview lasted between 45 minutes and three 
hours but due to the introductory nature of the conversations, they were not tape-recorded.  
 
Once the BA intermediaries had been informed of the research and had been asked to support the 
identification of individual angel investors, the intermediaries made introductions to individual 
members of their organisations. However, the intermediary‟s introduction did not guarantee that the 
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introduced investor would be willing to take part in the study. Therefore, a further level of access 
negotiations began with each potential participant. Since only a very small number of Business 
Angels, introduced through the intermediaries, was willing to take part in the study, this group was 
supplemented through the use of existing contacts known to the researchers in order to obtain a 
sufficiently high participation in the study. 
 
Through a combination of introduction from intermediaries and researchers‟ searching through their 
own networks, a total of 36 Business Angels were identified and approached. From these approaches, 
a total of 12 semi-structured interviews were held over the period 26
th
 June to 12
th
 August 2011. A 
copy of the interview prompt questions is included as Appendix 4. The interviews lasted 
approximately one hour each and all but one interview was tape-recorded (one interviewee refused 
any form of recording, which the researchers honoured). Before the interviews, participants were 
asked to sign Northumbria University‟s informed consent forms. The sample proved sufficiently 
representative with participating investors differing according to their BA experience, such that the 
initially planned variety of investment experiences could be explored within this study.  The 
interviews were transcribed and subjected to thematic analysis in order to identify commonalities and 
differences. The key themes which have emerged from the data are presented in the findings and 
analysis section of this report. While the main purpose is to present and discuss the findings derived 
from the interviews with the angel investors, the report will also draw upon the informal interviews 
with the BA intermediary managers, in order to provide a more complete picture.  All participants 
(both intermediary managers and angel investors) are anonymised and their identity is disguised – as 
part of this anonymisation, all participants are portrayed as males. 
 
3. SMEs - Focus Group Interviews and Questionnaires 
 
Before being able to approach any potential research participants for the SME strand of the work, it 
was crucial to select a suitable definition of an SME (Small and Medium Enterprise).  The definition 
adopted is based on that developed and accepted by the European Union
4
, and subsequently used by 
the UK government and its regional bodies.  
 
For the purposes of this research, SMEs are therefore defined as enterprises which: 
 have fewer than 250 employees 
 have an annual turnover not exceeding £43.7m (50 Million Euro) 
 are autonomous (conforming to the criterion of independence).  
 
The North East‟s SME population was calculated using data mined from the Government‟s Business 
Population Estimates 2010 (BIS May 2011)
5
.  NEA2F had initially requested that „sole traders‟ be 
excluded from the SME research and with their exclusion the resultant figure for the North East SME 
population is approximately 36,000, as shown in Table 2 below. This comprises micro, small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). 
 
                                                          
4 Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, as described in The New SME Definition – user guide and model declaration, EU 2005 
5
  Accessed at http://stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/ 
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The first part of the research aimed to establish a list of support interventions and finance initiatives 
which are being offered to SMEs in the North East region. Desk-based searches were undertaken 
during May and June 2011, starting with organisations such as ONE North East, Business Link, 
NEA2F and local authorities etc. as a source of information regarding finance and support 
interventions. These also proved an invaluable source of signposting to a wide range of other 
providers and interventions.    
 
The interventions and initiatives which were identified were subsequently entered into an Excel 
spread sheet and categorised according to: 
 location 
 target characteristics 
 content 
 provider of the intervention/initiative 
 any other available information.  
 
In order to explore the experiences and opinions of SMEs when trying to access funding and support 
within the North East region, and consistent with the overall approach to the research, a mixed 
methods approach was deemed most suitable. First, a qualitative focus group interview was held with 
a small number of regional SMEs, whereby SMEs were asked open questions about their experiences 
and viewpoints. Findings and emerging themes from this focus group were then used to inform the 
subsequent design and administration of a questionnaire survey that was aimed at a larger sample of 
SMEs within the region. 
 
The research aimed to investigate the experiences and opinions of SMEs in the North East, with 
particular focus on: 
1. Recent experience (both successful and unsuccessful) of trying to obtain business finance. 
2. Recent experience of trying to obtain business support. 
In order to gain access to SMEs for participation in the focus group interviews, a number of SME and 
entrepreneurship networking groups/intermediaries were contacted as gatekeepers to these groups. 
Through various intermediaries, the senior representatives of ten local SMEs were invited to take part 
in the focus group. The participants were purposefully selected to deliberately diverge according to a 
variety of factors, so that the focus group would ultimately include a mix of new and established 
SMEs of differing sizes from a range of industry types and locations. 
 
Seven of these ten SME owners attended the focus group held on 25
th
 July 2011, at Newcastle 
Business School. After each participant provided their details on a profile sheet (in order to establish 
the nature of each participating SME), the focus group was tape-recorded. The questions were 
purposely open-ended and derived from an initial review of the literature, focusing around funding 
sources available to SMEs, the participants‟ experiences and opinions of raising finance and obtaining 
other support within the region. In order to capture not only the positive experiences of obtaining 
funding and support, the researchers deliberately probed participants to also reflect upon situations 
where they have attempted to obtain finance or support but found that they were unable to do so.  The 
prompt questions for the focus group are included in Appendix 5. 
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Subsequent to conducting the focus group interview, the data was transcribed and analysed according 
to emerging themes. Based on the findings from the focus group, and informed by SME literature, as 
well as by the findings emerging from the Banks and Business Angels parts of this study, a 
questionnaire was designed, which would enable the collection of data from a larger sample of 
regional SMEs. The questions focused on experiences of raising finance and obtaining additional 
support. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix 6. 
 
Before making the questionnaire available to a wider audience, the focus group participants were 
asked to complete the questionnaire and provide feedback on it.  In effect this was used as a pilot to 
test for clarity and it resulted in slight rewording and the re-organisation of questions. Similarly, as 
with the access to the focus group participants, the networking groups and SME intermediaries were 
called upon once more to forward the online questionnaire (hosted on SurveyMonkey) to their 
members or make the link available to them via newsletters and/or their own websites. The vast 
majority of intermediaries were very forthcoming and supportive of the research and agreed to 
promote the questionnaire with the SMEs on their databases and mailing lists. 
 
Unfortunately, the response rates for surveys with SMEs are known to be generally very low (Newby 
et al., 2003). In order to increase the response rate for this survey, a variety of activities were carried 
out including asking intermediaries and networking organisations to remind their members of the 
survey; the researchers‟ personal networks were also called upon to distribute the survey; individual 
SMEs were asked to forward the survey to other SMEs that they knew; and flyers with the web link to 
the survey were distributed at various networking events.  SMEs were further incentivised to take part 
in the survey through the opportunity to receive one of ten randomly allocated individual coaching 
sessions offered by staff at the Business School.   
 





 October 2011, which resulted in a total of 119 responses. Due to the reliance on 
intermediaries to distribute the questionnaire, the total number of SMEs ultimately approached (i.e. 
the sample) cannot be verified as it is unclear how many SMEs have (a) received the survey and (b) 
received it from various sources. Consequently, it is not possible to establish the exact response rate to 
this survey. 
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Table 2 SME Population for the North East Region 
1 2 3 4 5 6 












A Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
4,185 1,520 55 5 1,580 
B, D and E Mining and 
Quarrying; Electricity, Gas, 
Steam and Air Conditioning 




260 115 55 10 180 
C Manufacturing 4,345 1,925 805 265 2,995 
F Construction 26,185 4,310 655 105 5,070 
G Wholesale and Retail 
Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 
11,290 6,325 925 105 7,355 
H Transportation and 
Storage 
7,720 1,085 220 40 1,345 
I Accommodation and Food 
Service Activities 
6,470 3,490 675 75 4,240 
J Information and 
Communication 
5,625 885 95 15 995 
K Financial and Insurance 
Activities 
2,455 450 50 10 510 
L Real Estate Activities 1,530 690 55 20 765 
M Professional, Scientific 
and Technical Activities 
16,880 3,355 505 75 3,935 
N Administrative and 
Support Service Activities 
7,595 1,750 270 55 2,075 
P Education 6,530 375 75 20 470 
Q Human Health and Social 
Work Activities 
8,870 890 685 105 1,680 
R Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 
5,270 495 100 20 615 
S Other Service Activities 6,920 2,050 135 10 2,195 
      
Total no. of SMEs by size --- 29,710 5,360 935 36,005 
As a percentage of total --- 82.5% 14.9% 2.6% 100% 
      
All enterprises in North East 
(BPE 2010, BIS) 
122,135 29,710 5,385 935 36,030 




The slight variation in totals between 36,030 and 36,005 is due to the data source methodology, which includes rounding in order to avoid 
disclosure and also using * symbol to replace data deemed to be disclosive. Where * occurs, it has had to be interpreted as 0. 
Explanatory Notes: 
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Column 1 - Categories of Industry are those used by BIS. 
Column 2 - Totals for all enterprises in North East.  
„All enterprises‟ includes sole proprietorships and partnerships comprising only the self-employed owner-manager(s), and companies 
comprising only an employee director (= solo entrepreneurs); plus micro, small and medium enterprises; plus large enterprises. 
Column 3 - Micro enterprises which includes all those with 1-9 employees 
Column 4 - Small enterprises which includes all those with 10-49 employees 
Column 5 - Medium enterprises which includes all those with 50-249 employees 
Column 6 - Total SME figures = addition of Columns 3, 4 and 5.  
SME in this report is based on number of employees only, not turnover figures. It includes all micro, small and medium enterprises (1-249 
employees) and excludes both „solo entrepreneurs‟ (= 0 employees) and also large enterprises (=250+ employees). 
 
 




1. Overview of SME Finance 
 
In a very basic summary, there are three types of finance, in addition to bootstrapping and internal 
attempts to cut costs, which are suitable for small businesses: Debt, Equity, and Mezzanine. 
1.1 Types of SMEs 
 
While it is obvious that some finance sources are not suitable for, nor accessible to, SMEs (e.g. raising 
equity through the stock market or issuing publicly traded bonds), there are a variety of alternative 
SME-relevant sources. However, SMEs represent a very heterogeneous population and thus finance 
sources will be specific to the age and development of the SME. Mitter and Kraus (2011) argue that 
the suitability of different finance sources depends upon the SME‟s capital needs, which in turn 
depends upon its model of foundation and stage of development: 
 Foundation model refers to the way in which the venture has been created, namely imitation 
foundation (i.e. based upon imitating an existing concept or technology) or innovative foundation 
(i.e. based upon a newly developed technology/product/service/etc.). 
 Stage of development refers to the venture‟s location within its life cycle (i.e. seed, start-up, 
development or expansion stage). 
 
A further commonly-used factor, which determines the sources of finance available to, and suitable 
for, SMEs is the distinction between lifestyle, middle-market and high-growth businesses (Sohl, 
1999): 
 Lifestyle businesses are characterised by a very low or non-existent growth rate; some lifestyle 
businesses are also characterised by the owner-manager‟s lack of intention to grow the business, 
whereas other owner-managers would like to grow the business but realise that the concept is not 
able to grow (the latter are sometimes called the „living dead‟) – a vast majority (around 90%) of 
„typical SMEs‟ are part of this group. 
 Middle-market businesses are characterised by a substantial growth rate which tends to provide 
investors with an acceptable amount of return. They are, however, not the new „stars‟ in the 
business world – only a small amount of SMEs are part of this group (around 10%). 
 High-growth businesses are those businesses that grow almost exponentially and that can be 
considered the „next big thing,‟ allowing investors to reap very large returns on investment, e.g. 
through stock-market flotation; less than 1% of all businesses are high-growth in nature. 
Cassar (2004) specifically investigated the financing of start-up business and identified that size and 
asset structure (i.e. the level of tangible and intangible assets in the business) affect the business‟ 
capital structure decisions, whereas organisational form only has a limited effect (i.e. there appears to 
be a signalling effect from incorporation but no further effect on capital structure) and the owners‟ 
characteristics have no significant influence on the capital decision. 
 
                                                                      
25 
 
1.2 Sources of Finance for SMEs 
 
While not all of the sources that will be discussed here are appropriate for, or accessible to, all of the 
different types of SMEs, there is a general consensus that two specific theories can help explain the 
funding choices of entrepreneur or owner-managers:  Pecking Order theory and Trade-off theory.  
Pecking Order theory suggests that it is the owner-managers‟ or entrepreneurs‟ individual decision 
as to which finance sources to approach at any given point in time. The theory posits that there is a 
pecking order, i.e. ranking, of preferred sources of finance, whereby entrepreneurs tend to prefer own, 
internal sources of finance over external debt, which in turn is preferred over external mezzanine 
finance, and external equity is the least preferred source of all (Fama and French, 2002; Hackbarth et 
al., 2007; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
Trade-off theory, on the other hand, takes into account the benefits and disadvantages of funding a 
business through debt rather than equity. This theory acknowledges that taking on more debt increases 
the tax shield effect of the interest payable, which reduces a venture‟s tax burden – in contrast, 
however, taking on more debt increases the risk of over-gearing, financial distress and bankruptcy, 
which involves a variety of costs to the business. The theory therefore proposes that entrepreneurs 
choose finance sources based on a trade-off between increased tax shield and increased bankruptcy 
costs (Fama and French, 2002; Hackbarth et al., 2007; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
 
However, independent from the owner-managers‟/entrepreneurs‟ desire for specific types of finance, 
not all types of finance are suitable for all SMEs (as indicated above). Relying on the ranking of 
financiers explained by Pecking Order theory, this section now briefly discusses the suitability of the 
different funding sources available to SMEs.  
 
1.2.1 Internal and Informal Sources of Finance 
 
This refers mainly to retained earnings (i.e. capital generated by the venture itself), as well as to the 
so-called 3F investors – founder, family and friends6 (Mitter and Kraus, 2011). Investment of own 
capital and an ability to obtain capital from a very close circle of friends and family tends to send a 
strong signal to outside investors, suggesting commitment from the entrepreneur (Prasad et al., 2000). 
Generally, any business can benefit from internal finance, independent from the stage of development, 
nature of foundation or growth intentions/potential. However, the larger the business becomes, the 
more likely it is that the entrepreneur has already invested all available capital and/or the 
entrepreneur‟s capital resources are insufficient to continue to fund the business, especially if it is a 
high-growth business and/or in the expansion stage. 
 
Using trade credit can also be considered part of internal sources as businesses use their interactions 
with suppliers and customers to fund their operations, e.g. through asking for pre-payment from 
customers but at the same time making use of the maximum trade credit period until suppliers are paid 
(Mitter and Kraus, 2011). Another internal source of finance, which is often discussed in academic 
literature and which may include some of the above-mentioned sources, is „bootstrap finance‟ – this 
                                                          
6
 Sometimes called 4Fs to include fools, but this is being omitted here. 
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refers to any activity which enables entrepreneurs to obtain resources (mostly, but not exclusively, 
financial resources) at a lower cost or even for free (Van Auken and Neeley, 1996). 
1.2.2 External Debt 
 
Debt, mostly provided through banks, is seen as the entrepreneur‟s second-favourite funding type. 
The reasons lie in the tax shield effect, as well as the fact that no ownership needs to be relinquished. 
 
Generally, it is the later-stage businesses (which already have a proven track record) and the lifestyle 
and imitation-based businesses, which can more easily attract debt finance because they might possess 
assets that can be used as security.  Additionally, they are less risky than, for instance, a seed-stage 
venture, which is generally based on a novel, „disruptive‟ technology that has very high growth 
potential but at the same time has very high risks attached. 
1.2.3 External Mezzanine and Equity 
 
While mezzanine refers to finance types that possess elements of both debt and equity, ordinary 
equity is ownership capital, which means that entrepreneurs are expected to relinquish some of their 
ownership in return for the investment. Generally, it is Business Angels (BAs) and Venture Capitalists 
(VCs), who are prepared to invest in smaller businesses – however, not all VCs are willing to do so; 
instead, some VCs only provide expansion or similar types of finance to later-stage businesses 
(Elitzur and Gavious, 2003). BAs, on the other hand, tend to specifically focus on smaller and 
younger businesses. 
 
For both types of investors, the risk associated with even high-growth and innovation-based 
businesses is not a turn-off, as long as the return potential is high enough to warrant the given level of 
risk (see section on Business Angels for further discussion). The literature suggests that BAs and VCs 
are not interested in lifestyle businesses and tend to also shy away from imitation-based ventures, as 
these cannot provide sufficiently high returns. Middle-market ventures are acceptable but it is the 
high-growth (i.e. high-potential/high-risk) and often technology-based businesses that are of most 
interest (Sohl, 1999; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). 
 
 
Bank Finance for SMEs 
2.1 Overview of Business Finance 
 
Bank lending (debt) is one of the key aspects of business finance. The banking and finance industry 
provides a range of products and services to all types of businesses, from the smallest micro to the 
largest corporate. The common finance option across all business is bank overdrafts (for working 
capital needs) and term loans (for capital expenditure needs). In addition, there are a number of 
specialist finance products such as asset-backed lending, invoice discounting, factoring, trade finance, 
vendor finance and consortium finance.  
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2.1.1 Types of Business Finance 
 
According to the financing objectives of the business, Table 3 below gives an overview of the 
different types of business finance. 
 
Table 3 Use of Business Finance across Different Sized Firms 
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(Source: Adapted from Business Finance Taskforce, October 2010) 
2.1.2 UK Banks‟ Lending to SMEs 
 
According to the British Bankers‟ Association‟s (BBA) Small Business Support Report (September, 
2011), there are in existence an estimated 484,000 term loans (within some 3.9 million small business 
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banking relationships) with a total outstanding value of £37.1bn, whilst overdraft borrowing stands at 
£7.1bn.  
 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the average monthly value of new term lending in the first half of 
2011 is slightly lower than throughout 2010. However, the aggregate value of deposits in small 
business current and deposit accounts stands at £58bn.  The report also states that around 50,000 small 
businesses are establishing new banking relationships each month. 
Figure 1 New Term Lending (£m) to Small Business 
 
 
(Source: BBA Small Business Support Report, September 2011) 
 
Further, Figure 2 below shows that as the Bank of England base rate fell to 0.05% in March 2009, the 
median interest rates on new SME variable rate facilities followed. The margins between the bank 
base rate and the lending rates reflects the increased credit risk and the funding costs. It could be 
argued that the spread is more for small SMEs (turnover of under £1m p.a.), however, the effect of 
interest rates on credit facilities availed by SMEs as presented in Figure 3 shows that credit cards 
attract higher interest rates than overdraft facilities.  
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Figure 2 Indicative Median Interest Rates on New SME Variable-Rate Facilities 
 
(Source: Department of Business, Innovation and Skills & Bank of England October 2011) 
 
Figure 3 Effective Interest Rates on Credit 
 
 
(Source: Bank of England, October 2011) 
 
2.2 The Credit Decision-Making Process 
 
Historically, banks would use judgment in evaluating the creditworthiness of the applicant, drawing 
from the experience of previous lending decisions. The end result of the evaluation process is to 
provide a „measure of creditworthiness‟. According to Lewis (1992, p. 3), “Creditworthiness is a 
characteristic of an individual that makes him or her a suitable candidate for the extension of credit 
while someone who is not creditworthy is, conversely, unsuited to credit”.  This means that the 
applicant who is creditworthy pays all their obligations as agreed in the credit terms and conditions 
and those that are non-creditworthy do not. Thus, creditworthiness implies an applicant‟s ability and 
willingness to repay. According to Feldman (1997), there is a correlation between the willingness and 
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ability to repay of a firm with that of the owner. It could be argued that the personal history of the 
owner could be used to determine the repayment prospects of the firm.  
 
Credit officers would examine the firm‟s characteristics, evaluate its creditworthiness and decide to 
approve or decline the loan (Chandler and Coffman, 1979). If the lenders find that the applicant‟s 
creditworthiness is opaque, then they would either: (i) increase interest rates charged to offset the 
extra risk; or (ii) exert extra effort in determining what information can add value, and how to obtain 
and assess it (Stanton, 1999). Ultimately, using this subjective approach, the decision as to whether or 
not to grant credit is based on the experience and personal knowledge of the credit officers (Hand, 
1998). The subjective approach may also incorporate rules and other non-empirically derived credit 
guides established by the bank‟s policies (Chandler and Coffman, 1979).   
 
Given the prevalence of the „human element‟ i.e. experience, judgment and common sense, supported 
by some basic numerical support in credit decisions (Banks, 2002), central to the granting of credit is 
the estimation of risk in terms of identifying good and bad credit risks (Lewis, 1992). Bunn and 
Wright (1991) advocate that the subjective approach can be beneficial in a lending environment which 
has little or unstructured data, especially Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and high net worth 
individuals.  
 
According to Thomas et al. (2002), while assessing the application for credit, banks would use credit 
scoring for small borrowers and move up as the size of the SME increases. The outputs from the 
credit scoring models are also subject to override by credit officers who rely on their experience and 
judgment rather than the score.  Saunders and Cornett (2010) argued that the credit scoring model for 
small businesses could be made more sophisticated by incorporating the financial analysis of the 
business along with the behavioural analysis of the owner/manager. Wilson et al. (2006) highlighted 
the variability in the credit decision-making process of a clearing bank applying the same credit 
scoring framework.  
 
Further, within the literature (Binks et al., 1992; Berry et al., 1993), banks adopt the following 
methods for lending to SMEs: 
 Going-Concern Approach in which banks look forward to future earnings as evidence of 
repayment ability of the business.  This approach requires more analytical skills, more 
information and monitoring which may be costly to administer.  
 Gone-Concern (or liquidation) Approach which takes a security-based lending approach. The 
emphasis of this approach is on the past and current financial situation rather than future 
projections.  
The specific approach being adopted by UK banks depends upon the size and the information 
availability of the SMEs. 
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2.3 Issues and Challenges in Bank Lending 
2.3.1 Relationship Lending versus Transactional Lending 
 
Globally, SMEs are confronted with relatively harsh credit constraints and limited access to finance 
(Beck and Maksimovic, 2002, Beck et al., 2004). According to Baas and Schtooten (2005), due to the 
limited publicly available information on SMEs, banks are hesitant to provide credit. However, Boots 
and Milbourn (2002) argue that the lack of information can be compensated by using relationship 
lending, in which the SME and the bank enters into a long-term relationship that assures the SMEs 
access to credit and the bank access to soft information. Thus, relationship lending is established on 
soft data such as personal connections and reputation. According to Peterson (1999), lending to SMEs 
differs to that of large corporates as: 
 lenders face fixed costs in lending 
 the relationship between the owner/manager of a SME and the bank is very close 
 small firms are more informationally opaque than large firms because they do not have 
certified audited financial statements to produce financial information on a regular basis.  
 
Relationship lending could be expensive to establish and maintain. For a large bank, spending time to 
develop small accounts is simply not an efficient use of resources when the same amount of effort can 
result in a much larger credit. 
2.3.2 Information Asymmetry  
 
One of the challenging areas in SME lending is „Information Asymmetry‟ which arises as a result of 
the different levels of information held by the bank as well as the SME about the future of the 
business (Binks and Ennew, 1996, 1997). Berger and Udell (1998) argue that new businesses are the 
most informationally opaque, on account of their lack of any track record of their business. The 
information required to assess the competence and commitment of the SME and the prospects for the 
business is either unavailable, uneconomic to obtain or difficult to interpret. With information 
asymmetry, two problems arise for the banker:  Adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection is lending to an uncreditworthy business and not lending to a creditworthy business, which 
may be due to lack of useful information on the future of the business. The banker would experience 
moral hazard after the credit has been made and due to information asymmetry, the business may hide 
certain actions which might be unfavourable to the bank‟s interest.  
 
It is important that the bank collects adequate information about the future prospects of the SME 
whilst evaluating its creditworthiness to address the problem of information asymmetry. 
2.3.3 Decision Overrides 
 
There might be instances wherein the credit decisions arrived at might be reversed or changed. These 
changes to credit decisions (either positive or negative) as reported by Lewis (1992) are referred to as 
overrides. They occur either through policy rules which are set out by the lender for the SMEs or 
through individual decisions based upon additional information available in respect of the SMEs.  
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Lewis (1992), Siddiqi (2005) and Anderson (2007) have listed the following situations in which the 
overrides might take place: 
 Informational Overrides are overrides which take place based upon new information about 
the applicant that had not been incorporated while credit proposals were being analysed. It 
could be argued that in the case of relationship lending, informational overrides might take 
place as the Relationship Manager/officer is in direct contact with the applicant. In situations 
where cases are credit scored only for guidance, Anderson (2007, p. 459) states that 
“overrides are part and parcel of the credit decision process”, which are seen in high-
value/low-volume lending and in circumstances where credit scoring is a new concept and the 
role of Relationship Managers are not ruled out.  
 Policy Overrides take place whenever new sets of rules are in place for a special customer 
group (for example, Project Merlin for SMEs‟ finance). There might be other instances 
wherein there is a change in the lender‟s policy regarding the lending criteria, which might 
trigger policy overrides.  
 Intuitional Overrides are overrides which may occur whenever the area director/relationship 
director might reverse the decision which has been arrived at through the scoring system or 




One of the challenges for Relationship Managers would be to know “how the rejected applications 
would have performed if they were accepted and this process is known as reject inference” (Lewis, 
1992; Hand and Hanley, 1997; Bhatia, 2006; Banasik and Crook, 2007). The process of reject 
inference is to make inferences about the sample population for the rejected applications.  It is 
important that a process of dealing with rejections be adopted within banks and financial institutions 
so that the SMEs which are not successful at securing access to finance are given additional support 
and access to appeals procedures, as well as alternative financial avenues. 
2.3.5 Non-Performing Loans 
 
Non-performing loans are characterised as bad loans which have an impact on the efficiency and 
performance of banks. Asset quality in lending institutions is frequently presented in  a classification 
matrix (Guy, 2011) such as that presented in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4 Loan Classification 
 
Loan Classification Criteria 
Standard Performing  
Sub-standard  Past due 3+ to 6 months 
Doubtful Past due 6+ to 12 months 
Loss Past due above 12 months 
(source: Guy, 2011) 
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100% provisioning is required for a loss (which is non-performing) and the bank‟s resources are 
consumed in monitoring and regulating such loans. 
2.3.6 Enterprise Finance Guarantee 
 
Launched in January 2009, Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) is a loan guarantee scheme offered 
by the UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, intended to facilitate additional bank 
lending to SMEs with insufficient or no collateral security with which to secure a business loan. The 
EFG is available to SMEs with an annual turnover of up to £25m, seeking loans for between £1,000 to 
£1 million. EFG can be used for new term loans, refinancing of existing term loans, conversion of 
overdraft to term loans, invoice finance guarantee and overdraft guarantee. The EFG will guarantee 
lenders for 75% of the total loan value. However, the assessment of SMEs for the credit facility still 
rests with the individual bank and the BIS does not have any role to play in credit assessment. Along 
with the EFG, the lender could also take other security such as personal guarantees, in relation to the 
EFG backed credit.  
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2. Overview of Business Angels 
 
Business Angels (BAs), or high net worth individuals, are private individuals who have modest to 
large amounts of disposable income, a proportion of which they use to invest directly into small, 
young, unquoted high-growth ventures, with which they have no family connection (De Noble, 2001; 
Elitzur and Gavious, 2003; Freear et al., 1994; Landström, 1992; Mason and Harrison, 1996a). BAs 
are not interested in businesses that have limited or no potential to grow into substantial organisations 
(the so-called lifestyle ventures).  Instead, BAs are mostly interested in high-growth, entrepreneurial 
ventures which are scalable and have a substantial growth potential. As previously explained, such 
businesses often face a funding gap as they have already used up all their internal financial resources 
and are too risky for banks, but at the same time are too small to be attractive to formal Venture 
Capital. It is argued that BAs are the oldest, largest, most often used and most important source of 
outside funds for entrepreneurial ventures (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). 
 
Many Business Angels have first-hand experience in entrepreneurship and small business 
management because their pre-angel career tended to be entrepreneurial in nature (Kelly and Hay, 
2001). Even those BAs who have not started and run their own business(es) tend to have substantial 
amounts of business and management experience because they often have been involved in the senior 
management of organisations (Mason and Harrison, 1996b). Only a very small minority of BAs have 
obtained their wealth through opportunities outside of their control, such as lottery wins or 
inheritance. 
3.1 Business Angels‟ Investment Motivations 
 
Extant research on BAs‟ motivations, i.e. their reasons for becoming an angel investor in the first 
place, identified two types of motivations, a combination of which forms the actual motivation to 
become a BA. The first of these motivation factors is the financial return; clearly, BAs are investors 
and therefore they are interested in obtaining a monetary return on their investment, however, 
researchers have also identified a very strong secondary motivating factor, which is non-financial in 
nature. This so-called “psychic income” (Ehrlich et al., 1994, p. 70) consists of personal reasons, such 
as the fun of being involved in business or the enjoyment of making business decisions, as well as 
more altruistic and philanthropic reasons, such as the opportunity to support the next generation of 
entrepreneurs or the possibility of helping new businesses or the region (Barrow et al., 2005; 
Landström, 1998). 
 
Due to the invisibility of the BA market in general, it is impossible to pinpoint exactly how much 
money is still available for BA-type investment each year – researchers and policy makers have to 
rely on extrapolations and guesstimates to obtain estimated data about amounts invested and amounts 
still available for investment. 
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3.2 Sources of Deal Flow and Investment Criteria 
 
This section details the literature surrounding the reasons why BAs invest in certain businesses but not 
in others, i.e. their specific investment criteria. Although investment criteria are not simply the 
opposite of rejection criteria, the latter can nevertheless provide further insights into the reasons why 
BAs invest in certain opportunities but not in others. Therefore, research on rejection criteria is 
reviewed here. 
 
In order to explain BAs‟ investment criteria, it is worthwhile to briefly explain the investment process 
which BAs tend to go through, from becoming aware of an investment opportunity to the moment 
they exit from their investee. Paul et al. (2007) investigated the investment process of BAs and, after 
identifying a number of distinct stages, produced the model as shown in Figure 4 below.  
 
As Figure 4 shows, Paul et al.‟s (2007) model portrayed the investment process as being both 
sequential and rather organised. However, they admitted that this portrayal would be a rather 
simplistic view of the investment process as the reality of investment suggests that the process can be 
messy and iterative, moving backwards and forwards between the stages and it can even be 
interrupted at any point (when one of the parties decides that the investment should not go ahead). 
 
Figure 4 BA Investment Process 
 
 

















(Source:  Paul et al., 2007, p. 114) 
 
According to Paul et al.‟s (2007) investment process model, the entire process can be broken down 
into three phases, which in turn can be further broken down into a total of five stages: 
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Phase 1 – Pre-Investment, which consists of three distinct stages; familiarisation, screening and 
bargaining which (should the BA be willing to invest) results in the actual investment. 
Phase 2 – Post-Investment, which Paul et al., (2007) referred to as the „managing stage,‟ where the 
investor becomes involved in the investee business and adds value to the business. 
Phase 3 – Exit, or Harvesting, which is the moment in time when the BA leaves the investee 
company and (in an ideal scenario) makes a financial return on investment. 
 
During the familiarisation stage, investors become aware of investment opportunities and start to 
familiarise themselves with the entrepreneur and the business idea. During the screening stage, BAs 
conduct more detailed due diligence, by scrutinising every aspect of the entrepreneur, business plan, 
presentation and business concept generally. The bargaining stage then requires BAs and 
entrepreneurs (and possibly additional investors) to negotiate the specifics of the investment deal and 
to eventually sign the actual investment agreement. Post-investment, BAs tend to become involved in 
their investee companies (for instance, in the role of mentor, advisor or sounding board) and by so 
doing, they attempt to add value beyond the financial investment. Finally, BAs exit their investee 
businesses by selling their share and, ideally, making a return on their investment. For the purpose of 
this study, only the stages within the pre-investment phase are relevant as it is the identification of 
deals, as well as the motivations and investment criteria, which is the area of focus. 
3.2.1 Deal Flow 
 
During the early familiarisation stage, BAs are becoming aware of investment opportunities and this 
so-called deal flow requires BAs to either actively identify investment opportunities or be guided 
towards such opportunities by their contacts. Paul et al.‟s (2007) qualitative study found that BAs tend 
to identify potential deals through three key intermediaries: business associates, Business Angel 
Networks (BANs) and investment syndicates. The authors further specified that there are other 
alternative sources of deal flow, such as accountants, lawyers, banks and other financial organisations, 
but that they were much less common than the three key sources mentioned above. 
 
When Mason and Harrison (1996b) investigated an informal syndicated fund of BAs, they concluded 
that the syndicate obtained deals from a variety of sources, which they then forwarded to their 
individual members. The sources of deal flow included business sections of newspapers, investment 
magazines, brokers and accountants, suppliers of mailing lists and databases, BANs, industry-specific 
market research and being approached by entrepreneurs directly.  
 
In the Norwegian context, Reitan and Sørheim (2000) further corroborated that BAs tend to obtain 
most of their investment opportunities through friends/acquaintances, followed by financial 
institutions and intermediaries, as well magazines/newspapers and other business connections. Only a 
small number of proposals came through direct contact with entrepreneurs, own initiative, public 
support agencies, BA associations and service providers such as accountants. 
 
Both Paul et al.‟s (2007) and Reitan and Sørheim‟s (2000) studies further indicated that BAs appear to 
prefer deals emerging through trusted contacts, as opposed to unsolicited deals or opportunities 
presented by people with whom they are not familiar. Sørheim (2003) specifically investigated the 
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pre-investment behaviour of Norwegian BAs and found that with regard to flow of investment 
opportunities, there are substantial inefficiencies within the angel market; he also demonstrated that 
BAs who have operated for a long time within a specific region and/or industry are more likely to find 
suitable and high-quality investment opportunities within that region and/or industry. The reasons can 
be traced back to the fact that such investors have not only rather large networks of contacts, but 
also a rather visible position within their particular networks. 
3.2.2 Investment Criteria 
 
The investment criteria of Business Angels have been of interest to various researchers over the last 
few decades and it is interesting to note that findings tend to be rather similar. A lot of early work in 
the BA field has been around the characteristics and profiles of BA investors and, while this is not the 
focus of this study, some generic characteristics are noteworthy as they help to explain some of the 
investment criteria discussed below.  
 
BAs have often been entrepreneurs themselves and are often retired (mostly through voluntary early 
retirement) by the time they start their BA career. As such, BAs generally possess large amounts of 
entrepreneurial and small business or management experience, while at the same time having spare 
time and an interest in business. As such, they generally prefer to be „active‟ investors, which means 
that they want to provide some of their experience to their investee businesses through post-
investment involvement. In order to be able to do so, they need to be able to easily reach their investee 
business(es) – thus, BAs tend to invest locally (Paul et al., 2007). A further aspect of this desire for 
involvement is the often-expressed need for BAs to invest in businesses which operate in familiar 
industries or markets, as that is where the BAs have relevant experience – thus, BAs tend to prefer to 
invest in businesses that they can understand and in which they have had first-hand experience in the 
past (Paul et al., 2007). 
 
Moving away from BA characteristics and delving deeper into the literature around investment 
preferences and criteria, Feeney et al. (1999) argued that BAs‟ investment criteria can generally be 
divided into two categories: the attributes of the owner(s), i.e. entrepreneur(s), and the attributes 
of the business.  The following sections review both of these attributes, but it must be noted that these 
categories contain overlapping subcategories and content.  
3.2.2.1 Business Attributes 
 
Within the characteristics of the business, Feeney et al. (1999) identified four main attributes, which 
investors prefer or even consider essential: 
 Potential to be highly profitable. 
 An exit plan, which appears reasonable and allows BAs to realise financial return on investment. 
 Some form of security. 
 Being able to become involved in the business post-investment. 
 
Before the above list of attributes was published, Mason and Harrison (1996a, p. 109) had already 
also investigated BAs‟ investment criteria and identified the following attributes, which are ranked in 
descending order of importance: 
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 Product/market (i.e. sales prospects; quality and uniqueness of product; quality of overall idea; 
niche market). 
 Financials (i.e. margins). 
 Business plan (i.e. quality and feasibility of the plan and the entire business idea). 
 Business (including industry; asset-backing; geographical location; stage of development of 
business and product). 
 BAs‟ own attributes (i.e. possesses understanding of the business; knows the entrepreneur). 
 
Although Mason and Harrison (1996a) did not include the BA‟s exit as a key criterion, the qualitative 
element of Sudek‟s (2006) study identified the investor‟s exit and liquidity of the investment 
opportunity as the only main criterion in relation to the business venture.  Also his quantitative study 
presented exit as the highest-ranking business-related attribute, ranking 4th, following three 
entrepreneur-related attributes (see below). 
 
By applying signalling theory, Prasad et al. (2000) expanded on the financial attributes, suggesting 
that BAs are also interested in seeing the entrepreneurs invest a substantial proportion of their own 
wealth into the business that not only signals the entrepreneur‟s own commitment to the venture, but 
also the value of the business. 
3.2.2.2 Entrepreneur(s) Attributes 
 
Much literature which discusses the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team as a key decision criterion, 
generally argues that investors take into account both management-related and personality-related 
attributes of investee management:  
 Management-related attributes refer to the entrepreneur‟s management abilities, skills and 
familiarity with their business as well as with management generally. Some of them can be 
objectively established through due diligence (e.g. entrepreneur‟s track record etc.), while others 
will require BAs to interact with the entrepreneur and to make more subjective judgments, for 
instance regarding how realistic the entrepreneur‟s views are.  
 Personality-related attributes, on the other hand, are of a very different nature as they refer to 
invisible and immeasurable personality traits, which require highly subjective and intuitive 
judgment on the BAs‟ part (Maxwell et al., 2011; Riding et al., 2007). 
 
When evaluating entrepreneurs‟ management-related attributes, BAs use a combination of rational, 
objective and emotional, and subjective judgments. BAs evaluate, amongst others, the entrepreneur‟s 
past, performance and demeanour.  For example, Paul et al. (2007) showed that BAs require 
entrepreneurs to be able to present their businesses and themselves in a professional and effective 
manner, but they would also rely on their own network of contacts to verify the entrepreneur‟s 
background and past performance in order to confirm or disconfirm potentially intuitive early 
impressions. 
 
At the same time as evaluating entrepreneurs in a rational and analytical way, BAs also use intuition 
and subjective judgment. This is illustrated by Feeney et al. (1999), who, similar to the above-
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mentioned business-related attributes, also identified a number of entrepreneur-related attributes, 
which BAs consider desirable:  
 Track record, especially in terms of experience of commercialisation. 
 Entrepreneurs presenting a realistic view towards their business. 
 Entrepreneurs displaying integrity and openness.  
 
Only the first two attributes are management-related, whereas the third refers to the entrepreneur‟s 
personality traits and characteristics, which cannot be objectively analysed or evaluated. 
 
Feeney et al.‟s (1999) findings support and expand on Mason and Harrison‟s (1996a) conclusion that 
the people in the business are the main investment criterion taken into account by BAs; these authors 
also argued that it is particularly the entrepreneurs‟ expertise that stands out, whereas personal 
qualities like honesty, as well as enthusiasm, were only mentioned as supporting criteria. A decade 
later, Sudek (2006) slightly contested these conclusions:  Both the qualitative and quantitative 
elements of his study showed that the entrepreneur‟s trustworthiness stands out above other factors, 
including the quality and commitment of the entrepreneurial management. 
 
With regard to soft factors, Paul et al. (2007), for instance, emphasised that BAs often look for 
entrepreneurs who „they can get along with‟ or who „they believe they can work with.‟ 
 
In addition to trustworthiness, honesty and openness, there are various other subjective criteria, which 
BAs take into consideration: Harrison et al. (1997), for instance, found that some basic level of 
interpersonal trust needs to exist in the BA-investee relationship, even before the investment deal is 
signed, otherwise it is unlikely that the BA will be interested in signing the deal. Such basic forms of 
trust tend to be initially unconfirmed and unfounded, as the BA is only beginning to become familiar 
with the entrepreneur. Macht (2008) argued that this form of trust could be referred to as „blind trust‟ 
as it is grounded in intuitive feelings of being able to trust the entrepreneur, as opposed to „calculated 
trust‟, which develops through working together for some time. 
 
However, judgments regarding trust are not the only intuitive decisions that BAs take while 
evaluating investment proposals; they also need to like the entrepreneur.  (Mason and Harrison, 
1996a) believe they can „get along‟ with the entrepreneur (Paul et al.,  2007) and instinctively respect 
the entrepreneur, be it for their previous activities or for their personalities (Macht, 2008). Sweeting 
and Wong (1997), who discussed such subjective criteria in the context of Venture Capital, referred to 
it as chemistry and a positive gut feeling between investor and entrepreneur, which are required in 
order for the investment deal to be signed. 
3.3 Issues and Challenges of Business Angels  
3.3.1 Rejection Criteria 
 
As mentioned above, rejection criteria are not merely the opposite of investment criteria, nevertheless, 
the reasons why BAs reject investment deals can provide insight into the reasons why BAs accept 
other deals. Therefore, literature about rejected investment deals is reviewed in this section. Prasad et 
al. (2000) summarised that, at the very early familiarisation stages, it is generally a combination of 
                                                                      
40 
 
criteria which results in rejection, however, the further the BA moves along the screening stage, the 
more likely it is that only one single criterion will be the reason for rejection. 
 
Feeney et al.‟s (1999) qualitative study of Canadian BAs resulted in a long list of shortcomings, 
which BAs have previously found within investment opportunities.  Following the approach used for 
the investment criteria reviewed above, these rejection criteria can also be split into business-related 
attributes and entrepreneur-related attributes. 
Attributes of the business, which often result in rejection, are: 
 Low quality of management team (e.g. unbalanced team; not disciplined etc.).  
 Unsatisfactory profit potential in light of the venture‟s risk (i.e. BAs cannot see sufficiently 
high potential return). 
 Poor fit (between BA‟s other interests and this venture). 
 Undercapitalized (e.g. entrepreneur has not invested enough own capital). 
 Insufficient information provided (i.e. refers to poor business plans). 
On the other hand, attributes of the entrepreneur which often result in rejection are: 
 Insufficient management knowledge. 
 Unrealistic expectations (e.g. overly optimistic forecasts and firm values).  
 Personal qualities (e.g. entrepreneur is a „control freak‟; no integrity etc.).  
 
These rejection criteria also show that if BAs decide not to invest because of the entrepreneurs, these 
rejection criteria can also be split into management-related and personality-related attributes (compare 
with investment criteria above). 
 
Mason and Harrison (2003a) showed the presentation and business summary of a fund-seeking 
entrepreneur to 30 BA investors and observed their reactions. They identified that incomplete 
information, lack of understanding, poor presentation and investor fit were the key reasons why BAs 
decided not to consider an investment proposal any further. With regard to the investment 
presentation, it was mostly clarity, structure and content which turned off the investors, while clarity 
and completeness of information ranked highly in relation to the written summary of the business 
proposal. Nevertheless, their study also higlighted how individual BA investors are: some investors 
were very negative about the presentation and written summary but would not reject the opportunity 
yet, as they would prefer to delve deeper and find out more about the opportunity, the entrepreneur 
and especially the areas where they felt more clarity was needed. 
 
In Mason and Harrison‟s (1996b) study of rejection criteria, the majority of rejected deals have 
reached the BAs because entrepreneurs have contacted them directly – this corroborates Paul et al.‟s 
(2007) conclusion that BAs tend to prefer to invest in opportunities which have been referred by a 
trusted contact or colleague. Similar to other studies reviewed here, the management team or 
entrepreneur was the most mentioned reason for rejecting a proposal. Other reasons referred to 
finance (e.g. unrealistic projections), marketing (e.g. flawed marketing strategy), product (e.g. 
obsolete technology) and others (including conflict of interest or unprofessionalism).   
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Also, according to Mason and Harrison (1996b), it is generally the perceived shortcomings in the 
management team/entrepreneur(s) that comprises the reasons for rejecting an investment opportunity.  
Therefore, it can be summarised that while the people in the business can be the key reason for why 
BAs invest, they can also be the key reason why BAs reject investment opportunities.  
 
Mason and Harrison (2003a) further corroborated this view by stating that, in particular, 
technologically innovative businesses often struggle to attract BA capital because the entrepreneurs 
are insufficiently „investment ready‟.  This term can refer to a variety of issues, such as the technology 
or the market not being sufficiently advanced or researched, as well as the management not being 
sufficiently experienced, skilled or knowledgeable about external finance. Mason and Harrison 
(2003a) specifically argue that entrepreneurs are often not (yet) willing or prepared to relinquish any 
ownership, meaning that investment readiness can also refer to the entrepreneur‟s personal attitudes 
and perspectives. 
3.3.2 Training Needs 
 
The third aim of this study is to explore the perceived training needs of both experienced and novice 
Business Angels. However, literature about this topic is almost non-existent; only one academic paper 
dealing with this subject could be identified, but the existence of BA training and seminars, e.g. 
organised by BANs, suggests that training needs exist and that BAs are willing to make use of such 
training. 
 
San José et al. (2005) discussed that the afore-mentioned inefficiencies in the angel market not only 
derive from the investors‟ desire to remain invisible, but also from the fact that many BAs (mostly, 
but not exclusively, prospective and novice Angels) do not sufficiently understand the investment 
process and as such are unable to appropriately identify and follow up emergent investment 
opportunities. These authors suggested Business Angel academies or schools as a possible solution to 
this problem, by researching 27 „student BAs‟ (i.e. participants at a Business Angel academy) in 
Spain. Although San José et al. (2005) did not specifically ask their „student BAs‟ about their 
perceived training needs, they obtained data regarding what their BAs expected from the curriculum. 
As Table 5 shows, identification and evaluation of opportunities ranked within the top two for both 
active and passive investors, but a variety of other topics are also mentioned. Subsequently, San José 
et al. (2005) concluded that their sample of BAs valued investment education and perceived training 
needs. 
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Table 5 Expectations from a BA Academy 
 
(Source: San José et al., 2005, p. 159) 
3.3.3 Key Challenges for Business Angels in the NE Region 
 
Similar to training needs, specific literature about key challenges is also virtually non-existent. 
Nevertheless, all the literature reviewed above can give some indication as to what challenges might 
exist for Business Angels, since none of the extant literature is specifically focusing on the North East 
region at this moment in time (i.e. mid-to-end 2011), this section needs to be viewed cautiously. 
 
As previously mentioned, the BA market is invisible and ineffective and is the reason why BAs have 
to make use of a large number of varied channels and networks in order to identify suitable 
investment opportunities. This, in combination with San José et al.‟s (2005) finding that most BAs are 
interested in learning more about sourcing deals, may suggest that deal flow, or lack thereof, is a 
challenge for BAs, not just in the North East. Mason and Harrison (2002) expanded upon this deal 
flow issue by suggesting that BAs face the challenge of insufficient quantity of opportunities 
however, and even more importantly, insufficient quality of opportunities. The above-mentioned lack 
of investment readiness and other rejection criteria mean that BAs often have spare finances but do 
not see any proposals worth investing in; a demand-side issue as it is the fund-seeking entrepreneurs 
and venturers that require training in order to become investment-ready and thus to propose deals of 
higher quality. 
 
A further challenge, which was touched upon by Maxwell et al. (2011), refers to the multitude of 
potential investment criteria, which researchers have identified (see above). BAs are unlikely to be 
able to use all of these criteria in all of their investment decisions and thus the question of which 
criteria to use and especially which criteria to prioritise may be a further challenge that BAs face. 
Moreover, San José et al. (2005) suggested that BAs are interested in learning more about how to 
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evaluate potential deals.  This suggests that BAs may be insecure in terms of how to apply their 
investment criteria and how to deal with the large extent of subjective, intuitive decision criteria. 
 
Mason and Harrison (2002) suggested that further challenges may exist after the pre-investment 
phase, for instance if BAs and entrepreneurs do not manage to agree on a mutually convenient 
investment deal. Other challenges, which may occur after the pre-investment phase, might refer to the 
post-investment relationship between BA and investee, where the Business Angel‟s involvement and 
interactions with the entrepreneur can lead to conflicts and tensions, which need to be managed 
(Macht, 2011). Finally, it could also be the exit process (i.e. the final stage of the investee process), 
which could be challenging for BAs. 
3. SMEs‟ Difficulties in Raising Finance 
 
Funding difficulties for SMEs have been subject to much research since the first use of the term 
„equity gap‟ in the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry report in 1931 (Committee on 
Finance and Industry, 1931). Since then, debates about whether this gap exists and where it may be 
located have been raging in both academic and practitioner circles; in addition, the notion of a „debt 
gap‟ or – bringing both forms of finance together – a „finance gap‟ has emerged, which this section 
will discuss. 
 
According to Mason and Harrison (2003b), the equity gap is a market failure which results from a 
mismatch between supply and demand of equity to small businesses. Mason and Harrison (2003b) 
argued that the equity gap exists between the funding provided from Business Angels (BAs) and the 
funding provided from Venture Capitalists (VCs). They further pointed out that the equity gap is 
particularly evident for: 
 Start-up and early-stage ventures (most of VCs‟ investments were found in expansion or 
MBI/MBO-type opportunities) - stage of development. 
 Businesses requiring small amounts of investment (VCs tend to invest in fewer but larger 
deals, rather than more small-scale deals) -  size of funding requirements. 
 Businesses located outside the South East, East and London regions (this is where the 
proportion of VCs in relation to businesses is larger than in other regions) - location of fund-
seeking venture.  
 
Innovative firms have a particularly hard time accessing equity because of the amount of capital they 
often need even early on in order to sustain their growth (Venturelli and Gualandri, 2009).  The size 
of the equity gap differs according to what method has been used to research it and other factors, such 
as the economic development and cycle of the location being researched (Venturelli and Gualandri, 
2009). Since many researchers found the equity gap exists between the amounts typically provided by 
BAs and those commonly invested by VCs, the location of the equity gap was often placed around the 
boundaries of £250,000 and £1.5 million (e.g. Harding, 2002; Mason and Harrison, 2003b). 
 
However, in recent years, there appears to be a shift in the location of the equity gap, as well as the 
emergence of a second equity gap: Harding and Cowling (2006) identified the equity gap as lying 
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within the boundaries of approximately £150,000 and £1.5-£2 million, while at the same time 
discovering a second equity gap lying between £10,000 and £30,000 for 18 to 24-month old 
expanding firms, which require such amounts of funds in order to make regulatory and fiscal 
payments. 
 
The majority of early work relating to the equity gap has assumed that the gap was due to insufficient 
funds being made available through investors, i.e. the existence of the gap was blamed on the 
suppliers of finance; this is also the reason why many of the government initiatives to try and 
reduce/remove the equity gap have focused on improving the supply of finance to small companies 
(Mason and Harrison, 2001). 
 
Murray (2007) summarised the key supply-side reasons for the existence of an equity gap:  
 High costs:  Investments involve high costs for investors; not only is the actual invested 
amount a sunk cost, which can sometimes not be recovered, but also there are high transaction 
costs in terms of finding suitable investments and creating the appropriate contracts for them; 
the monitoring costs post-investment also need to be added.  
 Few opportunities for economies of scale; every proposal needs to be evaluated on its own 
individual merit and thus there is little room for economies of scale. 
 Information asymmetry:  This is especially prevalent in technology and innovative businesses 
where technologies may not be proven yet and their acceptance in markets is yet to be 
realised, which results in high risk for investors. 
 Unproven entrepreneurs:  Entrepreneurs without prior business experience pose a further risk 
to investors and may increase the monitoring costs post-investment. 
 R&D spillovers:  In many cases, real competition for technological businesses does not 
emerge until a few months or years after the actual invention; this poses risks to early-stage 
investors if there was no competition initially but emerging competition at a later stage. 
 Low liquidity/lack of exit options:  Investors in small, unquoted businesses have very limited 
opportunities to exit their investments and to harvest their returns, which in turn increases the 
risk they take when investing in small, young businesses. 
 
All of these reasons result in high risk for investors, especially when it comes to investing in very 
young (i.e. seed, start-up and early-stage) and very small businesses (i.e. businesses requiring small 
amounts of capital). As such, investors are incentivised to prefer to invest in fewer, but larger deals, 
thus favouring larger businesses, which require larger amounts of funding, thus the equity gap 
emerged. 
 
However, in recent years, researchers have established that blaming the supply-side for the existence 
of an equity gap does not take into account the full picture as the finance recipients (the demand-side) 
have a role to play in the existence of the gap. For some researchers, the fact that many investors 
complained about a limited amount of high-quality investment proposals suggested that it may be a 
demand-side issue (Mason and Harrison, 2001). 
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Murray (2007) argued that the main demand-side reason for an equity gap is the quality of the fund-
seeking entrepreneur; if the entrepreneur is of insufficient quality, they are unable to raise capital and 
as such are facing an equity gap. Mason and Harrison (2001) seconded that by presenting the notion 
of investment readiness, the lack of which results in entrepreneurs being unable to raise capital. 
Investment readiness involves: 
 Entrepreneurs‟ attitudes towards equity; many entrepreneurs prefer to avoid equity as they are 
unwilling to relinquish some of their ownership and/or unwilling to obtain external 
involvement (or interference) in their businesses. 
 Low-quality presentation of entrepreneurs‟ proposals; this refers to both written and oral 
presentation of the proposed business opportunities, for instance, through ill-prepared and 
incoherent presentations or poorly presented business plans. 
 Investability of the proposed business; this can refer to an incapable management team, 
insufficiently large potential target market or insufficient potential return in relation to the risk 
posed by the opportunity. 
 
In order to address the equity gap from a demand-side perspective, government has therefore shifted 
its approach from increasing available capital (on the supply-side) towards enhancing the demand-
side, for instance, by enabling investment readiness training and seminars (Mason and Harrison, 
2001). 
 
Although there are strong reasons to suggest that the equity gap may be due to either the supply-side 
or the demand-side, Mason and Harrison (2003b) summarised this debate by arguing that the equity 
gap most likely exists because of a combination of both supply-side and demand-side reasons. 
 
Although many researchers and practitioners admit to the existence of an equity gap, Venturelli and 
Gualandri (2009) highlighted that although some small businesses are unable to obtain funding from 
external sources, this does not signify that they are all facing an actual funding gap. Instead, there may 
be merely a „perceived‟ funding gap for many small ventures, which only affects those businesses that 
are less efficient or less competitive than others and as such are less interesting to investors; the 
principle of „survival of the fittest‟. 
 
Other authors follow this notion of a perceived gap, which only affects some but by no means all 
businesses.  For instance, Lam (2009, p. 268) stated that the “funding gap is not static or concrete; 
rather it is dynamic, manageable and in many cases is within individuals‟ power and ability to 
overcome.” Vos et al. (2007) further added a „contentment hypothesis‟ to the (what they call) „finance 
gap hypothesis‟, in which they argue that businesses, independent of their growth aspirations, are 
generally happy or content with the capital they are able to access; this also rejects the notion of a 
static finance gap. 
4. Support Interventions for Access to SME Finance 
 
In total 106 finance interventions and 37 support interventions were identified, both public and 
private, available from a wide range of public, private and third sector organisations within the North 
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East. The finance initiatives include all types of funding, from a range of different providers and with 
both broad and narrow criteria. The types of finance include:  
 Grants e.g. start-up grants, R&D grants, match funded grants.  
 Loans e.g. micro loans, unsecured loans, loan guarantee schemes. 
 Investment finance such as equity funding and venture capital. 
 Other – tax relief, awards and competition prize finance.  
 
These were available at the time of the research activity conducted in June 2011, but some may since 
have been withdrawn or closed and others ended due to changes in public sector funding.  
 
Some initiatives are targeted at businesses at a particular stage of development e.g. seed-corn funding 
for pre-start or finance aimed at start-up SMEs. Some finance initiatives are for specified sectors or 
types of business, for instance technology. Others are targeted at particular groups of (potential) 
entrepreneurs, such as older people, ex-Armed Forces personnel, young people, ethnic minorities or 
women. 
 
Some sources are located in the North East, however the availability of finance is not dependent on 
the geographical location of the source. Some provision, particularly among the private finance 
initiatives, is available throughout the UK and therefore the source may be located elsewhere in the 
UK. Public finance initiatives are generally local authority area-specific or available across the North 
East region. 
 
Support initiatives are also available widely through signposting from organisations such as Business 
Link and local authorities etc, by location in the North East and via websites.  
 
Finally, there is a considerable overlap between finance and support interventions. Some finance 
initiatives come with support interventions attached such as the Acceleration Programme from Ignite 
100, and „Money with Management‟ from Entrust. Several support providers e.g. Project North East, 
also signpost SMEs to finance options. 




Analysis and Findings  
 
Banks 
An overview of the summary findings from the banks was presented in the executive summary section 
of this report, what follows here is the detailed findings from both the interviews and from the 
questionnaires. 
1. Banks - Interviews 
 
The findings from the bank interviews are presented across three sections in line with the main themes 
described in Table 1. 
 Section I presents information on SME classification, changing trends and the impact of the 
economic situation on banking paradigms and customer behaviour.   
 Section II reports on the credit decision-making process and also the attitudes and perceptions 
which impact upon SME access to finance. 
 Section III provides an overview of the support for SMEs in the North East region, through the 
role of the banks and government initiatives. 
 Section IV discusses the marketing strategies of the banks and their expectations for the future of 
SME finance.     




1. Definitions of SMEs are clearly variable.  For example, initiatives such as project Merlin 
employed the definition of an SME as having an annual turnover of less than £25 million; while 
this study used the EU definition employed by the UK government and its regional bodies of a 
turnover of 50 million Euros.  The banks in this study variously classify SMEs as having a turn 
over ranging from between £1 million and £2 million up to £5 million, £25 million or even £59 
million.  
2. Some banks have developed sector specific expertise by focussing on particular categories of 
lending, mainly agriculture, manufacturing, construction, real estate, retail, leisure, trading, health 
and educational charities. 
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Trends in Demand and Supply Post 2008 
 
3. Banks in the region state that their lending has increased compared to previous years, although it 
is not always clear how much of this is due to new debt or is the result of debt being acquired 
from either competitive banks or a merger.  
4. Most banks feel that businesses are streamlining and adopting a more conservative approach to 
business. 
5. The general consensus is that the supply conditions were too liberal pre-2008 and that banks have 
simply returned to their more traditional lending practices of some 20-30 years ago. Profit 
margins for lending are seen as historically low while risk is perceived to have increased.  They 
can no longer, for instance, rely on the price of property increasing. Consequently, the banks 
implicitly demonstrate a more conservative attitude to lending. 
6. Loan to value ratios have increased in some instances, although other lending criteria remain 
unchanged. 
7. Some banks felt that there was a need for greater transparency of criteria, although they 
maintained that terms and conditions of products were always provided. 
8. The banks interviewed indicated that demand from the SME sector is low. Whether this is 
influenced by the economy or by their perception of banks‟ attitudes to lending (influenced by the 
media) is difficult to establish.   
 
The Credit Decision-Making Process 
 
9. All of the banks place great emphasis on the importance of relationship banking. This suggested a 
reluctance to recover businesses „in jeopardy‟ but a willingness to stand by their more loyal 
customers in the event that they experience difficulties. Although many banks have departments 
focussed on business turnaround. 
10. Banks acknowledged that they are paying greater attention to the detail of business proposals.  
Many suggest that input from professionals such as accountants helps improve the quality of 
proposals which benefits the lending process. They also note increasing sophistication in the 
proposals being received (this same finding emerged from the bank questionnaire). 
11. Overall, the credit decisions made are subjective and judgemental.  However, for the initial 
screening of the businesses, statistical techniques such as credit scoring are used.  
12. The lending decision is always made by either a separate department or a separate individual, 
which can be in-house or at a centralised location. Any loan below £100k may proceed through an 
automated credit scoring process.   
13. Generally, the larger SMEs have a dedicated Relationship Manager who has sector knowledge 
and experience.  However micro SMEs appear to be managed over the telephone from a remote 
location or a Head Office which deals with generic enquiries with specialist knowledge of the 
operational area. 
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14. All banks reported a high level of confidence in the information they gather to enhance the 
decision-making process and therefore did not consider information asymmetry to be an issue. 
15. The monitoring of accounts was dependent on the perceived risk and size of the business. Larger 
businesses are able to provide management reports and audited accounts on a more regular basis if 
required.  The smaller businesses were generally monitored annually, although frequency is 
dependent on triggers such as inability to repay and delinquent accounts. 
Additional Support for SMEs 
 
16. Many of the banks have adopted new strategies in order to support SMEs in the current economic 
climate.   For example, some banks deliver workshops, employing role models, ambassadors and 
experts to help SMEs develop proposals.   
17. The banks were supportive of and committed to Project Merlin, although one was sceptical of the 
impact it was having on the SMEs.  
 
Improving Market Share and the Future of SME Finance 
 
18. The banks seek to differentiate themselves on the basis of quality of service (including speed of 
decision turnaround) and sector specialisation.   
19. In general, all banks are driven by targets which are increasing.  
20. Many of the banks were hopeful but also concerned for the future of SME finance as any 
improvement in the economic situation could result in an increase in base rates placing additional 
stress onto businesses.   
 
SECTION I 
1.1 SME Classification 
1.1.1 Turnover 
 
The UK government categorisation of SMEs was described earlier as being autonomous enterprises 
with fewer than 250 employees and an annual turnover of less than £43.7 million.  All of the banks 
classified an SME according to their turnover and debt levels.  For instance, Bank A1 categorises 
SMEs as commercial businesses up to £15 million; 
 
“..start-up to £15 million and in that sector we would classify everything in that sector as an 
SME.” (A1) 
However, they acknowledge that this is not synchronised with the present market trend; 
“…so there could be a great, could be a great discussion around should we match the other 
markets and move to £25 million.” (A1)  
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The £25 million limit is supported by other banks (B1, C1), though the baseline fluctuates between 
£1 million and £2 million.  In addition to this, C1 also incorporate SMEs with debt levels of £250k 
or more. This is in line with bank G1 who has a classification of £2 million to £50 million. E1 also 
adopts the higher ceiling of £50 million but restricts debt levels up to £250k.  In contrast, F1 
classifies SMEs with a turnover of between £2-£5 million. 
Conversely, D1 adopts a completely different approach as they do not classify SMEs; 
 “To be honest we don't and that's why basically we don't classify SMEs. Effectively in this 
branch, I could be sat dealing with a multinational PLC which we do, I could be dealing 
with a small family business that's been established 30 years that borrows £50K, you know, 
that's the way we operate.  We've got the principle that a good business is a good business, 




SME lending is fundamentally based on relationship and subjective decision-making as opposed to 
transactional lending.  Categorising SMEs into sectors is part of the bank‟s business strategy as it 
enables them to allocate resources in terms of specialist expertise, identify lending targets and 
adoption of risk management strategies.  
Each bank identified a variety of sectors that their relationship managers deal with; agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, real estate, retail, leisure, trading, health and charities such as 
educational charities. 
“SMEs spread across all sectors, so you‟ve got property, you‟ve got construction, you‟ve 
got hospitality and leisure, you‟ve got manufacturing which is a key part of growth as far as 
we see it.” (E1) 
Agriculture appears to have been stable and largely unaffected by the recent economic crisis, with 
some banks stating that it has been a growth area, especially in the North East.  This sector warrants 
its own specialist sector within the banks, i.e. A1, E1, F1 and G1. 
“Yeah, I have two agricultural managers sat in my team who actually report to a specialist 
agricultural manager (director)……...  Historically the bank have been very very close to the 
agricultural marketplace.  It‟s very very safe – we haven‟t lost a penny to any agricultural 
borrower in the last 20 years.” (E1) 
In addition the health sector has been particularly successful for A1, which was also noted by C1, but 
their activity in the area did not appear to be as prolific as A1.  This sector can cover GPs, dentists, 
care home operators, pharmacies and opticians but excludes those SMEs who manufacture health care 
products.  
G1 has recently developed an innovative approach through its international network, a highly 
specialised international trade sector which not only spreads risk but also provides competitive 
advantage: 
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“...we can facilitate the customer in this country setting up an operation in China; we‟ll get 
our colleagues in ….(country) to sit down with them; we might do some debt in the UK, we 
might also do the debt in ….(country) for that same customer, you know, and I guess they can 
then see, because we‟re one bank, they can see everything on one platform.  So they have one 
bank, they have one ....one internet account ….they can see all of their accounts right the way 
throughout across the world.  So some will have four, five, six, seven countries, all the 
information held on one platform.” (G1) 
In addition, the manufacturing sector, which has a strong tradition in the North East, is also 
maintaining buoyancy in their operations.  
“...we absolutely want to support trade and businesses, engineering, manufacturing 
businesses, you know, particularly exporters.” (A1). 
“you‟ve got manufacturing which is a key part of growth as far as we see it. Manufacturing is 
still strong.” (E1)  
“Manufacturing seems to be doing quite well; most of the manufacturing side of things seems 
to be doing quite well.” (G1) 
1.2 Trends in SME Demand for Credit Post 2008  
 
It is claimed that the credit crisis of 2008 had greatest impact on the small and medium enterprises 
throughout the UK (e.g. Forum of Small Business 2009; Forum of Private Business 2009) and reports 
from the interviews suggest that the North East region was no exception. A common theme from all 
banks was the adoption of a conservative approach by the SMEs. 
“For the two years after the crash in October 2008, the customers I think were just saying 
well I‟ll just stay with the bank that I‟m with – better the devil you know sometimes, let‟s stick 
with them, if they support us then that‟s fine.” (E1) 
“Yeah, it certainly changed from a demand point of view, undoubtedly.  A lot of what you'll 
read about is the banks not lending.  Certainly where we are, that's not our major issue, our 
major issue is that a lot of customers don't want to borrow, customers have used this as an 
opportunity to, I think, redress their balance sheets, deleverage where they can.” (C1) 
“The issues the banks have is that by not – our key income stream is out of lending money and 
we‟re not lending the money that we anticipated because the market isn‟t hungry for it.”(E1) 
On the other hand, there is no substantial evidence such as anecdotal statements by businesses to 
support these claims, although claims by the SMEs that the banks were refusing to lend is 
substantiated by one of the banks, but they stated that this was only for a short period of time.  
“I don‟t think any bank‟s really been shut for business other than maybe for the first couple of 
months after October 2008 because nobody knew what was going on.” (C1) 
Whilst there is no doubt that lending was substantially reduced following the credit crisis, the exact 
degree of the contributory factors, i.e. the supply versus demand dichotomy, is not fully established. 
                                                                      
52 
 
Nevertheless, A1 claims that their lending is presently in an upward trend;  
“2008 we lent ....£170 million.  In 2009 that dropped to £160 million and then in 2010 it 
dropped further to about £155 million.  ... I think we‟ll get up to £100 million for the first half 
(of 2011), if we do that again we‟re up to £200 million, ...what we're seeing has absolutely 
turned around this year and we've been on a steady incline following that dip.” (A1) 
However, there are now fewer players in the market and both A1 and G1 acknowledge that the figures 
do not differentiate between old debt, new debt and debt that has been acquired from competitors who 
are no longer operating.  
“we‟re 82% (loans) ahead of what we were at this point last year.  I can't give you the data 
for is how much of that is brand new debt and how much is where we've taken it from a 
competitor.” (G1) 
Therefore, whilst it has been acknowledged that banks may have „frozen‟ their business lending until 
the outcome of the 2008 credit crisis becomes apparent, this has since followed a reduction in 
demand. The direct cause of the demand reduction could consist of a number of contributory factors; 
misperceptions that the banks are no longer „open for business‟ or just a general conservative 
approach on the day to day expenditure of business operations.  Whilst the supply figures may well 
indicate that lending is up, this opinion is not positively correlated with the banks‟ perceptions of 
demand.  Comments from two of the banks would indicate that the statistics for lending are too 
simplistic and do not provide sufficient detail which could illustrate the underlying trends. 
1.3 Trends in SME Credit Supply Post 2008  
1.3.1 Change in Banking Paradigm 
It has been recognised that the current crisis has resulted in major liquidity problems for the banks 
(Peston 2008; Cable 2009).  
“….if you go back beyond the two year piece where have we lost funding.” (A1) 
“You know, the appetite for commercial property lending in 2007, say, was very different to 
the appetite for commercial property lending in 2009 because of the market conditions.” (A2)  
Unsurprisingly, this effect has gradually influenced the lending processes, not just in their appetite for 
lending, but also the associative risk strategies adopted, which undoubtedly raises the issue of changes 
in banking paradigms, either through pricing, margins or different product profiles. 
“There is a re-pricing exercise that every bank is going through at this point in time because 
our raw material cost has changed.  So the price we pay for the funds on the wholesale 
market has gone from 60 basis points to - if it‟s five year money - to somewhere around about 
280 basis points.  The conversations we have with customers have to be very sensitive to the 
fact that they‟re not expecting that and they don‟t understand when – we are not a bank that 
just sends a letter out saying „today your margin is 2%, tomorrow it will be 4%,‟ we‟re not 
doing that.” (E1) 
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“As for lending terms, certainly margins have moved since 2008, you know, I think the cost of 
capital and that has been a well-rehearsed argument but whilst margins have moved, base 
rates are still at 0.5%, whereas before, our average margin may have been 2% above base, 
it's now maybe 3% above base, we've probably moved up 1%, but you're still looking at 3.5% 
as an overall package which is very, very cheap in historic terms.  So pricing in itself, I don't 
think can be an issue.” (C1) 
“All of the banks will tell you that if we‟re funding working capital then we‟ll look to do 
invoice finance, we‟ll look to do asset finance and actually if we can't fund it on them then we 
may look to do an overdraft but it would be our last kind of preference.  And part of that is the 
world has changed, you know.”  (G1) 
Another criticism levelled at the banks from the ICAEW (2011) report was that the banks have 
definitely changed their attitudes towards lending.  This has resulted in complaints concerning the 
lack of transparency over the lending criteria and the decision-making process, together with greater 
stringency attached to the conditions.  A potential issue arising from this area that could leave the 
bank open to further accusations from SMEs is that they are replacing overdrafts or existing facilities 
with more expensive products, possibly to mask the increase in overheads. However, in response, 
many banks argue that the system prior to 2008 was not sustainable.  
“I believe that's not what a banker should be doing. A bank should be assessing repayment 
capability and so what do we look more at is assessment of the proposition to repay, not just 
you put 20% deposit down and we‟ll lend you the rest because we‟ve got bricks and mortar 
because I think that's where we got to and that to me is wrong and I don't think we should 
have been there, you know, and I was lending money, we were all doing it, the market made 
us do it.” (A1) 
“a criticism of the bank in the past, it was, you know (if you asked for a loan)...it was just 
„Yes!” (G1) 
The banks‟ counter argument to criticism is that whilst they acknowledge the role of banking in the 
current economic climate, they each viewed themselves as more responsible in their lending and thus 
not as culpable as other banks with regard to the present market situation. 
 “...we've come through this period without any government aid, without any call on the 
shareholders for rights issues, anything like that, you know, we have a very, very strong, very 
liquid position and certainly whatever measure's taken, we'd be one of the stronger.” (D1) 
On the other hand, banks are stating that the new products are actually beneficial to the customer as 
they allow more stringent control and awareness of the business management accounts.  B1 claimed 
that there should be a different product for each part of the balance sheet; 
“The problem with overdrafts is that they are „murky buckets‟, you don‟t know what‟s in it.” 
(B1) 
“We've done more invoice finance than we've ever done but it's not, for us it's not a case of 
forcing customers [inaudible] because we make more money out of that. The traditional way 
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to lend is overdraft, ....... it's also very expensive for us to run an overdraft, that's our biggest 
issue because in terms of the capital we've got to put aside for an overdraft, we've got to put 
far more capital to one side than we do for invoice finance, because invoice finance you've 
got a specific charge.” (C1)  
“...it‟s not about moving something from a cheaper to a more expensive product; it‟s about 
having the right structure of finance in place for that particular customer.” (A4) 
“There is a re-pricing exercise that every bank is going through at this point in time because 
our raw material cost has changed.” (E1) 
“Other issues you have with overdrafts is as the business grows, they've got to keep renewing 
the overdraft and maybe renewing it at a higher level, whereas invoice finance does grow 
with it naturally.  I would guess somewhere between 5% and 10% of our customers will use 
invoice finance so it's still very much at the small end, the vast majority still use overdraft.” 
(C1)  
Nevertheless, the pricing strategy could just be the recognised relationship between risk and return 
and if the risk has increased, then costs should automatically increase as well. Furthermore, the 
banks state that they are sensitive to how these increased charges are being perceived.  
“…if we were renewing the overdraft facility and the business was, you know, deteriorating 
or we‟d seen a deterioration, the rate on the overdraft facility would go up, the fee would 
probably go up, and in actual fact it probably isn't any different.  They're comparing what 
they had to what we‟re proposing, but if you did a like for like, this is what the invoice would 
cost you and this is what your new overdraft facility under these terms would cost you, I don't 
think there would be an awful lot of difference.”  (G1)  
“Conversations we have with customers have to be very sensitive to the fact that they‟re not 
expecting that (an increase) and they don‟t understand when – we are not a bank that just 
sends a letter out saying „today your margin is 2%, tomorrow it will be 4%‟, we‟re not doing 
that, we don‟t have the critical mass of customers to do that so therefore we can take each 
opportunity on its own merit and actually go down and sit with the customer and have a 
discussion and explain and at the same time try and encourage them to bring in their 
professional support.” (E1)  
1.3.2 The Quality of Proposals/Sophistication of Customers 
Whilst many of the banks are stating that the lending guidelines have not changed, they have 
acknowledged that business proposals definitely now require more detailed information.   
“...guidelines haven't changed but we‟re probably analysing the information more and we‟re 
probably asking for more information.” (G1)  
“...so previously a member of the public would walk into a bank and say, 'right, I've got a 
deposit for this property, here‟s the deposit', back of a fag packet, job done.  Now we‟re 
looking at more, and this is right and I believe this with a passion, it‟s not good, you know, 
talk to customers about it.  I believe that's not what a banker should be doing. A bank should 
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be assessing repayment capability and so what do we look more at is assessment of the 
proposition to repay, not just you put 20% deposit down and we‟ll lend you the rest because 
we‟ve got bricks and mortar because I think that's where we got to.” (A1) 
However, many of the banks do actually think that their customers‟ behaviour is changing as they are 
becoming slightly more sophisticated in their proposals and in their expectation of the banks.  
1.3.3 The Role of Accountants/Financial Advisors 
The banks‟ expectations of customers‟ credit expertise have increased during recent years and they 
now require a higher level of organisation in their proposals, they further encourage the SMEs to 
include accountants in the credit discussion process.  
“...the customers are being more aware of –it‟s all about cash discipline. I guess we are all 
focussed on profit in the past – what‟s the turnover, what‟s the profit. Now we focus on, you 
can still make a profit but, if you run out of cash then we focus a lot on cash flow in that 
business aspect. To get customers to meet their payments as they become due and we are 
getting our customers to focus a lot on that as well.” (G1) 
“So unless they have a good financial advisor who often costs money and they'll say, well, I 
can't afford that, they've got a good bank manager who‟s supporting that process, I think they 
do struggle in terms of getting into a structure to come to a bank and say, actually this is what 
I want to do.” (A1)   
This can not only save time and resources but also can expedite the credit decision-making process. 
“We start to interrogate and can then drill down to the numbers.”  (G1) 
However, the benefits of using professional expertise are evident but the adoption of this is dependent 
on the size of the SME.  The banks may offer to help, or a book-keeper may just be required or a 
reasonable financial/accounting software programme.   
“If you had a micro business you‟d be HR director, FD, shop floor – so they tend to then use 
consultants.  I‟m more of the opinion that perhaps they should be using professional advice 
and OK, having to pay just a little bit more but pay for a good firm of accountants, a good 
firm of lawyers – it doesn‟t have to be …[firm name], you pay the suit but you have to pay – 
you get what you pay for and some don‟t want to pay anything because they‟re very much 
focused on their costs structure.  So yes there‟s more of a support offering and we watch them 
grow.” (E1) 
 
SECTION II - The Credit Process 
2.1 Attitudes 
 
A concern over the funding gap appears to focus on either a lack of demand from businesses or a 
reduction in supply from banks. This dichotomy is evidenced during discussions of confidence and by 
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a more conservative outlook. Generally, the lack of confidence is explicitly attributed to businesses, 
whereas banks appear to be implicitly demonstrating the adoption of a more conservative approach. 
2.1.1 Confidence 
 
Initially, the over-riding issue of confidence focussed around the SMEs not coming forward and 
approaching banks for finance.  Many banks stated that the supply was in place but the lack of 
demand from SMEs was down to a lack of confidence.  Poor publicity was highlighted as partially 
contributing to this. 
 
“Clearly you've got all the press around banks not supporting, not lending money, through 
the whole economy, culturally was down, so people were less positive.” (A1) 
“...our major issue is that a lot of customers don't want to borrow, customers have used this 
as an opportunity to, I think, redress their balance sheets, deleverage where they can……… 
we tell them that we're open for business and that we've got funds to lend, but ultimately, you 
know, you can't push a customer into making that investment decision to buy the property 
next door or invest in plant machinery, we can't push them that way.” (C1) 
However, the present absence of confidence cannot be purely attributed to lack of demand and poor 
publicity.  Other factors, such as capital, play a role in lending decisions.  
“Overall banks are struggling for capital.” (B1) 
Generally it has been acknowledged that in light of the current situation, it will take time for 
confidence to increase and this will continue to impact on the demand for, and supply of, SME 
finance.  
“...there‟s not one – not a silver bullet that‟s going to be the catalyst for confidence to 
suddenly appear in the marketplace, I think you actually have to grow confidence within – by 
just saying look, look at the North East, how good is it, look at what we‟ve got, yeah it‟s a 
struggle at the minute but actually there‟s some good businesses here.” (E1) 
2.1.2 Outlook 
 
On the surface many of the banks claimed that they had maintained a conservative policy to lending 
prior to 2008. However, further investigation indicates that, whilst the guiding principles remain 
unchanged, the approach to how the proposals were processed and evaluated has become more 
stringent in recent years (A1, C1, F1, G1). 
 
“Our credit policy has never changed, ultimately our credit policy was always the same 
which was can they afford to repay us, you know, but whereas in days gone by you'd make an 
assumption around certain things i.e. the economy is going to grow so, the difference now is 
we probably want more information.” (C1) 
A possible exception to this was E1 and D1 who have international parent capital backing to absorb 
potential losses in the event of market turmoil.   
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“…we were the second strongest bank in the world, …. it's all about the bank's credit and that 
all comes down to our credit policy.” (D1) 
“We‟ve got a [country] parent – I was just reading something on our intranet today that 
[country] are still gearing up for further growth but they‟ve got 5%-6% growth forecast, 
....it‟s a very strong booming economy out there.” (E1) 
Furthermore, one interviewee (D1) constantly makes a conscious effort to select low-risk professional 
customers through networking; 
“...if you knew that there was a person or a company that you were interested in you'd try to 
find out who you knew that knew them, …..there's lots of different ways ....if you knew their 
accountant, lawyer, a friend, you might say is there any chance I could have a coffee/dinner 
with this guy …… it's just that type of networking.” (D1) 
Ultimately, the rationale behind the conservative approach adopted in recent years may well be 
motivated by their business model.  For instance, G1 stated “...the last thing we want to do is put 
people out of business. You know that is the last resort.”   
2.1.3 Trust (Relationship) 
 
Relationship management is seen to be a fundamental aspect of SME lending. This approach has been 
criticised in the literature however for being too time consuming and lacking in transparency (Berger 
& Frame, 2007).  It is claimed that this approach also impacts upon the decision-making process and, 
being too subjective, can result in unfavourable lending criteria (Thomas et al., 2002).    
 
Whilst it can be more costly than objective transactional lending, there is evidence to suggest that the 
opacity of the SME industry warrants this approach (i.e. Berger & Udell, 1998; Cole et al., 2004; 
Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2008).  In addition, it allows the banks to forge relationships and thus induce 
loyalty.  Moreover, the sector expertise acquired as a result can be utilised - not only to help the 
clients - but also to differentiate the bank with such an approach against the competition.  
“We‟re not a transaction bank where we lend the money and then maybe never see them 
again; really it‟s about an ongoing relationship and that's one of the reasons why we‟ve got 
sector specialists who receive additional training so that they understand, you know, about 
how (sector) works, about how ...practices work.” (A3) 
 
“I mean I can't recall the last time that we, that I lost a [sector] relationship to a competitor 
and I‟d know about it if we had because basically I've got to do a report at that time to 
analyse kind of what went wrong in the relationship, what we can learn from it.” (A3) 
 
“….only do business when there is a genuine relationship between them and the customer.” 
(B1) 
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“Everything's sort of centred around the, it's all around the customer, you know, the bank 
believes in and that's why we're expanding in getting as close to the customer as you can.” 
(D1)  
“For the two years after the crash in October 2008, the customers I think were just saying 
well I‟ll just stay with the bank that I‟m with – better the devil you know sometimes, let‟s stick 
with them, if they support us then that‟s fine, if they don‟t support us then yeah, we have to go 
outside to see what‟s going on.” (E1) 
“...all of my Commercial Managers mentor one of the businesses, local business managers, 
because our guys have got a bit more experience, so they're dealing with a bit more complex 
banking requirements.” (G1) 
To summarise, relationship management appears to be the fundamental aspect of SME lending and 
banks could claim that they are supporting SMEs through its utilisation. 
2.1.4 Transparency in Lending 
 
In order to foster good relationships with the SME, it is of paramount importance for banks to be 
transparent in their lending criteria and associated decisions.  
 
“I've got no problems at all with transparency.  I think it‟s absolutely what is needed.” (A4) 
“The banks need to be more uniformed in their approach in the products they offer – and 
transparency to client required.” (B1) 
“...our responsibility is to actually get that message out, not to disappoint the customer when 
they‟re sat around the table, they have to be aware of the level of availability of bank 
funding.” (E1) 
“We can explain quite easily to our customers how we‟ve arrived at that price.” (G1)   
Whilst the banks argued that transparency in lending is preferential, their responses imply, to a certain 
degree, that the level of transparency varies due to the complexities of the lending process.  For 
instance, discussions around using an overdraft facility yielded the following response: 
“The customer is fully aware of what it is they‟re signing up to, or what would happen, 
leading up to, or they couldn‟t meet the terms and conditions of the facility letter. But 
actually, especially for an overdraft, it‟s on demand and the bank does have the right to 
rescind that at any time.” (G1) 
 However, the actual terms of the lending facility are not explicitly explained in a financial context to 
the customers so they may not be fully aware as to when and under what circumstances the facility 
could be revoked.  
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2.2 Credit Decision-Making Process 
 
There are several issues concerning the credit decision-making process.  Firstly, a possible barrier in 
delivering a more transparent approach to lending could result from changes adopted in the decision-
making process in reaction to market forces.  These may make the process more complex. Secondly, 
the time taken to provide a response to a credit request can be problematic, and finally, different credit 
limit authority levels within the bank can impede the credit decision-making process.    
 
“The assessment of the proposition is a lot more structured; we do look at that and analyse it 
a lot more than we did.” (A1) 
“Relationship Director and Credit Manager must independently say „Yes.‟ They are from 
different departments and they must agree.” (B1) 
“...we have a credit function for certain levels of borrowing but generally speaking, most 
decisions are actually made locally and that's what most banks would probably struggle to 
get their head round because you decentralise and you let the people make decisions.” (D1) 
“We‟re getting regular management information, the credit manager has to visit the business, 
any new business that we bring on, the credit controller, the risk controller as you‟ve called 
him there, has to visit the business.” (E1) 
“From the time we get all the information, the longest it would take is 14 hours to turn an 
application around, for an increase.” (C1) 
Whilst time delays appear to be inevitable, slight misperceptions of delayed decision intervals may 
stem from the SME‟s misunderstanding of the information required for the credit decision-making 
process. 
“I guess it‟s from where they are starting to count. It might be 28 days from when we‟ve sat 
down and listened to their ideas. But from when they‟ve sat down and collected all of the 
information for us to make the decision. We write a paper and then it goes off for the decision 
to be made with a 48 hour turnaround. But actually, it‟s 48 hours from when the application 
leaves here to when we‟ve supported it and it goes into our credit team.” (G1) 
2.2.1 Dealing with the Diversity of SMEs 
 
The argument for supporting SMEs through relationship lending stems from the diverse needs of 
those businesses. However, evidence from the banks highlights that they have developed their 
organisational structure to deal with the diverse nature of SMEs.  
“We don't treat them any differently to how we would treat a customer, any other customer. 
…we will put our more experienced people on the high value transaction type customers and 
our less experienced people on the lower ones.” (A1) 
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“...at the smaller end it would go into a department and be dealt with over the telephone…. in 
our space they get a dedicated manager, at the smaller end it will go down a process route. It 
will be transferred to a central team and they would manage it via the telephone.” (G1) 
“...have different requirements…. at the bigger end, so my managers will typically run with 
between 50 and 80 relationships.  At the bottom end, the guys who look after start-ups out of 
the branches and look at businesses internally, will run possibly up to 200, 300 relationships, 
the vast majority of the bottom end don't require credit; a lot of these businesses are kind of 
cash type businesses anyway.” (C1). 
2.2.2 Dealing with Information Asymmetry  
 
According to Berry, Grant and Jarvis (2003, p. 13) information asymmetry can result in a „moral 
hazard and adverse selection.‟ „Adverse selection‟ results in not lending to creditworthy customers or 
lending to uncreditworthy customers due to a lack of information about the business. „Moral hazard‟ 
arises after the loan has been sanctioned and the SME hides from the bank information which might 
be unfavourable. It is also problematic as it can delay the decision-making process, take up additional 
bank resources and impact on the risk profile of the SMEs. However, the process is dependent on 
what is provided by the owner or the director of the business.  In addition, it is also dependent on the 
local knowledge and the experience of the relationship manager.  
   “The accountants really can help.” (G1) 
However external professionals cannot be solely relied upon to provide accurate information; further, 
the level of available expertise is clearly differentiated according to the size of the business. 
“One incident where we found the accountant was naive, that's the best way to describe it, 
naive.  He didn‟t do, he didn‟t do anything wrong but he didn‟t sort of help the situation.” 
(A1)  
“Sometimes it‟s just a bookkeeper they need. ....quite often we recommend that they‟re not 
with the right accountant so we can identify if they are with someone who isn‟t giving them 
the right.....or isn‟t big enough to manage, you know, the complexity of it, recommend to them 
that their business has grown ..... need a better accountant.” (G1) 
2.2.3 Triggers for Non-performing Loans (NPL) and Support Interventions 
 
NPL‟s have been widely used as a measure of asset quality amongst lending institutions.  They are 
useful for managing and monitoring credit risk and classifying the loans into distinct categories of 
„pass‟, „sub-standard‟, „doubtful‟ and „loss‟ (Guy, 2011).  
 
“We‟ll have our own internal systems that will give us an indication as to sort of 12-month 
turnover trend, any pressures on any kind of overdraft facilities, any kind of accessing of 
facilities or a lack of demand or.... that will give us some indications.  We‟ll also look to the 
business to provide us with their own management information, trading performance on a 
monthly basis, annual accounts, profit and loss, balance sheet.  There's varying different that 
we‟ll all pull together and make a general assessment on how that business is performing.  
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But again, the director, the sole trader, the partners, can give us a great indication as to how 
that's performing.” (A4) 
“...look at spending through bank accounts on a daily basis or once to four times a year, 
depending on the business.” (B1) 
“It will just depend on the complexity of the customer and the banking needs really.” (G1) 
“So he [risk control manager] will sign off new transactions but monitor existing transactions 
going on…  if we take a new customer, we will always review that customer after six months, 
so we‟ll make sure all of the pre-draw-down conditions have been met. Sometimes there‟s - 
when they come to draw the funds down maybe a bit of security isn‟t registered or they need 
to put a life policy in place or they need to give us a bit of information – we‟re quite flexible, 
they‟re not always in place on the day of draw-down.  So that six-month period gives us a 
chance to check that we‟ve done everything that we said we were going to do, that we‟ve 
achieved the right pricing for the individual, he‟s met our private banking team who are 
based in here, he‟s had an IFA review, he‟s had a look at treasury, so we can tick all of 
those.” (E1)   
It is apparent that banks adopt a flexible approach to monitoring and managing accounts so that risk is 
minimised. In addition, many confirm that it is a useful tool to enable them to help customers in 
distress by early implementation of interventions to support business recovery and turnaround.  
“We have a facility that is similar to an Intensive Care Programme.  This enables us to help 
the business recover.” (F1). 
“...you've got increasing debt, you're struggling to make payments, losses, that type of stuff.  
Then we've got a pool of managers, we call them special relationship managers who are 
looking after our customers who maybe need more intensive care, more support.” (C1) 
Furthermore, one bank reports a successful use of this strategy; 
  “We would have expected recoveries to have increased, but they haven‟t.” (G1) 
However, sometimes closures are inevitable as a result of changing market demands.  
“I call it „borrower fatigue‟ and it‟s nothing to do with the bank.  The bank‟s giving as much 
support as it possibly can but I think as an owner manager, some owners must get up in the 
morning and think „I‟m chasing debtors and they‟re not paying me, I‟ve got creditors chasing 
me and I can‟t pay them, I‟m up to the overdraft limit, I‟ve got staff who haven‟t had a pay 
rise for two years now, the good people are leaving – have I really got a business?  And how 
long, at what point can I go on and I think that will come.‟  I think when you talk to the 
insolvency practitioners they are expecting that, it‟s not going to be driven by the banks, I 
think it will be the SMEs themselves that will think what‟s the point? Do you then decide to 
cut your losses and say it‟s time to stop?  And that‟s inevitable in a recession, businesses will 
suffer because of that but I don‟t think it‟ll be the banks that will be the catalysts for it, I think 
it will just be – the owners will think that‟s me, I‟ve had enough.” (E1) 
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2.2.4 Level, Sophistication and Assessment of Credit Control  
 
Credit control plays an important role as it can avoid the dichotomy of Type I and Type II errors.  As 
already discussed within the literature section, Type I errors within a banking perspective result in 
classification of a business as being viable when it is not.  In contrast, a Type II error incorrectly 
identifies a poor business as being a viable proposition.  The banks, in their discussion of the benefits 
of relationship managers, have already highlighted their role in teasing apart potential Type I and 
Type II errors.  However, their abilities are limited and subjective and they can also be under-
resourced which prevents them from being able to conduct these assessments proficiently.  Initial 
business screening is conducted through statistical techniques such as credit scoring, either through 
in-house models or external models i.e. Moody‟s, Experian, Dun and Bradstreet and Equifax.   
 
 “We will credit score any lending application up to £100,000, but all that's doing is, is giving 
us a check on the individual‟s sort of circumstances behind that.  Ultimately, you know, the 
lending decision will lie with the …… managers or credit departments.  So the credit score 
gives us a sanity check around any potential defaults.” (A4)  
“...we'll do some credit searches so if that comes off clean that's good.  If we've got some 
security that gives us a better risk grade.  If the financial performance has been good that 
does, if the account operations have been good, we'll answer some questions around the 
management, our assessment and management.  So that will give it a risk grade and that will 
give a level of what we call auto-approval.” (C1) 
 
Clearly the systems are not 100% infallible as manipulations can occur and caution is required by the 
banking industry.  
“...we don‟t know how the credit scoring system works – for a reason. Because they don‟t 
want us to influence it. Obviously they don‟t want to give us information about how it works 
because, in the past - I‟ve been doing this for 34 years - but in the past, we knew what the 
credit scorings were so you could kind of manipulate it as you knew how to present the 
information.” (G1) 
Nevertheless, it can at least provide some level of objectivity against which to make a decision.  
“…it must be more robust. Because it takes out any kind of judgement. It‟s based on what we 
see in that sector and it‟s based on the figures. So it‟s got to be a much more professional way 
of doing things. Is it a perfect system? No, because there‟ll be lots of anomalies within that 
decision. But we still have the facility to override.” (G1) 
 
SECTION III - Support and Initiatives 
 
3.1 Additional Support for SMEs 
 
The recent changes to the economic climate have brought about several initiatives to support financial 
recovery.  Whilst the major focus of attention has been directed towards the banks in order to 
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facilitate this recovery, there is a tension between providing finance and lending responsibly.  
Furthermore, according to the banks interviewed, the process is hindered by reduced confidence and 
alleged lack of demand for finance by SMEs. In order to facilitate their access to finance, the banks 
have adopted several schemes through which they can support SMEs in the current financial climate.  
 
“We‟ve got a customer who .... when property prices were good .... bought a couple of houses 
in a very nice area (place) and let them .… he fell ill and he had quite a serious heart 
condition, he was in hospital for six or nine months, the properties were left vacant, he didn‟t 
get them re-let, he exhausted his own personal resources to pay the interest on the loans and 
he‟s effectively run out of money.  Go back to five/ten years ago, we probably would have 
foreclosed, made him bankrupt, repossessed the houses, sold them and sued him for the loss.  
We‟ve actually put the loans onto non-interest accrual and said to him we see that you‟re 
going to get back to full health in the next six to nine months, you‟re actually going to start 
trading again within your profession, therefore you‟re going to be generating cash, we‟ll 
actually sit with them and will not sell the houses and when you do come back, we expect to 
see some form of capital repayment.  Now I‟d never seen that done at all in the last 30 years 
and you know, I think that‟s quite innovative in the way that we‟re supporting businesses.” 
(E1)  
3.1.1 Coaching, Mentoring, Guidance and Professional Advice 
 
The use of role models or ambassadors was a common theme from some of the banks interviewed 
(B1, E1, G1). The rationale behind this appears to be that they can inject increased confidence into 
local businesses and also provide additional knowledge through workshops. (B1) has a scheme 
whereby select local businesses are involved in a seminar taken by blue chip companies to discuss 
challenges and implementing change.   
 
“...we‟ve got ambassadors that we have aligned to (banks), people like (names) did a 
presentation for us at the (place) last year, we had 200 people there, a mix of businesses, just 
from a mentoral [sic] point of view, just listening to somebody and we didn‟t used to do that 
four or five years ago.” (E1)   
However the positive impact of such events may well not filter into the targeted audience.  
“Some are well attended, some are not as well attended as we‟d like, and actually they're 
attended by loads of business introducers and not actually down to the customers that we 
want to be there.” (G1) 
Further reactions to the economic downturn are also evident in one bank‟s restructuring to support 
increased customer needs. 
“When the crisis hit we settled this team to look after businesses that need more support, so 
the important thing here is our most experienced credit managers, our most experienced 
front-line credit people went in to support these customers.” (C1) 
Overall this would suggest that the banks are taking positive steps in supporting SMEs in the region.  
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3.1.2 Dealing with Rejections 
 
The actual statistics for rejections were provided by three banks; (A1) reports 20% of credit appraisals 
rejected whereas (C1) reported 10% and (G1) stated just 2% of credit applications were rejected.  An 
anomaly here may well exist around the precise stage at which the customer is classed as having a 
valid business application which is used in the bank‟s statistics.  Interestingly, one bank stated that the 
rejection statistics reflected all applications. 
 
“They'll nearly all come through to us because even if the relationship manager declines 
something themselves, they should report it and I should see it, so everything should come 
through.” (C1) 
However, all of the banks discussed the rejection process and help that they offer to SMEs through 
additional support, appeals and alternative financial avenues (Business Angels).   
“We have an appeals process, which is a kind of formal process for the customer to appeal, 
but basically you would talk to the customer about why it‟s been rejected so we‟d look at if 
there was a way of changing it slightly so we could accept it or we tell them what we‟d need 
them to do so we could accept it really.  So we‟d look for a kind of way forward.” (A3) 
“If the reason for decline is that there's too much debt, there's no contribution, you've looked 
at the - at all the alternatives then you'll talk to them about Business Angels, we don't just 
kind of say no, go away, you're always look at how you can help the business.” (C1) 
 
3.2 Initiatives 
3.2.1 Project Merlin, the Task Force, Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) 
 
There are several initiatives that have been implemented subsequent to the credit crisis of 2008 that 
aim to promote lending to SMEs.  In particular, Project Merlin encompassed a range of aspects of the 
financial institutions‟ operations with the intention of promoting SME finance.  The „Big Four‟ 
leading high street banks are subscribers to this initiative: Barclays, Lloyds, RBS and HSBC.  
The Task Force is a British Bankers‟ Association (BBA) initiative which encourages all major banks 
to commit capital for SME lending.   
EFG is a venture promoted by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills which is a loan 
guarantee scheme intended to facilitate additional bank lending to viable SMEs with insufficient or no 
collateral. Under this scheme the Government will provide a guarantee of 75% of the loan value. 
The interviews yielded mixed attitudes with regard to the various initiatives
7
. 
“...introduced Project Merlin as a reaction to public attitude to bonuses.” 
“...a lot of pressure on us to meet these [Project Merlin] targets.” 
                                                          
7 Bank references have been omitted to avoid compromising anonymity and confidentiality. 
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“...it is possible that [bank] has shrunk the balance sheet to meet the Project Merlin targets.” 
“...the enterprise finance guarantee which is well used and it‟s a much better product than 
the small firms‟ guarantee, the EFG – is a more robust product.”  
“...the Business Taskforce commitment, yeah.  It‟s in everybody‟s interest; we‟re targeting 
very heavily on increasing our lending books so, you know, that's a key priority for us and 
will be even more key, as time goes on.”  
SECTION IV - Improving Demand and the Future of SME Finance 
4.1 Demand and Market Share 
 
Porter‟s (1980) five forces model effectively analyses the attractiveness of an industry by identifying 
five forces within any market, these being: Likelihood of new entry; power of buyers; power of 
suppliers; degree of rivalry; and the substitute threat.  In any changing market the emphasis on each 
„force‟ has to adapt and adjust to meet the changing influences.  The section on trust (relationship) in 
this study identified that some banks have focussed on becoming experts in certain areas or sectors 
which can increase demand for their particular products and thus increase market share. In any 
changing landscape, industries - irrespective of their nature - need to adapt and evolve in order to 
survive through identification of new opportunities to increase growth and productivity.   
 
4.1.1 Unique Selling Proposition (USP) 
 
Unique selling propositions are characteristic to many firms who are trying to differentiate their 
product, perhaps to enable them to stand out from the competition for specific and targeted customers.  
Most of the banks are explicit about their own particular USP
8
, advertising their specialisms on 
websites and in marketing material. The following response was common to each specialism of every 
bank; 
“We've been able to put in place some kind of finance to allow them to expand into new 
markets.  We‟ll we do it better than the other banks because we've been around in that 
(sector) a lot longer.”  
Interestingly, despite being at various stages of the evolution of banking finance, several respondents 
stated that they have been actively approaching customers to consider obtaining further credit. This is 
in direct contrast to the pre-credit crisis period where they would just wait for the customer to come to 
them, and one bank pro-actively researches the market to identify gaps for improving market share. 
The exception to this is one bank which states that they do not publicise as it would be a direct 
contradiction to their business strategy that had itself evolved directly from the identification of a gap 
in the market.    
4.1.2 Targets  
 
Motivation is considered to be the driving force, not only of individuals, but also of the majority of 
businesses, including banks. Each business has a need to survive and this need is met through goals 
which can be achieved via targets. There is a plethora of literature in psychology that identifies the 
                                                          
8 USPs not cited as this would compromise anonymity of the participants and confidentiality of the research. 
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effects of goals on changing perceptions and also on behaviour.  Therefore, if the banks are able to 
withhold funding, then this may well be apparent in their targets. 
 
“We‟re driving them towards their personal team expectation, yeah, and we will get, we will 
get there.” (A1) 
“It‟s not a target, it‟s an objective to make sure that the least number of businesses fail in a 
year and that those that do fail, the loss is mitigated to the benefit of the bank and the 
customer.” (A2) 
“Target-wise, my target‟s around about £[amount], which it has been for the last few years.” 
(A3) 
“I‟d expect to see something in the region of 20% growth on healthcare across the lending 
book, whereas if we go into a charity or a not-for-profit organisation then they don't borrow 
money.” (A4) 
“...[our] focus is on growth.” (B1) 
“Targets are marginally reduced but we're still very aligned to lending targets.” (C1)  
“...see steady year on year growth and all the bank aims to do is outperform its peers on a 
returned equity basis each year, and it does, every .... year it outperforms its peers without 
targets, without bonuses.”  (D1) 
“We had a 15% increase in our targets this year, we‟ve grown a lot of our income lines by in 
excess of 20% year on year.” (E1) 
“Corporates are holding cash and actually deleveraging, the 2A/4A SMEs don‟t have the 
confidence to invest in huge capital items or capital projects so our income streams I guess 
are being supplemented by 3Banksb/5E alternative products like treasury and the opportunity 
to perhaps provide hedging instruments for businesses, particularly when rates are so low.” 
(E1)  
“...always fair to reasonable but challenging, if you get customers interested you can meet 
targets.” (F1)  
“It‟s in everybody‟s interest; we‟re targeting very heavily on increasing our lending books,  
that's a key priority for us and will be even more key, you know, as time goes on.  Because if 
you take it down to brass tacks, our core purpose is to lend money.” (G1) 
“Every week we are talking about our debt targets.” (G1) 
 
4.2 Future of SME Finance 
 
Responses concerning the future of SME finance were mixed; not just concerning demand but also 
how some businesses might react if the economic climate experiences an upturn in growth and 
inflation.  
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“It‟s all down to the level of demand and the extent to which an SME will put together a well 
thought through, well constructed proposal.” (A2) 
“Things have been a bit quieter in terms of demand, there's still quite a good reasonable level 
of demand out there.” (A3) 
“The problem is change happens too slowly; banks are not structured to lend money at 
present but to provide liquidity.” (B1) 
“I'm positive ....everyone recognises the importance of the SME sector in terms of 
employment and the SMEs growing and providing wealth for the country, so we will continue 
to support the SME sector undoubtedly, there's political pressure to do so.” (C1)  
“My concern is that the SMEs haven't got a strong balance sheet, they haven't got massive 
balance sheets to kind of absorb losses and if we continue on the route we are, the recovery 
doesn't come for another two, three years or we hit another recession then I do have some 
concerns for the SME sector.  I think a lot of them will be bumping along the bottom, cos the 
interest rates have been low, a lot of them have managed to survive, it will be interesting to 
see where we go to with it.” (C1)  
“The challenge for all those banks will be when the economy does take off and the SMEs 
come to us and say we now want to invest, we've now got this opportunity, we want another 
£100K on our overdraft, we want a £200K loan to do this, that and the other and we look at 
the balance sheets and the balance sheets have been kind of, impaired during this process, 
that'll be the difficult thing to try and lend through the growth period that will come 
hopefully.” (C1) 
“There's still a lot of distressed assets on the books that probably haven't come out yet, being 
protected by a low interest rate environment. I think there's just so many imponderables, my 
personal opinion is I don't see anything changing for the next few years, I can't see there 
being any sort of additional, I can't see there being any freeing up of the funding for SMEs, if 
anything there could be a possibility further in track, depending upon what happens with 
these new sort of capital requirements that the banks are having to adhere to.” (D1) 
“I still see the banks being very supportive, I think the banks will continue to provide 
forbearance for customers in difficulty.  I think, at the front end, there has to be a gap-filler, 
there has to be a fund of some sort – whether it‟s either  government fund or a gap provision 
that is either European money or whatever but the banks are not going to change their tack, 
they‟re just not in a position to change their lending policy at this point in time and the SME – 
and our responsibility is to actually get that message out, not to disappoint the customer when 
they‟re sat around the table, they have to be aware of the level of availability of bank 
funding.” (E1) 
 
2. Banks - Questionnaires 
 
As previously described, following the series of interviews that were held with Area Directors and 
Commercial Managers of the eight banks in the Newcastle upon Tyne and Gateshead area, we 
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requested that they forward a link to our questionnaire (hosted on SurveyMonkey) to their 
Relationship Managers (RMs).  The researchers had no direct contact with the RMs and thus cannot 
verify the number of questionnaires that were distributed in this manner.  All participation was 
anonymous therefore the responses received cannot be identified or correlated directly with the 
interview information.   
In total 51 individuals contributed to the survey although response rates to individual questions were 
lower.  That said, the information that emerged from the survey did enable us to add valuable 
additional data to the information obtained from the detailed interviews and thus it was considered 
that this part of the work had a valid contribution to make to our overall findings.  
Bank Questionnaires Summary 
 
Credit Decision-Making Process 
 
1. The majority of decisions can be made within seven days or less, depending on product (Table 7).   
2. The use of professional advisors, in particular accountants, is seen as making a positive 
contribution.  
3. Just over half of the RMs answering this question stated that the decision-making process had 
changed, mentioning that specific sectors were approached with greater caution with an associated  
reduction in appetite for lending. However, the specific sectors referred to were not expanded 
upon. 
Assessing Creditworthiness of SMEs 
4. The main characteristics considered to be most important for the assessment of creditworthiness 
(Table 8) were:  Project viability; business acumen; sources of repayment; applicants‟ financial 
strengths and weaknesses; and ability to repay. The least important were:  Age, educational 
background and application type (sole/joint/company).  
Rejections and Overrides 
5. According to the ICAEW (2011) report, one issue with the RMs is that they lacked autonomy and 
needed greater empowerment in their decision-making. This statement was not reflected in the 
responses. A significant number of the RMs stated that their decisions were „sometimes‟ 
overridden but the response as to whether greater empowerment in their role would reduce 
inconsistencies and delays was equally divided.  
6. The two most frequent reasons for proposals being rejected was a lack of quality and/or sufficient 
collateral, together with a lack of track record of firm/owner
9
.  Whilst many banks cite large 
percentages of proposals being agreed to, just under half of the respondents noted that about one 
third of proposals would not be taken forward to the credit committee.  It is generally assumed 
that these figures would not be included in the banks‟ statistics for approvals.  Generally these 
                                                          
9
 It was separately pointed out to the research team that the most likely reason for declining a proposition would be lack of 
quality of proposal rather than concerns over available collateral (e-mail exchange dated 13/02/12). 
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rejections are on the basis of subjective decisions of the experienced RMs, poor business plans or 
not fitting with the credit policy of the bank. 
7. When proposals are forwarded to the credit committee, the majority of the RMs state that more 
than 70% are approved in whole or in part. Just under half of the RMs stated that they had 
experienced decision overrides with some stating that it impacted on their loan portfolio.  The 
most frequent trigger for credit decision overrides was attributed to the business model, senior 
management or the relationship with the client.  
Attitudes and Perception of SME Behaviour 
 
8. It has been reported that demand was down because SMEs are becoming more efficient and 
curtailing expansion, effectively doing more with less (Business Taskforce Report, 2010).  
However, some of the RMs note that a high proportion of SMEs rely upon non-banking forms of 
finance.  There was also evidence of SMEs approaching and obtaining finance from more than 
one relationship bank.  
9. A small proportion of RMs felt that the expectations from the SMEs were unreasonable.  
However, this attitude was not reflected in their expanded responses which highlight that many 
clients are unaware of the underlying factors which influence financial costs and decisions. 
Nonetheless, these comments may reflect a small number of their clients as most of the RMs 
stated that their clients understood the bank‟s need for disclosure of as much information as 
possible to help make a decision.   Individuals stated that this was particularly relevant for the 
larger companies or if an accountant was used by their client. 
Competition and Initiatives 
 
10. When asked if all of the banks were playing on a level playing field the responses were divided.   
The responses suggest that many consider the cost of their „raw material‟ to be similar and that 
the differences between the banks must be dependent upon target profit margins.  The respondents 
were also divided in their opinion on whether the government initiatives were having a material 
effect.  The responses focused mainly on the Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme and suggest 




11. The respondents unanimously saw their own roles as the Unique Selling Point for their banks.  
Relationships were cited by all as playing a fundamental role in the banks‟ market share of SME 
finance. 
 
Future of SMEs   
 
12. As the financial landscape continues to change, the most successful banks and SMEs will be those 
than can adapt and evolve in line with changes in the economy.  Some of the respondents 
recognised this, citing initiatives or a new sophistication in the finance system evolving in order to 
meet the demands, including pressure on the SME to become more „savvy.‟  The majority 
however view the future as being difficult.  
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2.1 Demographic Information 
Demographic information was collated from 29 Relationship Managers (RMs) aged between 24 and 
58 years with experience in their position ranging from one to 39 years as presented in Table 6.  
Table 6 Demographic Information for the 29 Relationship Managers  
 
Demographic Factors Mean/Standard 
Deviation (years) 
Range (years) 
Age 40        (7) 24 -58 
Experience 16        (8) 1 - 39 
Time with current employer 16        (11) 1 - 40 
2.2 Portfolio Information 
The total number of clients each respondent was responsible for varied significantly amongst the 
different managers from zero, where they adopted another role within their section, for instance 
focussing on business development, through to 1,250. Of the 19 individuals who declared their 
product portfolio, the Total Asset Values ranged from £8 million to £150 million (median asset value 
was £40m; mean asset value was £53.7m, with the standard deviation of £45.9m).  
Information on the composition of the product portfolio was completed by ten of the RMs
10
, and is 
illustrated in Figure 5 below.  It can be seen that the majority of the portfolios consist of Term Loans 
(46%), followed by Overdrafts (21%), Asset-Backed Lending, (17%) and Hire Purchase (13%).  
Figure 5 Overview of Portfolio Composition 
 
Seven of the ten RMs who responded also outlined the authorisation limits according to the portfolio. 
This data excluded one who had another role within the team, and another two who stated that the 
                                                          
10 One bank specifically stated that this was commercially sensitive information and another RM did not have a portfolio. 
 
N = 10 
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authorisation “depended upon the customer‟s credit rating and security position” and “varies 
depending on security and risk weighting.”  
Figure 6 Authorisation Limit According to Product Type 
 
 
2.3 The Credit Decision-Making Process 
2.3.1 Advice 
Qualitative information was received from 25 RMs concerning the question “What guidance do you 
provide to customers on the factors that determine loan pricing?” One response was a simple 
“Loan calculator in Excel” although the majority of the responses covered a variety of aspects and 
clearly demonstrated the complexities of lending to customers; 
“I do discuss the key factors that influence pricing as this is something that they can 
influence, such as the account operation, the financials and the level of security being made 
available.” 
“Full understanding given to the cost of our capital through to risk weighted assets. A full 
picture is delivered
11.” 
“Pricing is determined by an internal value at risk model which is determined by sector, 
management capability, balance sheet strength, profitability, cash flow, security, strategy. 
These are all areas that are discussed in general conversation without price being mentioned 
as price is generally listed only fourth or fifth in terms of reasons to either borrow or transfer 
banking.” 
“Explain the: 
1) Cost of "money" i.e. capital to the bank.  
2) Cost associated with Risk (type of facility, purpose, repayment source).  
3) Cost associated with administration (term of debt, monitoring, review).” 
                                                          
11
 Whether this is understood is not recorded. 
N =16 
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“Cost of funds, cost of capital, risk involved, cost of time and administration, security.” 
“Quality of business (credit rating): Term of facility; Security.” 
“Detailed guidance around market conditions/cost of capital/scarcity of capital/internal 
pricing models which determine return on equity/pricing for risk /security.” 
“Credit Rating, Risk, Cash Flows, Secondary exit, Cost of Capital, term etc.” 
“Essentially explaining how the Bank calculate a price, including the relevant factors, but 
predominantly the financial strength of the borrower, the security provided and the term of 
the facility.” 
“Explain cost of funds/different cost of funds - Libor/Base/Asset finance. Effects of security or 
lack of it, effect of term of funding, Industry risk and borrower risk.” 
“Financials = Risk Grade = Capital Requirements = Rate of Return required = Pricing.” 
“….guidance on pricing covers a number of variables including cost of Bank capital, term of 
facilities, risk (credit rating) within the customer's business, sector they operate in and 
financial performance of the business.” 
“We always explain our lending is above base rate, and loan pricing is determined largely 
from risk, and also the return that we receive on lending. Many of our customers have 
shareholders themselves, and understand the need to evidence return on investment.” 
Furthermore, there was evidence that guidance was given to customers beyond the „here and now‟ 
lending decision such as long term strategies and alternative directions in case of failure. There was 
also evidence of explaining the benefits of alternative sources of finance; 
“Costs of capital, regulatory etc. Security/secondary exit route.” 
“Term, cost, cash flow, short, medium and long term strategy.” 
“Think of the required term and repayment profile. Pledge more security, if available. Look 
to hedge the loan as this may see a reduction in the margin.”  
2.3.2 Duration of Decision-Making Process 
Responses to a question aimed at establishing whether claims that banks were slow to respond to the 
needs of the SMEs requiring additional credit were justified are shown in Table 7 below. This 
illustrates that the majority of responses are complete within one or two weeks. 




Table 7 Approximate Decision-Making Timescale According to Each Product Timescale 
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Further comments were made which highlight the complexity of the decision-making process and also 
the emphasis placed on ensuring that SMEs are organised. 
“Impossible to answer - depends on having all the required detailed information and the 
receipt of this coinciding with diary availability. It is not like buying a tin of peas off a 
supermarket shelf. A thorough analysis is required and this can take time, particularly if this 
needs articulating and also specialist input.” 
“N.B. the above is on the assumption we have all the relevant information provided by the 
client - we often need to ask the client for additional information (i.e. forecasts, business 
plans, valuations etc). The time above is from being provided with the final piece of the 
„jigsaw.” 
“Timescales depend on the scale of the lending. For a complicated multi-product offering, 
timescales from receiving customer's request to receiving final approval would be 
approximately 4-6 weeks. For simpler, smaller, scored lending applications, decisions can be 
much quicker.” 
“Once we are in possession of all of the detail behind the lending request then I would say a 
maximum of 14 days.” 
“Timescales will fluctuate depending on size and complexity of proposal.” 
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2.3.3 Improving the Credit Decision-Making Process 
All 27 of the RMs responded affirmatively that SMEs were welcome to bring professional advisors 
and/or mentors with them for discussions and meetings concerning bank finance, with an accountant 
being by far the most popular suggestion.  Additional comments were put forward suggesting that the 
role of external professionals is clearly dependent upon the size of the SME, as other individuals 
could be present such as a bookkeeper, a financial advisor/consultant or even family members were 
proposed; 
“This would depend upon the sophistication of the client. One would expect to have a good 
working relationship/dialogue with the client‟s in-house and external accountant.” 
Furthermore, there was evidence to suggest that the RMs preferred this method; 
“It would usually be an accountant, but we would positively encourage any advisors being at 
the meeting - more often than not they can assist with such meetings, and mean accurate 
information can be provided/explained at these meetings.” 
“It may be their solicitor/lawyer or accountant. Usually this will be because there is a 
specific contract, or area of finance they wish to discuss, and we have close relationships 
with many advisors in the area to ensure these meetings are effective and productive.” 
2.3.4 Changes in the Decision-Making Process 
A frequent criticism of the banks from the SMEs is that they are no longer lending. Of the 25 RMs 
who responded, just over half stated that their lending criteria had changed in response to the recent 
credit crisis.  
The explanations behind the changes in the lending criteria were mixed.  
“But our view of the world has changed and therefore what was considered acceptable 
previously may no longer be so.” 
“Some loans to values have reduced in certain sectors. Move towards Invoice Finance as 
opposed to overdraft.” 
“Higher provisions are held as a result of the current economic climate affecting borrowers‟ 
ability to repay debt, increased risk = increased pricing, cost of capital is increasing which 
has to be considered when determining margins.” 
“Additional emphasis on capital requirements and sector driven.” 
“Yes, but only very marginally i.e. no MBIs will be entertained and criteria for MBOs has 
been tightened up. Aside from this it is very much business as usual i.e. the door is open for 
good, profitable established businesses in any sector. Start-ups have never been attractive to 
us. In some sectors, e.g. property, there is an emphasis on supporting existing customers 
rather than new to bank due to current appetite. Criteria in this sector hasn't really 
changed.” 
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Figure 7 Overview of Changes in Lending Criteria Post Credit Crisis 
52%
48%
Respondents claiming a change in 




The majority of the responses indicated that the changes were either sector-driven or that recent 
economic changes had resulted in a greater emphasis on capital and risk reduction.   
“Some sectors have an additional layer of decision-making within the credit process (albeit 
we are not „closed‟ in any sector).” 
“The bulk of our criteria is unchanged although appetite for speculative property 
development (residential) and leveraged transaction etc is very limited.” 
“Limited appetite for lending in certain sectors.” 
“Caution is [applied to] certain sectors.” 
“More defined policies and guidelines around many sectors.” 
“Return to traditional banking principles i.e. increased focus on the individual/cash 
flow/increased stake to reduce risk/less reliance upon security but still require robust exit 
route.” 
“Preferred route to reduce reliance upon property exposure and move into good quality 
trading businesses.” 
“We became more conservative.” 
2.3.5 Autonomy in the Decision-Making Process 
According to the ICAEW (2011) review of „SME Access to Finance‟, the relationship manager is 
considered to be the SME‟s ally but is increasingly seen as being disempowered with ‟tick box 
N = 25 
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decision-making‟ overriding their recommendations. The responses indicate that this sometimes 
happens
12
.   
“Head Office does not make lending decisions, but we have a credit team, split across three 
sites. C.95% of lending applications my team submits to credit come back approved.” 
 
“Very rarely over – ridden.” 
 
“Very infrequently - only two marginal deals declined in 2011.” 
 
“Can never say 'never', but very rarely are my recommendations over-turned.” 
Figure 8 Overview of Recommendations Overridden by Head Office 
 
However, the responses were divided when participants were asked whether empowering the 
Relationship Managers would prevent inconsistencies and delays in the credit decision-making 
process as nine (36.0%) agreed with this statement, however 16 (64%) disagreed and responded 
further by stating the process ensures consistency in decision-making: 
“The relationship manager knows the client better than anyone and must be allowed to make 
good decisions.”  
“Computer drives decisions. The experience/knowledge of the Banker is now of very limited 
relevance. Banking is de-skilling just when the opposite is required.” 
 “Delays – yes; prevent inconsistencies – no.” 
                                                          
12
 The perception of occurrence will be vastly different for the RM compared with SME, due to the impact of the decision 
override. 
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 “The credit process is robust and I do not think [this would] unnecessarily delay [the] 
answer.” 
“Having a credit function overview is the best way.” 
 “We have an embedded credit partner in our office who approves/declines applications if 
decisions are outside a Relationship Manager‟s authority so the credit process is rarely 
delayed and applications can be discussed in principle prior to formal submission, which 
encourages consistency. If we did not have a local credit partner making the decisions, then 
empowering RMs would help prevent delays but may not prevent inconsistencies in my 
opinion.” 
“Secondary sign-off process essential.” 
“Banks would argue that credit is a function to ensure consistency with policy, which is true, 
however, it does delay the process and experienced managers with sound track records 
should be allowed to use their own judgement more frequently.” 
“Empowered Relationship Managers will deliver inconsistencies - what you mean is - will 
they say yes more often. Clearly, more local decision-making will speed up the decision. 
Major current barriers are the ever increasing levels of regulation, which are acting as a 
time thief along with the banks‟ desire to reduce costs in line with the reduction in income 
(which is not unreasonable).” 
“Truly consistent credit decisions can only be achieved by a centralised process.” 
 “A credit function can help deliver more consistent decisions across the Bank, whereas more 
individual empowerment may lead to inconsistencies dependent on the individual.” 
“Our operating model has embedded local Credit Partners, who advise on and approve 
credit applications in conjunction with the Business Partners. This speeds up the process, and 
does ensure a consistent approach across the Region.” 
“The risk with providing too much empowerment to a relationship manager is the fact that 
this sector, is, and always will be, target-driven. Whilst I am not saying this happens, the risk 
is always there that loans will be provided by relationship managers that generate a 
profit/return to the Bank, that really do not carry the necessary credit strengths to justify 
making the loan in the first place.” 
“While I appreciate independence and empowerment can be important, sometimes it is easy 
for RMs to be too close to something, and especially where performance is measured against 
target there would be a risk of RMs approving pricing to enhance bank return, or perhaps 
approving higher-risk lending because it is high-income. Our RMs have sufficient 
empowerment to recommend credit applications, and much work goes into producing the 
necessary financial and non-financial analysis that leads to a decision. Consequently, RMs 
are knowledgeable enough to accurately advise customers and support applications, but there 
is also a „common sense‟ check done by a local representative and our UK credit team to 
ensure lending guidelines have been followed, customer interests have been protected [ensure 
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facilities are appropriate and priced according to usage and return] and that bank risk is 
considered alongside return.” 
“If by empowering you mean providing local managers with lending limits then NO, it would 
actually increase inconsistency in my view.” 
“If the decision was made by the RM there is likely to be more inconsistencies, although this 
would speed up the credit process.” 
“The reason we have been given for removal of lending authorities is the FSA rule where it 
would be possible to influence your own bonus in agreeing deals. This pays no heed to 
experience and is often counterproductive in making deals.” 
“There are more likely to be inconsistencies without a credit function overview. I do not 
believe there are any issues in our credit decision timescales.” 
“Allowing small authorities at local level would allow swifter responses to simple requests 
for new or increased facilities, thus removing delay for the customer and reducing workload 
for the RM.” 
“We work very closely with our credit team and seek their early approval. They review a 
huge volume of applications and can provide value to the local team when structuring 
proposals. I believe it is good practice for final approval to be given by someone who cannot 
directly benefit from the approval.” 
“It would be easy to say 'yes', but the credit process has been tightened up. What would make 
a difference is people saying no to a proposition quickly and not wasting everyone‟s time and 
perhaps hiding behind a centralised credit function. Lending criteria is not made up on the 
spot, therefore, managers should know what it is, apply it day one and they should be able to 
respond quickly even if it is negative. On this basis, the customer knows where they are - the 
not knowing often appears to be a frustration in itself. The credit process [manager, credit 
department] could be assisted if the customers have prepared properly - a „back of the fag 
packet' approach to borrowing does not help in the current climate and the differing 
approach by customers can lead to inconsistencies in decisions for similar types of customers. 
Also, banks don't like surprises. If there is bad news, tell them and there is then the potential 
to work together. If we don't know, we can't help. A last minute request for increased 
borrowing is never well received as clearly there has been no planning on the part of the 
customer.” 
2.3.6 Decision-Making Duration 
Lending to SMEs via traditional Relationship Managers is considered to be very time-consuming and, 
therefore, a costly process for banks.  Consequently the Relationship Manager approach may not only 
delay decision-making for certain SMEs at different stages in their business life cycle but also accrue 
increased costs due to the time demands placed on the Relationship Manager.   
Each respondent was restricted to selecting only one duration category for each life cycle stage. The 
results were strikingly different for all categories which may possibly demonstrate the differing 
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approaches and procedures between the banks when specialising in certain SME applications i.e. 
using credit scoring systems and having specialist departments dealing with delinquent clients.   
Figure 9 Time Spent Dealing with a Client 
 
“We have specialist teams who manage delinquent clients, and we have close relationships 
with clients to prevent short or long-term financial difficulties arising without support. As 
start-ups have more simple needs, we have a specialist team of branch Business Specialists 
who manage these customers, and then pass them to more experienced RMs as complexity of 
needs/sales increases.” 
“Looking at new prospective business occupies the majority of my time.” 
“New customers and increased facilities to existing customers take up most of my time.” 
“Delinquent clients are passed to our special situations department who have the time to 
provide the additional support and intensive management that is required.” 
2.4 Assessing Creditworthiness of SMEs 
Following claims that the decision-making criteria had changed subsequent to 2008, RMs were asked 
to identify, in order of importance, specific factors that would be considered when assessing 
creditworthiness.  Table 8 demonstrates that the most important characteristics in the process are 
financial aspects as opposed to market forces or growth potential of the proposal. 
 
N = 24  
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1 Project Viability;  
Business Acumen;  
Sources of Repayment;  
Applicants Financial Strengths and Weaknesses; 
Ability to Repay 
2 Financially Astute (i.e. current liquid bank account/healthy 
financials) 
3 Experiences 
Financial Statement Analysis 
Net Worth 
4 Personal Investment 
Market Demand 
Statement of Cash flow 
5 Clarity of Vision 
6 Property Value 
7 Competitors 
Product Type 
Time in Business 
8 Business Location 
Existing Customer 
Personal Guarantees 
9 Growth Potential 
Duration with Bank 
10 Applicant Age 
Educational Background 
11 Application type (sole/joint/company) 
2.5 Rejections and Overrides 
These characteristics are highlighted further in the ranked order of reasons for rejection where 
respondents had to rate the four characteristics in order of frequency for rejections (see Figure 10).  
The two most frequent reasons for proposals being rejected were a lack of quality and/or sufficiency 
of collateral and a lack of a proven track record, with comprehensive cash flow forecasts and accurate 
historical information being relatively less frequent as the cause of rejection
13
.   
Many banks now claim that a large percentage of requests and proposals are agreed.  However, of 20 




                                                          
13
 It was separately pointed out to the research team that the most likely reason for declining a proposition would be lack of 
quality of proposal rather than concerns over available collateral (e-mail exchange dated 13/02/12). 
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Figure 10 Rank Order of Rejection Reasons 
 
 
Figure 11 Client Requests not Taken Forward to Credit Committee 
 
The reasons for rejections were cited as: 
“Bad business plan.” 
“Inability to prove serviceability.” 
“If it is apparent that the borrower cannot repay the requested debt.” 
“Lack of proven ability to service debt from historic financial information.” 
N = 20 
N = 22 




“Do not meet underwriting criteria re property sector.” 
“Against credit policy or poor quality.” 
“As relationship managers, we know what a good deal looks like, and also what a bad deal 
looks like and will not put forward a deal we ourselves do not believe in.  My own view, I 
imagine it is my own money I am lending, and if I wouldn‟t be comfortable in lending my 
money, then I wouldn't lend the Bank‟s. Negative answers to any of the questions listed in 
Q19 [Decision Making Characteristics] are all reasons why a proposal may not be taken 
forward.” 
“Do not fit current lending criteria or customer unwilling to commit deposit/personal assets if 
required - also patchy recent financial performance.” 
“We have a strong client base and start from a position of looking to help/assist. New to Bank 
proposals are in the main very poorly packaged/presented and businesses are not doing all 
they can to present case in a detailed and positive manner - first impressions!!” 
“Applications not robust enough to meet lending criteria - various reasons.” 
“In the past when requests and proposals have not been progressed, it is because the facility 
is not right for the customer at the time, or because repayment cannot be evidenced, and 
paying the bank for lending may jeopardise the ability for the company to maintain cash flow 
and service their suppliers/pay tax/retain profits.” 
“Lack of visibility of historic, present and future profit and cash flow to service the funding 
requested.” 
“Unable to confirm affordability.” 
“Does not fit lending guidelines.” 
“Lack of detailed information, did not qualify for product (for whatever reason), poor quality 
financials, previous poor track record and lack of appetite.” 
“Did not meet our lending criteria/were not viable propositions.” 
In addition to adhering to the company policy, there is also evidence that subjective decisions are 
made, based on the RM‟s experience; 
“The Proposal does not make commercial sense and you are not able to buy into the request. 
Also as a manager you are aware that a decline decision would be made and take time.” 
This is demonstrated by the proportion of proposals which are approved (in part or in whole) and 
declined by the credit committee.  This indicates that more than half of the respondents state that the 
majority of proposals are accepted.   
Of the 21 respondents, nine claimed that they had experienced decision overrides by the credit 
committee, and, of these, a further two stated that it affected their loan portfolio. 
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Figure 12 Approvals made by Credit Committee 
 
This stage in the process was explained further, highlighting that some banks engage the credit 
committee from the outset which influences the decision-making duration and process:  
“10% of applications to Credit are declined. This impacts on the RM‟s ability to grow the 
loan book. But note 90% are approved.” 
“As we engage our credit department from the outset I know what is expected at submission, 
therefore there‟s no override.” 
“Early engagement with Credit provides the basis for further discussions with the customer. 
Ongoing discussions with Credit prior to submission of an application ensure that an 
application is only submitted if it will carry credit support therefore no credit override is 
required.” 
“If a deal has been formally approved, I have never experienced this being overridden.” 
“Decisions can and are occasionally appealed - sometimes then approved in a slightly varied 
format.” 
“Often an override may see a more balanced set of conditions and covenant.” 
“It is about knowing what credit appetite is - decline at Office before submitting to Credit. 
Big influencing factor is skills of RM on how 'story is told/presented' to Credit.” 
Furthermore, there was evidence that the overrides were generated by specific factors, such as targets 
or changes in appetite for lending with certain products; 
 “Overrides are triggered by targets as well as commitment by the bank.” 
N = 21 
                                                                      
84 
 
“Occasionally, the Bank's appetite for certain transactions has changed part way through the 
application process, and this has impacted the approval.” 
“I have challenged a decision and obtained an override.” 
This was partially supported with responses to the causes of credit decision overrides which 
highlighted “Senior Management” and the “Business Model” as being the most frequently occurring 
cause. In addition, the “Relationship with the Client” was also reported as instigating an override.  
“Referrals” and “Targets” were the least frequently occurring trigger, possibly due to banks having 
systems in place to deal with customers in difficulty and RMs being aware of the bank‟s targets.  
Figure 13 Triggers for Credit Decision Overrides 
 
2.6 Attitudes and Perception of SME Behaviour 
Evidence suggests that SMEs perceive a distinct lack of supply for finance and this has made them 
reluctant to approach banks (Hutton & Nightingale, 2011). The opinion of exactly how many SMEs 
rely on non-banking forms of finance varied between the 19 RMs who responded. One RM estimated 
the value at 60%. However, many of the other responses were comparatively conservative, but still 
estimating quite large values.  
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Table 9 Estimated Volume of Clients Relying on Non-Banking Finance 
Estimated Clients Reliant 











One respondent did not give an estimate but stated: 
“I suspect the answer is high at the S[maller] of the SME market - naivety, lack of 
professional advice, lack of confidence in Banks all contribute.” 
The additional sources of these provisions were not probed; one respondent claimed “25% - 
introducing additional equity as appropriate” which suggests that there is no cause for concern.  
However, if the additional sources of finance are from credit cards, then this may well be incubating 
further problems were another economic downturn to occur. 
In response to enquiring about the percentage of SMEs who might be obtaining finance from other 
banks, the response again was varied, which may be reflective of the banks‟ position in the market 
and their market share as well as the current economic climate. 








“Market conditions are tough reducing opportunities to obtain finance elsewhere – 5%.” 
The responses also indicated that there may well be differing perceptions amongst the banks for this 
type of behaviour; 
“Strange question - if an RM has suspicions or an awareness then the RM should be tackling 
the client about it immediately.” 
Estimated Number of Clients 





5% or less 5 
<10% 2 
10% 4 
20% - 30% 4 
60% 1 
Don‟t Know 0 
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“20-30%, though most of the funding we are aware of, and indeed, as having a fairly small 
market segment, we lend to many companies on a „second lender‟ basis to commence a 
relationship with businesses.” 
Overall, the RMs felt that the SMEs did have reasonable expectations of support from the banks in 
respect to both pricing and security.  
Figure 14 Percentage of RMs Stating Expectations of SMEs Reasonable 
 
However, further explanations which expand on their perception would indicate that the opinions are 
not so clearly categorised and suggest a tension between attitude and public opinion in responding to 
this. Some report that clearer communications result in a more agreeable expectation; 
“The majority of clients are aware of the Banks‟ challenges which impact the returns from 
loans etc.” 
“Providing reasonable reasons and explanations are provided as to why and how a decision 
has been made client is on the whole comfortable.” 
“When customers are made aware of the bigger picture and we explain the challenges facing 
Banks they usually understand the Bank's position.” 
Conversely, the negative responses, which far outweigh those indicated in the chart, would suggest 
that understanding is lacking to a certain degree from the SMEs; 
“Customers expect Bank support which is right. Occasionally they do not recognise though 
when a deal is equity not debt.” 
“I believe that many customers have unreasonable pricing expectations in the current market, 
and they don't understand the key levers that influence bank pricing.” 
 “I think there is an over expectation from clients as to both the availability, and cost, of Bank  
funding - most are still expecting terms along those seen in the pre credit-crunch days. It is a 
major lack of understanding, and it is our job to educate clients in this regard. The Press do 
not help here though!” 
N= 20 
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“There's a cynical perception which can influence a customer‟s thoughts.” 
“Some clients are unable to accept that the Bank's costs of raw material have also 
increased.” 
“I would sway towards unreasonable as some customers can have a negative view of Banks 
and think current pricing is unjustified given that base rate is so low without considering that 
the cost of borrowing is increasing due to cost of funds, capital and risk and stricter 
regulations imposed by the Government and FSA.” 
Although one response may suggest that the attitudes amongst SMEs are mixed; 
“Unable to generalise.” 
Finally, one respondent suggested that the banks themselves might be responsible for the 
unreasonable expectations; 
“Pricing has risen over the last couple of years – the strength of the long term relationship 
and good communication is the key here. We, as a bank, value the relationship and have not 
blindly followed the market in bumping up costs willy-nilly and without justification. Banks 
have built up massive levels of resentment and, if and when, the opportunity presents itself 
there will be re-banking on a huge scale.” 
Again, a large proportion of the RMs stated that customers understood the rationale behind banks‟ 
expectations concerning disclosure of information prior to making decisions. 
Figure 15 Overview of Understanding of Banks‟ Expectations 
  
“We have always requested the same set of information.” 
“On the whole, yes. Some customers still find it difficult to understand why the Bank requires 
regular financial information on an ongoing basis to monitor their exposure.” 
N= 21 
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“Some clients do - but others are very reluctant to employ proper professionals to assist with 
accounts/management accounts/budgets etc.” 
“With such scrutiny in the market place I believe the answer is yes.” 
“Larger clients in the SME market understand this.” 
“Given the changing market conditions, clients are probably aware of the need to produce 
better quality information.” 
“Although the paperwork and information requested to complete a lending application can be 
viewed as excessive it is accepted in the majority of cases as necessary.” 
“SMEs recognise that they will need up to date financials, quality management information 
and a business plan incorporating financial forecasts, strategy and information on 
management capability.” 
“It can be difficult sometimes when we deal with cross-border account opening (which we do 
a lot of) because the regulations and Know Your Customer requirements can be different in 
different countries. This can sometimes delay things, but these requirements are consistent 
across the industry, and customers expect much of the paperwork we ask them to 
complete/submit.” 
However, this view was not universal amongst the respondents; 
“Very few do - had credit too easy for too long. Banks soldier % of responsibility by not 
educating/communicating with Clients - has come home to roost.” 
2.7 Competition and Initiatives 
2.7.1 Competition 
Whilst many of the banks are major players in the North East region, there was a marginal division 
between those who thought that all banks in the region were operating broadly on a similar evaluation 
basis i.e. a level playing field, with 38% (eight) agreeing with this statement and 52% (11) 
disagreeing.  Not all respondents expanded upon their answers but some answers suggest that the 
reasons behind this are not just simplistic strategies to increase market share. 
“I believe that all of the Banks have differing priorities and agendas, which impacts 
consistency across the region. Increased external regulation, availability of capital and risk 
appetite are all variables at the current time.” 
“Some Banks appear to be pricing at finer margins than us.” 
“My own experiences are Banks have different agenda to suit their own internal needs. Some 
seem to be operating to meet government targets, some operating to grow market share, and 
some seem to be offering unsustainable terms.” 
“Funding basis at times seems different.” 
“Mostly, there are a few exceptions, not necessarily any Bank in particular but some cases in 
isolation suggest inconsistencies.” 
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“I think it must be very difficult for SME managers in state-owned banks, because they will be 
being encouraged to lend money because the government wants to encourage SME lending, 
but there may be times when they are not getting enough return to make this lending viable in 
the long-term for the bank. However, their service levels are normally equal to ours for 
domestic customers, and this encourages healthy competition.” 
2.7.2 Government Initiatives 
Again the response as to whether the Government initiatives, such as Enterprise Finance Guarantee 
(EFG) and Merlin, are having a material effect on funding proposals was mixed. 54% (seven) stated 
that they were and 46% (six) disagreed (two RMs declined to respond as they felt they were unable to 
comment). A fundamental question here would be to ascertain whether they belonged to one of the 
Big Four involved in Project Merlin, however this would have breached bank confidentiality and 
cannot be reported. Interestingly, all of the expanded responses focussed on EFG with a variety of 
explanations stating the benefits of the funding.  However, others claim it is rarely used and one 
response placed the emphasis on SMEs being aware of the existence of EFG or being too disorganised 
to fulfil the criteria for this funding. 
“Not enough of the businesses are aware of it. It is also difficult at times to prove viability 
which is a key part of agreeing to an EFG.” 
“EFG has been used effectively on several deals that I have been involved with, and is a 
useful product where lack of security, or falling value of existing security, may be an issue.” 
“Window dressing. Government and EU legislation is driving up the cost of borrowing and 
driving down its availability. Legislation is applying brakes to lending, with knock-on 
negative impact on funding recovery, at the wrong stage. Brakes on when we are hardly out 
of first gear - apply with (when) we are in 4th heading for 5th.” 
“I have used EFG - but very rarely - in my opinion it has not been as widely utilised as 
expected.” 
“EFG provides a valuable tool for bankers to provide good business with funding.” 
“EFG has been critical in some deal making.” 
“EFG is a good tool to use when there is a lack of security.” 
“A viable deal is a viable deal whether or not external support is available. Banks only use 
above to reduce its perceived risk in a small number of cases.” 
“Very small number of EFG's drawn.” 
“Experience of EFGs are limited but generally there seems to have been an increase in EFG 
funding.” 
“Just because Merlin has been implemented does not mean that assessment of funding 
requests has been relaxed.” 
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“We cannot agree deals just because this is project Merlin. The EFG is worthless as it 
permits PGs. The banks have to keep their capital ratios and this percentage is to increase 
from 10% to 17% which makes signing up relatively tight deals a major disincentive. We 
sanction deals which fit well with our own guidelines.” 
2.7.3 Market Advantage 
 
Asked what they considered their distinct market advantage to be, the responses all focussed upon the 
importance of the role of the relationship manager within the banking sector.  
“Good relationship management.” 
“Relationship management proposition and service.” 
“Local credit partner who can meet clients prior to making credit decisions, local specialists 
who can look after Private Banking, Wealth Management, Asset Finance, Payment Solutions 
and Treasury Solutions needs, working together in the same team and office as Relationship 
Managers.” 
“Relationship proposition.” 
“Traditional banking model with in-house credit executives.” 
“Integrated specialist support around Treasury, Asset Finance, Invoice Finance etc. Credit 
Executive also based within the centre. Sector specialism.” 
“Relationship, local credit function.” 
“Our USP in my view is the local credit decisioning [sic], and the level of local empowerment 
we have compared to other Banks.” 
“Personal relationship/local decision-making/open and honest support/desire to look after 
full rounded relationship rather than transactional one-off loans etc.” 
“Consistency of position - for long established profitable business that value a long term 
relationship.” 
“Integrated model, with all aspects of funding delivered locally (Asset Finance, Invoice 
Finance etc), along with a relatively strong balance sheet and appetite and ability to lend. 
Local decision-making is also a key differentiator.” 
“In-house local credit decision when a proposal is above manager‟s authority. 1-1 
Relationship.” 
“All relates to the relationship manager. As in all walks of life there are good bank managers 
and then are those that are pure salesmen and do not return calls/slow to make decisions etc. 
As an experienced Banker, my qualities are being transparent in words and deeds, honest and 
genuine.” 
“Our brand, strength and relationships with the professional community.” 
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2.8 The Future of SME Finance 
 
Comments concerning the future of SME finance were mixed and taken from many perspectives.  
Some focussed on increased sophistication from either the banks‟ or the businesses‟ perspective.  For 
instance, implicitly suggesting that the economic climate is influencing the players in the new 
financial landscape to evolve and adapt, whilst others suggest that the cost of future finance is 
adhering to a simplistic supply/demand economic model for costs; 
 
“Commitment with Project Merlin have forced banks to lend to SME.” 
“Positive if proposals are supported by a good information base.” 
“Credit applications and the credit decision process is becoming increasingly sophisticated 
with many factors having an impact on the outcome, Banks are evolving and adapting to 
conditions and regulations which may have a short term knock-on effect on access to finance 
but I think ultimately finance will be available if the lending is responsible and the borrower 
can demonstrate the ability to repay, and Banks can communicate and explain the drivers 
behind how the lending is priced in a way that customers can understand.” 
“Will continue to be difficult before improving.” 
“The supply is available if the demand is viable.” 
“The active Banks are all focussing on a similar market - good quality trading businesses, 
producing a varied regular income stream.” 
“Difficult times ahead.” 
“Can only get easier as bankers become more educated.” 
“Get the media to talk in the positive and not the negative, stop bank bashing and get the 
message out that for the right business the funding is there.” 
“Finance will always be available, however, and correctly, funding will not, and should not 
be provided to those businesses whose risk profile is too high - equity, or similar should be 
sought by such businesses.” 
“In the short term will not change dramatically - next 24 months - after this and assuming the 
economy improves then there should be increased availability.” 
“Harder and harder. SMEs need to up their game/pay for right professional input and 
guidance is how they go about asking for and justifying proposals.” 
“I think that the Banks will continue to lend, though they will be more selective on which 
deals they underwrite (and at what price). Access to grant funding would be seen as a 
concern, as in many cases this type of funding previously dove-tailed the bank funds, 
completing the funding package, and providing additional liquidity for businesses.” 
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“This is likely to remain unchanged although the pricing will increase as liquidity in the bank 
sector reduces.” 
“We need to continue to educate and inform our clients as to how to prepare themselves to 
approach a Bank for funding. A good business plan with some robust cash flow forecasts 
helps us to understand the cash dynamics of the business and we are then better placed to 
provide a solution to their funding need. Whether that be asset finance/invoice finance/term 
loans or overdraft.” 
 
Business Angels  
 
An overview of the summary findings from the Business Angels was presented in the executive 
summary section of this report, what follows here is the detailed findings from the interviews that 
were conducted. 
3. Business Angels - Interviews 
 
Main Findings by Research Area  
 
Business Angels‟ Investment Motivation and Amounts for Investment 
 
1. The findings suggest that Business Angels in the North East are not purely interested in financial 
gain but instead have a strong interest in supporting others and being involved in something that is 
of personal interest to them. This further suggests that Business Angels require investment 
opportunities that allow them to provide such support and to be able to engage in their areas of 
interest.  Investments which may create high returns but do not „turn them on‟ mentally seem 
uninteresting. 
2. A further key finding is the fact that there seems to be a lot of money available for investment 
which is currently not being used. 
Investment Criteria 
 
3. In general, the Business Angels in this study tended to be attracted by a combination of factors, 
most prominently the following: 
 The quality and personality of the PEOPLE running the investee business. 
 The specific BUSINESS CONCEPT relating to their individual investment preferences and 
 the quality and „understandability‟ of the BUSINESS PLAN, as well as the management‟s 
ability to present and defend it. 
 
Training Needs of Business Angels 
 
4. The participating Business Angels did not provide any insight into potential training needs that 
they might have. They did, however, indicate some areas in which they have developed some 
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learning since they became Business Angels. These can therefore be interpreted as potential areas 
in which less experienced investors might require training: 
 The importance of the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team in making an investment 
decision and working with them post-investment.  
 The importance of thorough due diligence, which seems to develop over time and through 
learning from mistakes. 
 Early investment decisions tend to be naive but ones made at a later-stage are more selective. 
 
Key Challenges for Business Angels 
 
5. There are three interrelated challenges: 
a) Insufficient high-quality investment opportunities  
There is no general dissatisfaction with the amount of investment opportunities being presented 
to the Business Angels, but there is substantial dissatisfaction with the quality of the 
opportunities presented. 
b) Flow of high-quality investment opportunities 
However, Business Angels tend to not promote themselves and as such seem to wait for high-
quality investment opportunities to reach them without proactively “advertising” their investor 
status. This may be a reason for a lack of high-quality proposals: If entrepreneurs do not know 
that the Business Angels are out there, they cannot approach them.  Well-known Business Angels 
who actively and proactively network and involve themselves in the region may have better 
chances of obtaining high-quality proposals. 
Subsequently, Business Angels are dissatisfied with the way that the Angel market (i.e. networks, 
groups and individuals) interacts with intermediaries in the region (e.g. Venture Capital funds, 
accountants, banks, lawyers) as these are considered to be a potential source of high-quality 
opportunities but this channel appeared to be insufficiently developed and/or used. 
c) Complex and Confusing Financial Environment 
The data showed that the Business Angels believe the entire financial environment in the North 
East to be highly complex, confusing and dynamic; there are a lot of parties involved, which all 
attempt to create many diverse initiatives and/or offer the same (or remarkably similar) products 
and/or services – if the angel investors consider this to be complex, it could be tentatively 
assumed that entrepreneurs/SMEs might consider it even more so, which adds to the severity of 
the other two challenges explained above.  
This latter point seems to resonate with the list of development interventions that was drawn up; the 
sheer size of the list and the amount of diverse interventions and programmes underlines this 
challenge and supports the view that the environment is a complex one. 
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3.1 Descriptive Summary of Participants 
Before exploring the themes which have emerged based on commonalities across the interviewed 
BAs, this section briefly presents some descriptive background information in order to provide the 
context to the identified themes as shown in Table 11 below. Out of the 12 participating Business 
Angels, six are highly experienced investors, having participated in between five and 15 BA-type 
investments respectively. A further three BAs are experienced, having participated in four BA-type 
investments each.  Two BAs are novice because they have invested as Business Angels in two 
companies each. One final BA has moved from prospective to novice between the initial contact and 
the actual interview; he made his first investment soon after an interview date was arranged.   
 
When asked about the amounts of finance the BAs had provided to their investee businesses, they 
tended to estimate rather than provide accurate figures, especially in cases where BAs had carried out 
multiple investments, they tended to be unable to specify the exact amounts provided to each of their 
investees. 
 
Finally, all participants were asked where they sourced the investment opportunities they were 
considering. In order to guarantee anonymity, the actual source of the opportunities is being disguised, 
i.e. the term „Regional BA Intermediary‟ is being used to include all BANs, syndicates and syndicated 
funds. The findings directly reflect the source of the Business Angels themselves, due to the fact that 
most of them have been introduced via intermediaries, it was obvious that they would be using these 
intermediaries as a key source of investment opportunities.  On the other hand, this study also 
includes some individuals who are not members of any formalised BA intermediary networks, 
syndicates or syndicated funds, therefore demonstrating other ways of identifying investment 
opportunities. Personal networks, most likely developed through the BAs‟ own interactions in 
business and the region, as well as other service providers, such as accountants or lawyers, are 
common sources of opportunities. 
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Table 11 Summary of Background Information of Participating BAs 
BA Investment Experience Amounts Invested Sources of Deal flow 
BA1  Highly Experienced 
 Invested in 6 start-ups and 
4 buy-ins 
 £450k  Regional BA Intermediary 
 Own Contacts: Lawyers/ 
accountants/network of 
contacts 
BA2  Novice 
 2 Investments in start-ups  
 £120k 
 
 Regional BA Intermediary 
 
BA3  Novice 
 2 investments 
 £75k (equity) 
 £120k (equity + debt) 
 Tends to work alone  
 Through personal contacts  
BA4  Highly Experienced 
 8 Investments 
 £250k 
 1 pending 
 Equity 
 Regional BA Intermediary 
 Ex-business colleagues 
 Personal individual 
connections 
BA5  Highly Experienced 
 5 Investments 
 9 rounds 
 Lowest = £30k 
 Highest = £700k 
 Didn‟t want to say exactly   
 Regional BA Intermediary 
 Personal business partner 
 Other business contacts 
BA6  Highly Experienced 
 10-12 investments 
 Between 6 and 7 figures  Regional BA Intermediary 
 Own contacts 
 His son 
BA7  Experienced  
 4 Investments 
 £100k between all 4  Personal contacts and 
business contacts  
 Not in any network 
BA8  Experienced  
 4 Investments 
 £160k  Networks: Regional BA 
Intermediary & London-
based BAN 
BA9  Novice (from Prospective) 
 1 at present 
 About to invest in another 
 £30k 
 Awaiting finance on the 
other 
 Regional BA Intermediary 
 Personal contacts 
BA10  Experienced 
 3 investments  
 £460k  Regional BA Intermediary 
 Regional Funds 
 Contacts 
BA11  Highly Experienced 
 5 businesses invested 
 £350k  Regional BA Intermediary 
 London-based BAN 
 Personal business contacts 
BA12  Highly Experienced 
 15 businesses 
 £1.5m  Informal networking 
 Networks 
 Professionals 
 Corporate finance 
 Insolvency people 
 Approaches from 
individuals who seek out 
investment via internet  
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3.2 Business Angels‟ Investment Motivations and Amounts Available for Investment 
 
This section details the Business Angels‟ initial motivations to become a Business Angel, as well as 
the amounts that this study‟s participants still have available for investment at the time of the study. 
The rationale behind investigating these topics is to obtain an insight into the (current and estimated 
future) availability of this source of funding within the region. 
 
3.2.1 Motivation to Become an Angel Investor 
 
In terms of motivation to become a Business Angel, the participating investors and prospective 
investors named a variety of motivating factors, including monetary and non-monetary drivers. The 
data showed that every investor is motivated by at least one non-financial factor, whereas only 
seven BAs specifically mentioned money as a key factor for them. The other non-financial 
motivators are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 Motivation to Become a BA 
 
BA investments as a personal challenge Discussed by 3 investors 
BA investments as fun and enjoyment Discussed by 5 investors 
BA investments as an opportunity to help others Discussed by 8 investors 
BA investments as something interesting to do 
(other than the usual hobbies or full-time jobs) 
Discussed by 9 investors 
 
It is particularly interesting that most of the Business Angels see investing as a form of support to 
others and something that they consider to be stimulating or even enjoyable.  
3.2.2 Amounts Available for BA-investments 
 
With regard to amounts available, three of the participating Business Angels were unwilling to share 
their financial situation, but the remaining nine investors mentioned figures of between £5,000 and 
£5m. Table 13 below summarises the individual responses given. 
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Table 13 Amounts Currently Available for BA-investments 
BA1: 
£5k-£10k for BA investments 
£1.5m for non-BA Investment 
BA2: 
Preferred not to say 
BA3:  
“A few hundred thousand” 
BA4: 
£500k for BA investment 
More if something special came his way 
BA5: 
Between £30k and £50k 
But only if the right business came along 
BA6: 
£50k 




Preferred not to provide a detailed figure 
75% of his assets are cash-based but he would not 
invest all in BA-type investments 
BA9: 
Was not prepared to provide the exact amount 
Would be prepared to invest £100k in high-risk 
investments 
BA10: 
£3m to £4m 
BA11: 




3.3 Investment Criteria 
 
This section explores the reasons why Business Angels invest in certain opportunities but not in 
others. This was done by investigating the angels‟ reasons for investing in their chosen opportunities, 
but also by exploring their reasons for rejecting opportunities. The three most often mentioned 
investment criteria refer to: 
1. The entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team, i.e. the PERSON. 
2. The idea underlying the business proposal, i.e. the BUSINESS CONCEPT. 
3. The written summary of the proposed business concept, i.e. the BUSINESS PLAN. 
3.3.1 Investment Criterion 1: The Person  
 
The majority (nine) of participating Business Angels mentioned the entrepreneur or 
entrepreneurial team as a key decision-making criterion. Comments such as the following exemplify 
this; 
“Whether we thought we could work with him - we were making a judgement on him and his 
team.” (BA1) 
 
“And I invested with them because a) the individual/individuals were credible, believable and 
I didn‟t get the whiff of bullshit when they were presenting.” (BA2) 
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“One person who drives it, who has preferably got track record, that‟s what I always look 
for.” (BA4) 
 
“It‟s about the personal chemistry and the feeling of trust and respect of other people 
involved, the person you are working with. So, you know, lots of people I‟ve met and worked 
with in one shape or form throughout my life, I wouldn‟t have risked a penny. But with these 
two particular cases they were people I‟ve respected, I admired their work ethic, belief and 
way they conducted the business, so I was quite happy to put some money in.” (BA5) 
 
“I like the guys and I thought I could do business with them.” (BA7) 
 
“We invested in the artist personally, basically. So, that‟s an interesting point, I mean in 
general you are being invited to invest in a concept, not necessarily a person, but quite often 
it comes down to your confidence in the guy you are sitting across the table from. Unless the 
chemistry is right, unless you feel you can work with them, the investment rarely proceeds.” 
(BA8) 
 
“But there is a heavy emotional aspect as well, so you have to believe the people that you‟re 
talking to because at the end of the day that‟s what you‟re investing into, the ability of the 
individuals to deliver the business plan.” (BA10) 
 
“If I don‟t trust ‟em and don‟t respect their abilities then that‟s a no-go, those are the 
thresholds they have to pass before – because they lack credibility, their business proposition 
would lack complete credibility if you don‟t respect their management credibilities or their 
idea or their trustworthiness, so that has to be a given.” (BA11) 
 
“I liked the person, trusted the person, thought it was a great idea, great idea.” (BA12) 
3.3.2 Investment Criterion 2: The Business Concept 
 
The above interview extracts show that the decision regarding the entrepreneurial person/team tends 
to be of a more emotional or intuitive nature, rather than a rational decision. To some extent, this is 
also true for investors‟ decisions based on the business concept or idea, as half of the participants 
stated that they are attracted to particularly interesting business concepts; some of these investors used 
emotional language to express this, such as “that‟s the one that‟s really turned me on” (BA4), 
whereas others were more rational about it, e.g. recognising that the product would be of benefit to the 
sector or the concept would be easily understandable. For some Business Angels, it was a specific but 
very personal like or dislike towards certain sectors, which swayed their decision to invest or reject 
opportunities (e.g. gambling, retail, technological sectors or armaments). However, no common 
findings regarding sector interest could be identified. 
3.3.3 Investment Criterion 3: The Business Plan 
 
Despite the above criteria having a strong emotional/intuitive connotation, there are other factors 
which Business Angels investigate from a more rational point of view, particularly the business plan:  
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Ten participants commented on the business plan as a whole, but also specifically on the financial 
aspects within the plan, for instance; 
 
“We would receive a business plan, we‟d read it, if we liked it we‟d call in the proposer and 
get him to talk to us and at that stage we would be judging not only the plan but how much he 
understood about the business...” (BA1) 
 
“Well, it does come back to the believability and that‟s…, is it a common sense thing or is it a 
gut feel thing, I don‟t know. It‟s the believability, the credibility of the business plan.” (BA2) 
 
“And then the business plan will have all the history in it, as well as a lot of future stuff and I 
think looking at the history is very simple to check out; the future is obviously a lot more 
difficult to check out, so I think I need to understand the product or service, I need to 
understand the market and I need to be convinced of both, really.” (BA3) 
 
“I would take a good look at it, and I liked what I saw.” (BA6) 
 
“And then it was a case of „show me the business plan‟ and that was maybe two or three 
weeks after having a look at the business plan, and a couple of meetings to ask the questions 
from the business plan that they had.” (BA7) 
 
“The general quality of business plans is often poor. Sometimes you get business plans that 
are written by advisors, which is a real turn-off for me, but a lot of people think that is a 
clever/easy way of doing it. Business plans put together based on advice from accounting and 
law firms tend to be put together as funding documents.  They don‟t always really represent a 
true business plan.” (BA8) 
 
“Carefully thought through business plans, properly stress-tested, are very welcome.” (BA9) 
 
“So the numbers have to stack up and I‟m trying to build some models so that I can evaluate 
different investments, score them up in the same way as I would‟ve done when I was 
underwriting.” (BA10) 
 
“This latest start-up, because it‟s a new product, I would say that‟s been six months and 
probably half a dozen meetings to formulate the business plan and the concept.” (BA11) 
 
“Know the individual, like the idea and do the numbers stack up.” (BA12) 
Although we have discussed the person as a separate criterion from the business plan, it is obvious 
from some of the comments above that they belong together and both need to impress the investors in 
order for them to be willing to provide finance.  
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3.3.4 Intermediary Managers‟ Perspective 
 
The above findings relating to the importance of person, concept and plan are on the whole confirmed 
by the BA intermediary managers who, depending on the nature of the intermediary, either have an 
overview of the members‟ investment criteria and/or are the only point of contact between an 
entrepreneur and the angel market. To be more precise, the intermediary managers referred to the 
following as important investment criteria: 
PERSON: 
 Investment readiness (some intermediaries help develop investment readiness and only 
subsequently introduce the entrepreneurs to their investors, whereas other intermediaries look 
towards investment readiness programmes to identify businesses that are already investment 
ready). 
 Charismatic entrepreneur(s). 
 Entrepreneur shows potential in terms of running a business. 
 Must be able to take criticism on board. 
 Must be able to make a convincing and professional investment pitch. 
 How much has the entrepreneurs invested themselves.  
BUSINESS PLAN: 
 Must demonstrate investment readiness. 
 Clear indication of the market potential and product. 
 Track record (of business and entrepreneurs).  
 Good order book. 
 Must demonstrate concise presentation of business concept. 
BUSINESS CONCEPT: 
 Good product is more important than a full team – the latter can be created easily. 
 Large market potential. 
 Scalable business. 
 Entrepreneurs must be able to explain the concept in a concise way. 
 
The intermediary managers further stressed that Business Angels are individuals, which means that 
they often have their own individual investment criteria and that it can be impossible to identify those 
in generic terms. This also corroborates the findings from the investors themselves.  
In addition to the person, plan and concept, two of the intermediary managers also referred to the 
DEAL itself as a key criterion for investment, e.g. if the entrepreneur asked for too much money in 
return for a very small equity stake or similar scenarios. This is an interesting finding as it emerged 
from only two intermediaries and from none of the investors. The exact reasons are unclear but 
considering that the investors displayed non-financial reasons for becoming a BA in the first place, a 
relaxed attitude towards the deal structure seems to be in line with their motivations. On the other 
hand, it is often intermediary managers who have to structure the deal or participate in negotiations 
(particularly if they are managing a syndicated fund or a syndicate of BAs investing together), so that 
they are more directly affected by the proposed deal structure and are often likely to withold 
inappropriately structured deals from their investor-members.  
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3.4 Training Needs of Business Angels 
 
This section discusses the findings related to the Business Angels‟ own perception of: 
1. What they believe their training needs are at this moment in time.  
2. Where they would expect to find such training. 
3. What they have learned since becoming a Business Angel. 
 
3.4.1 Training Needs 
 
Only one Business Angel admitted that he would like further information or training, the remaining 
11 investors claimed that they could not think of anything that they did not yet know. One of these 11 
said that investors and entrepreneurs should both receive better training but he refused to specify what 
type of training and he was adamant that he himself did not require any support. 
 
When asked about training requirements, three Business Angels complained about a rather complex 
finance environment in the North East and too many parties trying too many different initiatives.  
They did, however, state that they themselves did not require any support in making sense of this 
complexity.  
 
Complexity is a key theme emerging in relation to the challenges that investors face in this region and 
is therefore discussed in more detail below. However, it is interesting to note that making reference to  
this issue when asked about training, these three angel investors might have considered this an area 
where market participants might benefit from support in making sense of the complexity. 
 
3.4.2 Where to Find Training or Information 
 
Since most participants claimed that they did not require any training or development support, they 
were asked where they would go for further information if at any point they realised that they needed 
some support. 
 
One participant mentioned the importance of mentors and role models, whereas four investors stated 
that the syndicate, of which they are members, would be their first point of contact. Similarly, the 
corporate members and contacts of syndicates (e.g. accountants or lawyers) would also be used for 
further development. Lawyers, accountants and other such service providers within Business Angels‟ 
own networks were mentioned as a useful point of contact by those investors who are not members of 
any network. One Business Angel claimed he would approach the Managing Director of his investee 
business. 
 
Three Business Angels emphasised that, due to the individual nature of the investment process, 
investment decision and their own preferences and personalities, it would be impossible to obtain 
suitable training or to provide suitable advice to others.  This suggests that these investors believe the 
experience to be a very personal one, which every investor needs to go through in order to develop 
their learning, as opposed to anyone being able to provide any meaningful or useful support for the 
specific individual issues faced at any point in time. 
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3.4.3 Prior Learning as a Business Angel 
 
Since the participants provided very little insight into what training or support they might require, 
they were asked to reflect upon what they have learned since their first Business Angel investment, as 
that may suggest topics that less experienced Business Angels might find useful before entering the 
investment process themselves. Some of the learning derived from having had bad or unsuccessful 
experiences in the past, whereas others resulted from neutral experience of investing in general. 
 
Six investors discussed their learning with regards to other people involved in the investment process, 
mostly regarding the ENTREPRENEUR/ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM: 
 
“Invest in people you trust and can work with.” (BA1) 
 
“I think I am a lot more cautious when considering investing in a family business, when the 
family own the lion‟s share of the equity.” (BA8) 
 
“So, I think that‟s the lesson I would take from that; you really have to make sure you have 
invested in having the right management in place, even if you have to pay heavily for it. And 
it‟s worth it, as an investor it‟s worth it.” (BA8) 
 
“You have to have a good chemistry with the people and the trust and I guess that‟s probably 
it.” (BA10) 
 
“I think make sure you‟ve got a really good understanding of the drivers that the owners 
have, where they just want a lifestyle business, I‟ve seen loads of those and their capabilities 
as – their drivers and their capabilities is probably absolutely key, once you‟ve done the due 
diligence...” (BA11) 
 
“I think I‟m a much better investor now, than I was then. More discriminating; I think they 
were rather heady days and I didn‟t know what I know now. But nonetheless I would say that, 
yeah. I would challenge people as to why they are doing it, are they sure they are doing the 
right thing.” (BA12) 
 
Two participants also mentioned some learning they developed with regards to dealing with other 
people in the business, most notably other Business Angels; 
 
“You know, you are never quite sure what people‟s aspirations are. Somebody might have 
decided they didn‟t want to sell, which could have caused problems. So it was a management, 
managing process that in the end worked, but it was hard work. So, yeah, dealing with 
different aspirations is quite tricky, actually. But that‟s really been my own only experience of 
it because I only got to first base in investing with others because I have not tended to operate 
like that, I tended to operate on my own.” (BA3) 
 
“...and underlying interests of the equity holders as well, making sure – because there‟s no 
point having shareholders where some want a quick turn and make short-term decisions and 
others want to take a long-term view.  So underlying interests and getting that agreed really 
early is really important.” (BA11) 
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Seven Business Angels specifically stated that by carrying out DUE DILIGENCE and by being 
naive and making mistakes along the way, they learned a great deal about this aspect of the pre-
investment stage, but they particularly learned that due diligence is crucial and needs to be done 
thoroughly. 
 
Having been naive during their first investment, six Business Angels also emphasised that they 
became more selective over time, with regards to investing in specific types, stages or sizes of 
businesses:  
 BA1 suggested that people should only invest in things they understand. 
 BA6 and BA12 recommended to invest larger amounts into fewer businesses. 
 BA8 and BA10 stressed the importance of investing in familiar territories where BAs have own 
expertise. 
 BA9 advised to focus on predictions of reasonable return. 
 
Furthermore, four investors discussed the need to deliberately limit the involvement of emotions in 
the investment decision, so that investments are not made naively but based on rational and 
dispassionate reasons. On the other hand, four other Business Angels stressed the individual and 
personal nature of every investment, which requires gut feeling, instinct or sixth sense which, as such, 
is difficult to generalise. 
3.5 Key Challenges for Business Angels in the North East Region 
 
This section discusses the key challenges for angel investors, which have emerged from the interviews 
held with the 12 Business Angels. Relating to these challenges, six main themes could be identified, 
all of which have been mentioned by multiple investors. These themes will be discussed individually 
below, but reference should be made here that they seem to be connected with one another and as 
such can potentially be viewed as parts of one bigger and more substantial issue. 
3.5.1 Challenge 1 – Insufficient High-Quality Investment Opportunities 
 
Seven of the Business Angels within this research relied to a large extent upon their regional 
syndicate to present them with investment opportunities. While four angels have previously received 
opportunities through Business Angel Networks, only two mentioned this as a primary source of 
opportunities. Ten Business Angels further referred to personal networking and personal contacts (e.g. 
with lawyers, accountants or other business owners) as a key source of opportunities – those investors 
who are members of syndicates tended to mention such personal referrals after discussing the role of 
the syndicate, but obviously those BAs without syndicate membership relied heavily on personal 
contacts. 
 
Eleven of the 12 Business Angels considered the finding of suitable investment opportunities to be a 
key challenge they are facing. Out of those, only one investor stated that it is only the quantity of 
investment proposals that is insufficient; 
 
“I think it‟s very low! It‟s one of the big problems in the North East that there aren‟t 
many…” (BA4) 




The remaining ten BAs considered the issue to be one of quality and quantity, in that they claimed 
there were insufficient amounts of high-quality, investable opportunities, for instance;  
 
“So it‟s probably a factor to do with there aren‟t that many opportunities worth investing in 
up here, you‟ve got to spend a lot of time and effort so they tend to be serial, because that‟s 
just the way they hit your table.” (BA1) 
 
“I‟d like more, I‟d like to see more. I‟d like to see more quality ones. I don‟t care what sector, 
but, yeah, quality ones, quality ones that are investable.” (BA2) 
 
“The quality of the propositions that came to that group were dire.” (BA5) 
 
“No, they are crap, the quality is not good. Three or four out of ten may be good.” (BA6) 
 
“But right now there is a kind of shortage of quality opportunities at the moment.” (BA8) 
 
“I think one or two of the presentations I have seen [at a Business Angel Network Pitching 
event] just haven‟t been sufficiently thought through.” (BA9) 
 
“I would say, based on the investments I‟ve made, probably about 90% of those don‟t get 
past the first hurdle…” (BA10) 
 
“I mean, gosh, you see some unbelievably poor cases presented but there‟s been a couple of 
times in [Regional BAN] when – although as a business which - I like the people but it was 
completely uninvestable…” (BA11) 
 
“I am happy with the amount, I‟m not happy with the nature…” (BA12) 
 
This shows that it is more the quality, rather than the quantity, of investment opportunities which 
seem to be the challenge for Business Angels in the North East. Only one Business Angel was 
satisfied with the amount and quality of investment opportunities he saw. 
 
In order to draw useful conclusions and generate suitable recommendations, it is important to identify 
more specifically the issues that make these investment proposals so poor. There were no common 
issues which all investors discussed when referring to poor proposals but the following are indications 
of low-quality: 
 Exit plan/strategy:  
o The business plan and proposal generally does not include a sufficiently thought through 
exit plan for the investor. (BA2) 
o Business plans are too short-term focused with insufficient emphasis on the long-term 
strategy, overall objectives of the people involved and exit strategy. (BA10) 
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 The entrepreneur(s):  
o Finding entrepreneur(s) that he cannot work with. (BA1) 
o Entrepreneur(s) seems not credible. (BA2) 
o The individuals in the business do not demonstrate that they have track record (if 
experienced) or that they are sufficiently knowledgeable and the right people to run the 
business (if inexperienced). (BA2) 
o Entrepreneur(s) does not appear professional. (BA8) 
o Entrepreneur(s) does not demonstrate that they are able and capable of delivering the 
business plan (either because they lack ability or because they have not committed to the 
plan). (BA10) 
o Entrepreneur(s) appears inflexible and untrustworthy. (BA10) 
o Arrogant entrepreneurs who do not take advice and believe they already know it all. 
(BA11; BA12) 
o Entrepreneurs who do not demonstrate determination and resilience. (BA12)  
 Business plan does not hold up against scrutiny: 
o Business plans are too “flaky.” (BA5) 
o Business plans poorly structured. (BA8) 
o Business plans do not look professional. (BA8) 
o Business plans are not “stress tested”, i.e. have not been thought through from every 
angle. (BA9) 
o Business plans prepared from formulas or templates or prepared by third parties seem to 
not have sufficient buy-in from the entrepreneur(s); entrepreneurs must “live and breathe 
the business plan.” (BA10)  
o Overly lengthy business plans – shows that entrepreneurs cannot convey the message in a 
short form. (BA10) 
o The market is a key part of the business plan and entrepreneurs often do not demonstrate 
that they sufficiently understand it. (BA12) 
o All business plans are over-optimistic but it is a question of how credible the figures are 
once they have been made more realistic. (BA12)  
 Lack of investment readiness: 
o Good investment opportunities but both entrepreneur(s) and business plan seemed like 
they would have needed more time and work before they were ready to be submitted to 
investors. (BA8) 
o Due to cuts in the system, Business Angel Networks and syndicates no longer carry out 
sufficiently good screening and investment readiness preparation. (BA8) 
                                                                      
106 
 
o Lack of understanding around what a business plan is, i.e. entrepreneurs think it is a 
short-term tool for fund-raising rather than a long-term strategic tool that needs updating 
over time. (BA10) 
o Lack of basic understanding of finance. (BA10) 
o A lot of the investments being pitched are currently un-investable and would need more 
mentoring before they get to the correct point but the networks need to provide some deal 
flow and thus present businesses that are not ready or too young. (BA11) 
 Investment Pitch: 
o Presentations not sufficiently thought through. (BA9) 
o The market is a key part of the opportunity and entrepreneurs often do not demonstrate 
that they sufficiently understand it. (BA12) 
 Detachment between Entrepreneur(s) and Business Plans: 
o Third-party prepared business plans need to get the full commitment from the 
entrepreneur(s) as they have to deliver it. (BA10) 
o By allowing someone else to prepare the business plan, entrepreneur(s) removes 
himself/herself from the key document that is required for investment. (BA10) 
 Lack of Interaction with Universities/Insufficient Incubation and Spin-Off Activity: 
o Universities might need to convey more commercial awareness. (BA7) 
o More involvement with “raw talent” is desired. (BA7) 
o It is important to get involved with students and to show them the value and opportunities 
of starting up a business. (BA7)  
o There are insufficient commercially-aware spin-offs in the region. (BA8) 
o Academics are often not as commercially minded as they believe they are and thus do not 
produce the type of opportunity investors are interested in. (BA10) 
o There should be more research-based spin-offs that have commercial appeal. (BA11) 
 Other factors: 
o Investors with very strict criteria find it difficult to identify suitable opportunities in the 
region but they are unwilling to change their criteria. (BA1; BA12) 
 
As this has shown, there seems to be an opinion that insufficient high-quality investment opportunities 
are reaching Business Angels. While this suggests that there are not enough high-quality opportunities 
in the region, this on its own does not seem to provide a full explanation for Business Angels‟ 
dissatisfaction with the status quo – instead, the data further suggested that there may be a lot of high-
quality deals but that the issue might be one of communication and actual flow of deals rather than 
their quality. 
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3.5.2 Challenge 2 – Flow of High-Quality Investment Opportunities 
 
Business Angels are generally an anonymous population which means that, unless they make others 
aware of their existence, they are unlikely to be approached for investment. Within the theme of 
challenge of deal flow, there are two inter-related sub-themes, referring to: The Promotion of 
Business Angels‟ Activities in the region and the Business Angels‟ Interaction with Intermediaries 
in the region respectively. 
3.5.2.1 Promotion of Business Angels‟ Activities 
 
Five of the participating investors were very clear that they would not proactively look for 
investments or promote their investor status in any way; 
 
“Nowadays I probably only see about three a year and that‟s because I‟m not advertising in 
the newspaper as we did before virtually.” (BA1) 
 
“I don‟t solicit any myself; I am the world‟s worst networker. On a social networking scale I 
would be on the reclusive hermit scale, or end of the scale.” (BA3) 
 
“Well as I say apart from the two-year period that I was a member of the business group, I 
have never gone out looking for opportunities to invest in, they just come to me...” (BA5) 
 
“Well I think the key challenge is actually getting access to the right kind of opportunity to be 
honest, that seems to be the area that we struggle with most at. We‟re not getting access as a 
group, and maybe it‟s our own fault...” (BA8)  
 
“Four to date, on the back of my own and I would do as many as I could but it‟s getting 
access to those people. It‟s difficult, what do you do? Do you advertise? Do you wait? Of the 
four I‟ve been involved in, everyone has come to me.” (BA7) 
 
“And they come from everywhere. I don‟t actually know how you get your name out there to 
promote it. I never really got involved in that, you know, I haven‟t put my head up and said 
„I‟m a Business Angel, if you have an opportunity come and speak to me.‟ It tends to be word 
of mouth. And someone will be speaking to someone and say „you should speak to him, he‟s 
got some money that he wants to invest.” (BA7) 
 
In line with Business Angels being anonymous and not promoting their investor status, it seems 
logical that entrepreneurs may, therefore, find it difficult to identify a suitable angel investor or angel 
investors in general. The following comments are examples from the data supporting this notion; 
 
“I think out there partly because those with the good ideas do not know where to get funding 
from.” (BA9)  
 
“Yes, well I don‟t think there are enough people in my position that are fortunate enough to 
have made some money in relation to ventures who are happy enough to risk a proportion of 
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that in new ventures; I don‟t think there are enough, I don‟t think it is sufficiently widely 
known to the likes of me so therefore you‟re not meeting it in both directions. The guys and 
girls with the ideas don‟t know where they can get funding and the guys and girls with the 
money don‟t know whether there may be an opportunity to help people get funding.” (BA9) 
 
“When you are talking in a completion meeting and you are chatting to colleagues, in the 
heady days that we had completion meetings, or when we had deals or when you‟re at 
seminars, you will always be tripping off the tongue where you can get finance, and Business 
Angels have always come up. So everyone‟s known about Business Angels; the difficulty is 
how do I find a Business Angel, and that‟s the issue, has been the issue.” (BA9) 
 
“There should be more advice given to both BAs and entrepreneurs at the entrepreneur 
forums.” (BA6) 
3.5.2.2 Business Angels‟ Interaction with Intermediaries 
 
If Business Angels do not promote themselves, then there is a need for others to promote them – the 
participants were very positive about obtaining opportunities from their personal contact networks but 
in general, they stated that the interaction between Business Angels and intermediaries (including 
other investors who might provide co-investment opportunities) could be improved, which might 
result in better deal flow – for example; 
 
“Well, people like stock brokers come along as well, every so often they get an opportunity. 
There is as much, well these days, it‟s probably more about who you know than what you 
know. So, if people know you as well, bankers, stock brokers, whoever it might be, lawyers, 
they come across these sorts of opportunities and somebody says „well where will I find 
somebody to invest in me?‟ and they say, „we know one or two people.” (BA1)  
This shows that well-known Business Angels are being approached with opportunities by 
intermediaries. 
 
“So they come through syndicate and they get to syndicate via the banks if it‟s a turn round 
operation, trying to protect their investments [laughs]. Why are the banks doing this you 
know! Or there are firms of accountancy, accountants, is a very good one in Newcastle, that 
budding businesses will go to and they will help them draft a business plan, get it into shape 
and then present it, not just to syndicate but to other angel investors and obviously other 
sources of public funding. [...] They don‟t come through the door; they don‟t land on the 
doormat. I don‟t go out soliciting them, other than as a syndicate member - I have a link to 
one of the corporate members, which is a legal firm in Newcastle, but I don‟t think any 
proposals that have ever come through them. They are all entirely through syndicate.” (BA3) 
 
“Yes, so the difficulty we‟ve got is getting access to those opportunities. We are not aware of 
where they are, so unless the firm‟s accountants were to suggest „why don‟t you consider…‟ 
you know, they‟ve got to climb up a problem unless the accountants say „have you considered 
private equity?‟ or „would you like us to make some introductions?‟, unless they do that, the 
only other people that can do it are the banks. There is another thought actually, that maybe 
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the banks aren‟t totally au-fait with the financial condition of all their clients or au-fait as 
they should be. I mean certainly one of the big banks told me they were beginning to put quite 
a bit of effort into developing a better understanding of the financial condition of their clients 
which struck me as a few years too late, but…” (BA8) 
 
“Well deal flow is an issue. I suppose what would be helpful… I‟m an experienced 
commercial lawyer. I didn‟t know about Business Angel Network until two years ago or 18 
months ago. That was almost a fluke that I came across a presentation they were doing. I had 
given a presentation internally to the commercial department in my firm, they didn‟t know 
about it. That‟s not a criticism of Business Angel Network, it‟s just a statement in relation to 
the fact that Business Angels as a collective group are well known but don‟t have a profile or 
there isn‟t a procedure whereby accountants and lawyers, who would be wishing to try and 
help their clients get finance, can be particularly pointed in a direction. Now I‟m more 
familiar with it, it will be much easier. But unless more businesses, small fledgling and larger 
businesses are aware of the finance, then they just will not necessarily get finance to be able 
to take them to the next stage. So they may have a great idea but they may not know about 
that great idea, because it just isn‟t promoted at all. And this is a real weakness...” (BA9) 
 
“The Group for example is a – I see that more as a conduit, so it helps you to build up 
networks within the group and also outside the group as well and that leads to opportunities 
which arise which are independent of those groups...” (BA10) 
This is an example of a Business Angel who seems to have recognised the importance of own 
networking and creating contacts in order to increase deal flow. 
 
“Yes, it can come through business contacts from my previous roles, people that you know.  
Also I keep in touch with the banks and the corporate finance houses and the corporate 
lawyers so they – I‟ve built up a network there and that‟s incredibly important and it‟s an 
inexact science because there‟s no guarantee of any referral but the people who know – like 
the banks and lawyers and everything who‟ve been involved with me as I‟ve been on a project 
and everything, then they get to know that you‟re a person that gets things done or they like 
working with or whatever so if there‟s something which is suitable, I reasonably expect them 
to – and they do come up with opportunities now and again and any good angel investor 
should have a network of corporate contacts because they can be useful for any investment 
that they‟re going to get involved in – not just as a source for future investments but you know 
there might be banking arrangements.  Certainly when you‟re getting involved with a deal 
you‟re going to need a lawyer to draw up the contracts so you‟re – and that should be a two-
way thing because that lawyer will have other clients, businesses that are retiring and want 
extra funding and stuff like that so choosing the right ones is quite good” (BA11)  
This is another example of a Business Angel who seems to have recognised the importance of 
own networking and creating contacts in order to increase deal flow. 
 
“It‟s about having a more bespoke targeted offering, i.e. if you understood what a Business 
Angel is looking for and see what they do, and you are more able to reach it. So me, I am 
looking for a particular thing. I don‟t know that any of the networks are really focussed on 
                                                                      
110 
 
that, they just tend to find out who they want to give money and make them offers.  So making 
a more targeted discriminating broking network would help.” (BA12) 
 
“Well I am only seeking to source them by going to the networks and saying I am interested 
and will co-invest. So I go to the JEREMIE funds and I say, this is what I am interested in , I 
will go to the corporate finance people, over time I want insolvency people to know it, 
lawyers and the angel networks.  Because if they find something to invest in people normally 
then want to find people who have the money to put it in. I think the issue is a shortness of 
Business Angels rather than anything else. So I‟m sort of informally networking and hoping 
that that leads to things.” (BA12) 
 
“If a business plan has come from a firm of accountants, I would be a bit wary about it, to be 
honest [...]. Because a business plan should be… If you are the instigator of this business, it 
has got to be YOUR plan and I think if you…, OK, you might need help to put it together, at 
least get the knowledge of how to put a business plan together but I would hope you have 
written it, I would hope it‟s your narrative – OK, you might use somebody to crunch the 
numbers up for you but if there is too many accountants and lawyers circling around, I have 
got to understand that it‟s the individual‟s plan and not somebody else‟s. Particularly when 
people used to get grants for producing business plans and stuff like that, I am very wary of 
those things.” (BA3) 
 
“It feels strange. The common thinking is that it took an awful long time to set up. It took the 
so called JEREMIE funds, that European funding, it took a long time to put in place, and the 
thinking is that, that created a backlog of equity investment opportunities and once that was 
approved and put in place, then all that kind of washed through and we were all; we often co-
invest with the JEREMIE funds. Some of them I think have co-investment requirements, so we 
were quite busy for a while. Now those waves sort of gone through and we don‟t seem to be 
seeing the same kind of volume. I mean there is still stuff floating around, but it tends to be 
generally poor quality stuff.” (BA8) 
 
“But also they‟re the banks and the accountants and I think a big area for cooperation could 
be that the banks and the accountants referring to people like Business Angel Network and 
using their Business Angel experience and they don‟t do it, it‟s unbelievable, they don‟t do it 
as much as they should do and the banks, they think they‟ve got – well they don‟t think they‟ve 
got - they have got their own restructuring departments but these aren‟t guys who have really 
rolled their sleeves up and have been involved, they just take the financial view of it and it‟s 
much more complicated than that.  So in summary, I think for new businesses, new start-ups 
I‟d probably look at more media exposure but in a softer light which is more encouraging and 
shows success stories and things for existing businesses.  Certainly encourage the banks and 
the accountants to pass the underperforming businesses or try and introduce the owners of 
those businesses to the Business Angel Network members or Business Angels who‟ve got a 
wealth of experience and who can almost certainly find someone who‟s had sector 
experience.” (BA11) 
Another example of insufficient communication between Business Angel (groups) and other 
potential providers of opportunities. 




The above comments suggest that Business Angels who are well-known (or part of a well-known 
group) seem to be more likely to obtain opportunities through professional intermediaries than others. 
However, those who are not well-known are reliant on their personal networks, which in turn suggests 
that those who are proactively and actively involved in networking and extending their personal 
networks of contacts may be at an advantage regarding investment opportunities – there seems to be 
an expectation that the opportunities are going to materialise out of thin air, whereas it seems obvious 
that there is a need for interaction with others and for some level of promotion in order for 
opportunities to reach the Business Angels. 
3.5.3 Challenge 3 – Complex and Confusing Financial Environment 
 
The final challenge, which emerged from the data, is also related to the two previous challenges, 
which may indicate that improvements to the overall deal flow within the region may need to come 
from various angles simultaneously. This third challenge refers to a complex and confusing financial 
environment in the North East with many players offering the same or seemingly the same 
services and products – if the angel investors consider this to be complex, a tentative assumption 
could be that entrepreneurs might believe it to be the case even more so, which adds to the severity of 
the other two challenges explained above. The following are examples of what the participating 
Business Angels said regarding the complexity of the financial environment, together with brief 
interpretations of the individual comments (underlined); 
 
“I‟ve attended a few of those. I came to the conclusion myself that I‟d rather make my own 
decisions and I‟d rather have…, I‟d rather not have somebody competitively trying to pull the 
rug from under me – I‟d rather work closely with the people I am going to invest in, get them 
confident with me and I‟ll take a rational decision about whether I do this. I think there is too 
much [short pause]…, I might be misreading it – I think there is a bit of political infighting 
going on with this, with these groups, there is an insistence on consultancy if you are not 
putting the effort in, there is a few things going on that I don‟t particularly like [...]” (BA3)  
This suggests that there may be too many players with too many conflicting and overlapping 
interests and objectives, making the region a difficult one in which to operate. 
 
“I think it‟s a more general thing about the North East of England. We‟ve had SO many 
initiatives in this area to try and provide finance for growing businesses but I think people are 
getting a bit lost as to what is going on. I mean, we used to have a sort of grants culture, 
which thankfully we moved away from but then we have some loose sort of cartels of Business 
Angels – there is nothing formal that I know of; you get some organisations seem to manage 
them and then don‟t seem to manage them, like[regional BAN] or whatever. You got VCs out 
there, you got the big JEREMIE fund came in a year and a half ago – I don‟t know where 
that‟s going, actually – it seems to be all going as loans rather than equity because the 
funding came from European investment banks, which requires quick returns, so it‟s all hitty-
and-missy and ONE North East going the journey, at least there was some form of control 
exerted over all of that but now, there is a bit of a missing link, really. It‟s quite difficult to 
keep up with what on earth is going on, who‟s doing what and I know most of the people in 
almost all the new Venture Capital outfits because they all came from [VC Firm B] or [VC 
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Firm A] or whatever but I still don‟t see a lot of activity happening, which is quite frustrating. 
So I think it would be good if somehow all that could be controlled and we had a five-to-ten-
year plan of, you know, this is what we want to do and we have got the power and the 
authority to do it and we are gonna create – a bit like, if you go to the States, it‟s much better, 
actually, but if you go to somewhere like the universities, I mean Cambridge, years ago, 
created sort of incubator-type arrangements and you knew you could get funding and a lot of 
businesses developed out of that and that model came from the States, MIT and all that. And 
that…, I mean I worked with the university here when I came back to the region in the mid-
80s actually, when [Regional] University set up a thing called Technology Fund, which was 
linked with [other regional universities], through some arrangement which was in operation 
but I did it for a year and found it very frustrating, actually and I felt that could have done 
more and I think if the universities – and I know there is a whole issue with funding and 
everything else – that could be something in the North East that could create a culture, create 
an environment for start-ups that had all the pieces in place to help them, the advice, the 
money, the support, you know, it‟s not a grand thing but certainly HELP to get a new 
business going. We‟ve never really done that – we‟ve had attempts at it – and there‟s been 
some private initiatives as well. It‟s all…, there‟s no ten-year plan built. I think I have felt 
that frustration ever since I came back to this region in the mid-80s – you‟ve always got to go 
your own way, which is what I‟ve done. And the reason I‟ve done that is that there‟s no 
natural way of doing it.” (BA3) 
Similar to the comment before, this quote suggests that the environment is difficult to operate 
in due to a multiplicity of initiatives, not all of which are easily understandable but appear 
overlapping and complex. 
 
“Well, I have mentioned one and that is the absence of opportunities – there aren‟t enough – 
if we are talking about here – around. The… I can‟t think of any… I think this area was on 
the whole well served by One North East – not many businessmen say things like this about 
public sector bodies but… But I did think of all the regional bodies and I met them all when I 
was at the Learning and Skills Council and this was probably the best one, certainly one of 
the best, and much more needed here than in any other parts of the country. So I think it was 
very sad when it was dismantled and I don‟t think the substitution of it – I think it‟s six, isn‟t it 
– authorities for it works at all. And the North East is quite a small economy anyway, it‟s only 
about £40bn, something like that; it‟s really, in the global – even the European – scheme of 
things, that‟s almost…, it‟s not nearly as big as say the Barcelona area. So, to break it up like 
that was silly and very unhelpful. Of course, the new system is also much less funded than the 
previous one, they managed to disguise that but it is. So I think that‟s a shame and it needed 
focus and putting together and a bit of flag-waving and businessmen can‟t do that – they can 
help it but it really has to be led by politicians or public sector somehow. And we‟ve lost that 
and that‟s a shame.” (BA4) 
This investor is dissatisfied with the changes within the region, which he believes have been 
for the worse. 
 
“The Trouble is, if there are two Business Angels in the room, three Business Angels and one 
developer, one business developer, everyone‟s not gonna get on, someone‟s gonna get on 
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better than the other person and then it gets all political and there‟s enough hassle with 
building and running a business without any politics in it.” (BA7) 
 
“And in the main, well, they‟ve all got to find private investors to co-invest with. I don‟t know 
if they are all as proactive as they could be in terms of coming and knocking on our door, 
Regional BA syndicate‟s door, but they may have other doors they prefer to knock on to get 
that private co-investment.” (BA2) 
 
“But the fund managers, [names], they are driven by somewhat different objectives I think , 
and I think if we can align those objectives between groups of BAs,  [name of example group], 
there is a view that most of the members of those organisations would have about how you 
would go about valuing something. We‟ve had presentations from, I think it was one of the 
directors at [regional firm of accountants] who said, you know it‟s not exactly a science and 
he went through three or four different approaches you can take on that, which is fine, 
intellectually we understand that, but then the fund managers, because I think this money has 
come from JEREMIE, and I think they‟ve got to invest another five years. But I think that 
money has gone in as loan capital, as opposed to equity, with a coupon on it. And I‟m not 
sure that‟s desirable and sometimes that can lead to a radically different view as to the 
eventual evaluation when it comes to the next stage of investment.” (BA2) 
The previous three comments show that the complexity of the environment is not only due to 
complex government and political initiatives, but is also related to the complexities of dealing 
with co-investment from other Business Angels, Venture Capital or (presumably also) others. 
 
“I find the investment environment a confusing one. There are a lot of organisations out there 
purporting to support businesses, new businesses, and business start-ups. Frankly, I don‟t 
know what the hell they all do. You know there is a lot of government this and that, Business 
Link and da-der da-der da-der da-der. And I just find the whole thing very confusing.  There 
seems to be a scattergun approach to supporting business start-ups. There just doesn‟t 
appear to be a good process. It just seems to be all over the place. And so people like myself 
just flounder around trying to do the best we can.” (BA8) 
A further discussion of the complexities and multitude of parties involved in the region. 
 
“There‟s a constantly changing landscape in terms of taxation and those sorts of matters – 
it‟s quite hard to keep up with all of that.  Also the structure of the government subscribing 
entities – Regional Fund and all the other funds that are out there, sources of capital, 
government-sponsored sources of capital.  You turn them over everywhere, there‟s 
environmental technology funders, Technology and Strategy Board, there‟s the former 
JEREMIE Funds – they‟re all over the place. [...] Yes, because even if you look at your 
sponsor, they‟re part of North East finance, they fit in somewhere and they‟re doing a bit then 
all the funds – it‟s quite a complex structure, you wonder how much bureaucracy is in there 
and how it could be slimmed down – Business Link and all that kind of stuff, there‟s a lot of 
things out there where, if you looked at them with a private sector perspective should I say, 
then you might be able to strip some of the cost out of it which would mean that more of the 
funds would find their way to where they‟re supposed to get to.” (BA10) 
A further discussion of complexities and dynamic changes within the region. 




“There does need to be greater clarity. As I say there are all kinds of bodies and groups, and 
entrepreneurs‟ group forums that they‟ve got locally. And I get the local morning newspaper 
and hardly a week goes by when there‟s another one. There‟s another one this week. There 
used to be a group called [name] which was set up I think with One North East money or 
funding and the idea was to take ten companies into a process, give them £50,000 or 
something and from those ten companies we have got three synopses. From those ten 
companies we‟ve got synopses from three companies or three of four and a couple of them 
seem quite interesting, but we‟ve been trying to get a business plan, for three months!  SO 
WHAT THE HELL HAVE THEY BEEN DOING if they haven‟t been preparing a business 
plan?  And now that‟s been replaced by something else. There is another thing in the Journal 
this week, I started reading and thought oh shit I can‟t be bothered... I get sick of reading 
this….  So it just seems to me that there is a lot of effort going into it but it all just seems so 
disparate and un-coordinated, half-arsed. Somebody comes up with a bright idea and they try 
that, and then they try this. And people like me sort of try to ignore it basically and just try 
and find opportunities…” (BA8) 
Complex and dynamic environment with too many initiatives and insufficient emphasis given 
to each one. 
 
“Yes because even if you look at your sponsor, they‟re part of North East finance, they fit in 
somewhere and they‟re doing a bit then all the funds – it‟s quite a complex structure, you 
wonder how much bureaucracy is in there and how it could be slimmed down – Business Link 
and all that kind of stuff, there‟s a lot of things out there where, if you looked at them with a 
private sector perspective should I say, then you might be able to strip some of the cost out of 
it which would mean that more of the funds would find their way to where they‟re supposed to 
get to.” (BA10) 
Complexity and too many players with too many initiatives. 
 
“I think it would be great if there was a market where all the opportunities existed, and you 
could have a look at them. And if you could target in a way to communicate what you are 
specifically looking for, so you knew you were seeing the - that would be quite useful. It‟s a 
bit ad-hoc and I‟m not sure of a way of avoiding that. I know they are creating a new 
Business Angel Network but, fine there will be another one, someone else to talk to. They are 
not going to scoop up any more than all the others are. It would be useful I think to have a 
secondary market, i.e. people who have got private equity investments and can‟t sell them. 
Some people desperately want to sell, either because the business isn‟t working or more 
particularly because they need the money for some reason. So there are opportunities to come 
in and trade with them, but that is very hard to do because nobody is offering them a 
secondary market in private equity investments. And it would make sense you know. If you 
started off with ten, you end up with five; you might want to swap half of your five with half 
another five so you‟ve got ten again.” (BA12) 
Another comment on complexities and the number of parties involved. 
 
“It‟s not, but I‟m not sure how it can be really, because there is always someone running a 
different initiative. They are essentially competitive, so you‟re right, but I‟m not sure how one 
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can resolve that really.  I resolve that by talking to all of them rather than being in one 
network.” (BA12) 
A final comment on the diverse number of initiatives. 
SMEs 
 
An overview of the summary findings from the SMEs was presented in the executive summary 
section of this report, what follows here is the detailed findings from both the focus group interviews 
and from the questionnaires. 
4. SMEs - Focus Group Interviews 
The purpose of the focus group interviews was to gather first-hand information from a random 
selection of SMEs on their views and experiences of the demand-side of SME finance.  The common 
themes discussed during the session concerning SME access to finance were as follows:  
1. Bank Finance. 
2. Guidance and Support. 
3. Role of Advisors/Mentors. 
4. Business Areas. 
5. Top Things to Consider. 
SMEs Focus Group Summary 
 
1. SMEs are experiencing difficulties in gaining bank finance for new businesses, but also for 
established businesses. 
2. Banks‟ „relationship management‟ systems are perceived as not being in operation anymore. 
3. Banks are perceived to over-emphasise personal guarantees and over-recommend SMEs to use 
alternative funding sources. 
4. There is a perception that funding difficulties derive from mistakes banks have made in the past. 
5. Advice and mentoring are crucial to the sector but the value depends upon the provider. For 
example, there was mixed experiences with different support providers, some good, others less so 
and differing experiences with Business Link – one has a great relationship with their Business 
Advisor, others have been given poor or not useful or out-of-date advice. 
6. There is a perception that „fashionable‟ businesses (e.g. green businesses) receive preferential 
treatment. 
7. There was a general call for awareness, communication and transparency of support and finance 
sources to be improved upon. 
8. Networking and business contacts are key for sourcing relevant information and support. More 
experienced participants were keen to emphasise the importance of experience and developing 
networks, relationships and one-to-one business contacts regarding knowing who to approach, 
„tips‟ and where to get good information and support. 
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9. Some of the SMEs reported issues/experiences which were specific to their particular business 
needs and circumstances.  For example, one new E-business finding that lenders don‟t understand 
its business model; another new SME having specific finance problems related to the seasonality 
of its goods. 
 
4.1 Overview of Participants 
  
There were a total of seven participants that agreed to take part in the focus group (see selection 
criteria discussed in analysis and findings section above). As discussed, each completed the brief 
background questionnaire on the day and from this a profile of the participants could be created, 
indicating their age, stage of development, size, growth potential, sector and location: 
 Age: There was a good range of ages of SMEs represented in the focus group, from businesses 
which were one year old or less, to a business which was established 17 years ago. 
 Stage of Development: There was a good mix of both „new‟ and „established‟ SMEs represented 
in the focus group. However there were no businesses at „start-up‟ or „pre-start-up‟ stage. 
 Size: The focus group comprised five micro and two medium sized SMEs and no small 
enterprises. In the North East the distribution of micro, small and medium SMEs is: micro 82.5%; 
small 14.9% and medium 2.6% (BIS 2011). From the focus group, five out of seven SMEs were 
micro (71.4%) and two were medium (28.6%); none were small. 
 Growth Potential: SMEs are intending to grow their businesses. One respondent intends to 
maintain their business at current levels. The remaining six respondents indicated that their 
intention is to grow their business and all intend this growth to be greater than 5%. 
 Sector: The focus group included a cross-section of industry types and businesses from four of the 
five sectors. Across the five sectors, the distribution of micro, small and medium SMEs in the 
North East is: Primary sector (4.4%); production sector (8.8%); TRAD (transport, retail and 
distribution) sector (38.7%); construction sector (14.1%); and service sector (34%) (BIS 2011). 
From the focus group, three out of seven SMEs are from the production sector (43%); one from 
the TRAD sector (14%); one from construction (14%) and two from the service sector (29%). 
None were from the primary sector. 
 Location: The focus group included a cross-section of business locations in the northern part of 
the region, with businesses from urban, urban-fringe and rural areas. However there were no 
businesses from the southern part of the region (Tees Valley area). 
 
4.2 Key Findings 
4.2.1 Bank Finance 
  
SMEs within the region were experiencing difficulties in gaining bank finance, which could be 
attributed to the shift in the banking paradigm (attitude to lending), the credit decision-making 
process, the use of personal guarantees, mistakes made by banks, the use of international banking 
avenues and changes in banking products and services.  
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“I mean that‟s quite a common trend, and I mean I‟ve – up until a year ago – I worked for a 
bank for eight years so I was one of the guys sitting on the other side of the fence and saw the 
kind of shift that banks made pretty much overnight away from „Well we‟ll do anything we 
can to help you as long as we can see how we‟re going to get repaid and it kind of makes 
sense then we‟ll do what we can to support you,‟ to being… was literally an attitude shift, 
overnight, by the banks.” 
“Well those are your overdraft facilities, those are your….. stick to it, that will give us more 
security and that was the kind of change in attitude practically overnight.” 
Banks were known to finance SMEs through a specialised relationship management system; however 
it is perceived to have been replaced by a “credit team” and “credit scoring.” 
“….I find this, the word „credit team‟ appears a bit more now, before you used to talk to your 
relationship manager and they‟d say yes or no and now you don‟t really know if you‟re going 
to be approved for something or not because it goes away to „the credit team‟ and they come 
back with lots more questions. Whereas now, all the decisions are still made by the credit 
teams.” 
“Decisions at that level are made by – where banks say, you know, 80% of our decisions are 
made on the spot by our managers are by machine, at that level they are, that‟s the way those 
decisions – you know, it‟s a credit scoring process, at micro finance level, the decisions are 
made by a machine essentially.” 
SMEs are also concerned about the increased demand for personal guarantees by the banks.  
“…the banks won‟t do it unless there‟s an extra personal guarantee linked in, you have to 
provide a full set of monthly accounts and go through everything annually just to get to the 
point of saying „yeah, we‟ll lend you another £50,000.”  
“Now all accounts are graded in the bank, no matter whether you‟re a micro business or 
you‟re a multinational organisation.  Every single one that - will be on different grading 
structures for different sized businesses but they‟re all on a grading structure and if your 
grading structure is in that bottom percentile, no matter how good your story is you will find 
it very difficult to raise finance and that‟s the way - but because the way the regulations are 
changing, that‟s the way the banks have to manage it now as well so the capital adequacy 
ratios…” 
Further, banks are advising SMEs to opt for other sources of finance such as invoice financing or 
securitised debt.  
“We have an overdraft facility, I was fairly confident we‟d get it increased for six months or 
so last year, there was a good reason behind it and they steered us down having invoice 
finance,  it is a bit more costly but in their eyes it‟s a securitised debt.”  
“I know we‟re talking about banks now so on the day to day basis that‟s been our main 
change; the switch from an overdraft to invoice finance.”  
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SMEs are experiencing a shift towards international banking with the entry of new players for export-
import companies and also companies related to a specific part of the community.  
“….there are other banks coming into the banking sector and you can knock on the doors of 
countries that you export to, knock on their door and I think you‟ll see more of that.  If you 
were exporting into that market you can use their bank.” 
“Yes, and of course there‟s also Islamic banks coming in, there is a different emphasis as well 
on Islamic lending which has come into the market place.”  
SMEs were also of the view that banks have made some mistakes in recent years which have made 
access to finance difficult. 
“The banks have come out and openly admitted that a big part of why we‟re in this position is 
because they‟ve made some bad mistakes and what other business could you be in where you 
would make those fundamental mistakes and go out and ask your customers to pay for them?”  
“They went through an extensive cost-cutting exercise, you know, they might have wiped 
£20,000 off the cost base and then you would go out and wipe that out overnight by doubling 
the interest margin on the overdraft facility and putting up the money transmission fees and 
all this and it was – you begin to ask some questions of yourself actually when you‟re in that 
position.” 
4.2.2 Guidance and Support 
 
More experienced participants were keen to emphasise the importance of experience and developing 
networks, relationships and one-to-one business contacts.  They emphasised knowing who to 
approach, „tips‟ and where to get good information and support.  
“…having somebody who could pull my application together for me, who knew exactly what 
the funders were asking, who could tell me that… „your business plan says X - we‟re not 
changing the business plan but you need to highlight why‟ and that‟s what they‟re looking for 
and that was absolutely invaluable.” 
“…we had a successful grant from [council], it was the guy who said „you need to put this in 
the application, you need to say this, this and this….and you need to get it right first time 
because you won‟t have a chance to reapply because it runs out in ten days‟ time‟, and it was 
that support.” 
“Telling us what to put for the right reasons and in the right manner to enhance the 
application standing.” 
“There‟s a load of courses available out there, there‟s a load of advice on how to write a 
good business plan. Very few of them come from the point of view of being able to write a 
business plan to obtain finance because they‟re two completely different beasts and this is 
where what I was saying before about accountants charging £2,000-£3,000 to write a 
business plan, that might be a great business plan to help you manage your business and 
monitor performance.” 
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“There isn‟t any training for SMEs on accessing finance or finances as a thing so how do you 
pitch to VCs, how do you really - the whole way of getting money that way is a business skill 
and it needs to be taught, it needs to be trained and it isn‟t just something you do, it‟s a 
fundamental part of the business, banks are part of it.” 
“Investment readiness stuff. Business needs to plug into academia in a way because these 
skills need to be absorbed.” 
4.2.3 Role of Advisors/Mentors 
 
SMEs can find the advice and mentoring initiatives offered by different organisations invaluable. 
However, concerns were raised by participants on the role of advisors and mentors as follows: 
 
“Money available for courses, but not for business. They have their own agenda to hit the 
targets.” 
 
“Advisors are expert in anything. … quite bureaucratic... the advisors are seen justifying 
forms… money wasted… lots of advisors.” 
  
“Advisors saying „impossible to get the EFGs.‟ …some are advising to use angel investment 
platforms.”  
 
“There is others though, as well isn‟t there, there‟s, like, the Entrepreneurs‟ Forum where 
you can ask for a mentor and that‟s probably – if I reflected on the last five years, probably 
was a bit too proud to go and ask for a mentor because you thought „what‟s he really going to 
have,‟ moving onto – nearly completion of my course and everything else you look and you 
think I wish I‟d done that earlier because the narrow vision of an individual is never going to 
give the full perspective of what probably a businessman that‟s had the last reality of 20 
years‟ worth of good, bad and ugly and in order to do that I think it is a good thing, it‟s just 
being strong enough to go and ask.” 
4.2.4 Business Areas 
 
In the current economic climate, SMEs were of the view that it would be easy to get grants or bank 
finance if the SMEs were associated with renewables, green energy and social enterprises.  
“Renewables, green energy and social enterprises are becoming the buzz words. It‟s novel, it‟s 
new, it‟s of the time.”  
“…can get points on his ticket for supporting that kind of business as well because they need stars 
on their cards for what they‟re doing so if they‟re seen to be in the right place at the right time, 
great.”  
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4.2.5 Top Things to Consider 
 
There are some issues/experiences of SMEs which differ because of specific industry, size, etc. For 
example, one business‟s experience of exporting; one new E-business finding that lenders don‟t 
understand its business model; another new SME having specific finance problems related to the 
seasonality of its goods. However, it could be emphasised that awareness, communication, knowledge 
of the finance products and transparency were essential constituents for consideration.   
“Awareness and communication…. think if there was one place which I know is probably 
what [organisation] are meant to be – but one place could pull all that together and 
communicate it out regularly to the business community, I think that would be a massive 
difference.”  
“I think if the banks, when they‟re showing you their product ranges – if they were just 
clearer about what‟s on offer, you know, for you to get this rate, your business has to be – has 
to have X amount of profitability or if you‟re a starter you have to invest, you have to 
demonstrate this element of long-term growth and you have to have invested X percentage 
into your business.” 
“But they [banks] could at least be transparent, like OPEC and tell how much production 
they‟re going to be ???!” 
5. SMEs - Questionnaire Survey 
 
Since the main reason for conducting the questionnaire survey was to identify the experiences and 
opinions of many SME owner/managers, it was deemed important to make use of every response, thus 
partially completed questionnaires were included in the analysis where valid data had been included 
in the response beyond provision of merely demographic information. The questionnaire resulted in 
119 responses in total, 116 of which were usable based upon the definition of „SME‟ adopted for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
SME Survey Summary 
 
Requirement for Finance 
 
1. A large number of SMEs will, in the near future, require access to external growth finance, which 
suggests that many (if not all) may soon be affected by potential difficulties in finding funding 
sources suitable for their growth intentions.  
2. In the last 12 months, SMEs used bank finance, especially overdrafts, more than any other 
funding source. Since capital was required mostly for working capital purposes, flexible 
overdrafts appeared to be the best suitable form of capital. 
3. Debt and grants are the preferred sources of finance. 
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4. Almost 80% of SMEs have faced difficulties in raising capital, and some were unable to raise any 
finance at all. SME owner-managers consider investors (particularly banks) to be the reason why 
they were unsuccessful in raising finance – hardly any demand-side reasons for difficulties were 
offered. 
 
Sources of Finance 
 
5. An over-emphasis on bank finance may suggest an over-reliance on debt to the detriment of 
potentially suitable alternative funding sources. 
6. Almost three quarters of SMEs were unable to raise the required amounts of capital from their 
preferred or alternative sources of finance; therefore, many were faced with a „forced stagnation‟ 
as they had to put plans on hold or defer projects. 
7. More than one third of respondents lack knowledge of the suitability of various funding providers, 
which may possibly indicate a demand-side reason underlying their inability to raise capital. 
8. Just under one third of participants openly claimed to be unaware of what funders are looking for 
in a funding proposal. 
9. SME owner-managers are worried or only moderately optimistic about the future funding 
situation, stating that the fundraising process has become more cumbersome over the years and is 
expected to remain difficult in the future. A very small minority of respondents believe that the 




10. Less than half of respondents asked for further finance-related training, but over two thirds stated 
that SMEs generally should have more finance-related training. 
11. As with the findings from the focus group, when seeking information about business support 
activities, SMEs rely mostly on personal contacts, followed by Business Link, professional 
contacts and membership of business organisations. Most SMEs required support for business 
growth (which may include financial support) but only a very few SMEs explicitly sought finance 
and investment readiness support. The most frequently used support providers are accountants, 
banks, Business Link local services and the Business Link website.  The least used sources are 
government departments, trade/business associations, other specialists (e.g. HR or marketing) and 
enterprise agencies or partnerships. The most useful support providers, on the other hand, are 
consultants, business mentors and other specialists (e.g. HR or marketing); the least useful were 
identified as banks, local authorities/councils and enterprise agencies or partnerships. 
12. There were no particularly strong opinions about how easy it is for SMEs to access support 
providers or whether required service is available locally. Almost two thirds of participants 
thought that finding the right business support involves having to contact too many different 
organisations. Less than half of respondents claimed that there is no suitable business skills 
training for their type of business. Only a very small minority of SME owner-managers 
considered currently provided support services to be excellent.  SMEs are most confident that 
accountants, mentors, other businesses in own industry and the Business Link local service can 
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communicate support services; SMEs are not confident in the communications from local 
authorities/councils and solicitors/lawyers. SMEs are most confident in accountants, other 
businesses in own industry and mentors/trainers to deliver support services.  
 
5.1 Profile of Respondents 
 
The respondents were asked to provide the number of employees they had employed during the 
preceding 12 months.  Figure 16 below presents the findings, showing that out of 97 responses, the 
majority (58%) of participating SMEs can be considered micro businesses as they employ fewer than 
ten employees. A further 18% employ between ten and 49 employees and thus can be considered 
small businesses, whereas only 10% of participants are medium-sized enterprises employing between 
50 and 249 employees. 
 










Comparing this to the overall population of SMEs in the North East region, the findings are slightly 
biased towards small and medium-sized enterprises, as the figure below shows. However, our findings 
still possess substantial similarities with the overall population of SMEs. Considering that our survey 
was distributed through various business associations, it is possible that membership in these 
associations is skewed in favour of small and medium-sized businesses, so that our data might reflect 
the membership of those organisations, rather than the overall population in the region. 
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The profile of respondents by sector shows that the survey‟s responses are substantially skewed 
towards the services sector, which does not reflect the official statistics (Figure 18 below). However, 
our survey gave the respondents the opportunity to choose their own sector or industry and to provide 
their own description of their sector. Since 48 out of 119 respondents made use of the „other‟ option, 
we allocated their responses into one of the categories. Due to a large amount of very generic 
descriptions, such as „consultancy‟, we were unable to identify exactly whether such a response might 
fit better with other categories and thus a large proportion were allocated to the services section. 
 










5.2 SMEs‟ Growth Intentions 
 
The participants were asked what their plans were for the next two years of their business, which was 
intended to establish their growth intentions. As shown in the Figure below, out of 110 respondents 
who answered this question, 90 respondents (corresponding to 82%) intend to grow their businesses, 
whereas only 12 respondents (11%) aim to maintain the business at current levels and only one 
respondent (0.9%) wants to reduce levels of trading. 
 
The growth-oriented owner-managers were subsequently asked for more detail about their planned 
growth and the required financial resources. 53% (47 out of 89 respondents) of the businesses which 
intend to grow expect to use external finance to fund all or some of their growth, see Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Anticipated Sources of Finance for Growth-Oriented Businesses 
 
 
(NB. The three respondents who indicated „Other‟ explained that they would not require any financial 
injections despite wanting to grow because of increased royalties, reduced overheads and increased 
number of customers.) 
 
35% (31 out of 89 respondents) of growth-oriented businesses had already begun seeking finance for 
their intended growth objectives and, when asked what support they would draw upon to find such 
external finance, 20 responses were collected. Of these, 30% (six out of 20) are receiving support 
from more than one source: Six mentioned some form of service provider (e.g. accountants) or 
consultancy; five mentioned the bank; four mentioned venture capital, and three mentioned Business 
Link. Two respondents mentioned Business Angels. 
 
Combined, these findings show that a large number of SMEs will, in the near future, require access to 
external growth finance, which suggests that many (if not all) may soon be affected by potential 
difficulties in finding funding sources suitable for their growth intentions.  
 
5.3 SMEs‟ Capital Requirements over the Past Year 
 
The participants were asked about their recent experience in raising capital in the North East of 
England. When questioned whether they had attempted to obtain finance between September 2010 
and September 2011, 109 respondents provided an answer. As Figure 20 shows, 56.9% of respondents 
(corresponding to 62 SMEs) had tried to obtain finance in the last year, 29 of whom had tried to 
obtain finance on more than one occasion.  
 
                                                                      
126 
 




When asked what they needed this capital for (in the case of SMEs attempting to raise capital more 
than once, we asked respondents about the main fundraising event), 60.4% listed „working 
capital/cash flow‟ (32 out of 53 respondents), 34% indicated „business expansion/growth‟ (18 
mentions) and 26.4% referred to „marketing‟ (14 mentions). The remaining answers were less 
frequent but can be seen in Figure 21. 
Figure 21 SMEs‟ Reasons for Raising Capital in the Last Year 
 
 
(NB. The three respondents who answered with „Other‟ stated the following reasons for fundraising: 
Supporting core activities; buy-out; and no actual requirement for capital.) 




When asked what type of finance they were trying to obtain, 54 respondents answered the question 
with a total of 212 mentioned sources. The following presents the top five most frequently mentioned 
sources of finance, which respondents claimed to have sought: 
1. „Bank overdraft‟ (31 mentions). 
2. „Bank loan‟ (24 mentions). 
3. „Grant‟ (20 mentions). 
4. „Venture capital/equity finance‟ (18 mentions).  
5. „Company Credit Card‟ (15 mentions). 
 
Given that a majority of businesses needed finance for working capital purposes, it is not surprising 
that bank overdrafts were used, as it is not only the most flexible form of finance but also does not 
require dilution of ownership. The least often used forms of finance were found to be loans from 
friends, family and other businesses, personal credit cards and factoring/invoice discounting. 
5.4 SMEs‟ Preferred Sources of Finance 
 
Having indicated which sources of finance they attempted to obtain, respondents were further probed 
as to which of those sources they preferred and why. 47 respondents answered this question and gave 
insights into their preferred sources. Table 14 below shows the responses, in descending order of 
preference, together with the reasons the SMEs gave for preferring these sources. 
 
Table 14 Preferred Sources of Finance 
 
Rank Source of finance and proportion of all 
responses 
Underlying reasons 
1 Banks (44% - 21 respondents), including: 
 Bank loans 
 Bank overdrafts 




 quick decision 
 reasonable interest rate 
 trust 
2 Grants (27% - 13 respondents)  no repayments 
 no interest 
 flexibility 
 no debt 
3 Venture capital (6% - three respondents; one 
as a potential match funding for an EU grant) 
 No reasons provided 
4 Business Angels (4% - two respondents)  comes with experience & contacts 
attached  
 someone who understands the sector and 
what we are trying to do 
 
Given that entrepreneurs generally tend to prefer non-equity based finance sources (in order not to 
have to relinquish any equity in their business), the finding that grants and debt, sources that 
typically do not involve any dilution of shareholding, were preferred sources of finance by a 
                                                                      
128 
 
majority of respondents is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that none of the respondents 
mentioned this issue in answering the question on why they preferred these sources. 
 
5.5 Difficulties in Obtaining Finance 
 
When asked if they had any difficulties in obtaining finance from their preferred source, 78% (42 out 
of 54 respondents) responded positively, claiming that they had experienced some difficulties (see 
Figure 22). 
 




40.7% (22 respondents) were unable to obtain any finance from their preferred source. A further 37% 
(20 respondents) either obtained all the finance but with some problems, or did not get all the finance 
they needed. This appears to be in line with the notion of a finance gap existing for small 
businesses, as the majority of SMEs appear to face difficulties in obtaining their preferred 
source of capital. Considering that more than half of respondents previously stated that they expect to 
utilise more external finance in order to grow their businesses within the next year, this finding is 
worrying as it may suggest that businesses with growth intentions might also face similar problems in 
the coming year; this in turn may result in a continuation of a finance gap and further 
unsuccessful fundraising efforts within the region.  
 
Those respondents who were wholly or partly unsuccessful in obtaining finance were probed further 
regarding their fundraising experience and 34 participants responded, see Table 15.  
 
Although more than half of respondents (i.e. 55.9%, or 19 out of 34 respondents) described their 
experience as „completed the process but was unsuccessful‟, a number of SMEs stated that they 
voluntarily withdrew from the process prior to completion. Unfortunately, we could not probe into 
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the reasons for this early withdrawal, but it is interesting to note that the termination of the 
process was due to the decision of the SME, rather than the investors‟ rejection of finance. 
 
Table 15 SMEs‟ Recent Experience of Fundraising  
 
Response Number of mentions  
(out of 34 respondents) 
Corresponding  
% 
SMEs began the fundraising process but were 
unsuccessful 
19  55.9% 
SMEs began the process but were put off early on 10 29.4% 
SMEs began the process but withdrew part way 
through 
4 11.8% 
SMEs did not complete the process for other (non-
business related) reasons 
1 2.9% 
 
In order to understand the reasons underlying the fact that 78% of respondents struggled to obtain 
funding from their preferred source of finance, the respondents who were wholly or partly 
unsuccessful in obtaining finance were asked to provide the reasons for this; both the reasons 
provided by their preferred source of finance, as well as their own view. 
 
When asked about the reasons given by the finance source, 46% (18 out of 39 responses) mentioned 
difficulties or obstacles regarding access to bank sources of finance. Details provided include: 
 
“Banks are not helpful.”  
 
“The bank … did not understand our business.”  
 
“The bank wanted a house as security for £25K.” 
  
“Each time we have approached the bank they have quoted different reasons for not lending. 
They are inconsistent.” 
 
“Banks… reluctant to loan.” 
 
“Banks are not lending - they are pretending they are, but can only substantiate this by turning 
overdrafts into loans, so they look as if they are lending to business… It's actually a SCANDAL.” 
 
“The bank wanted a higher level of equity in the business.” 
 
“The interest was laughable, this was from our bank.” 
 
“Banks tended to try and nudge us away from […] to a traditional loan.” 
 
“Bank would not support the application without Personal Guarantees even though it was the 
Government backed Development Fund.” 
 
                                                                      
130 
 
“Government loan was not explained and … overdraft was not available for bank‟s own 
reasoning.” 
 
28% (11 out of 39 respondents) used aspects of their business (such as its financial position at the 
time, its structure or stage of development) as reasons for lack of success in obtaining finance. Of 
these, 82% (9 out of 11 respondents) were trying to obtain bank finance.  
 
17% (7 out of 39 respondents) identified that they could not access finance because of their „type of 
business‟ – either no funding was available (43% of these - three out of seven - referred to grant 
sources), or funders would not lend to them. Sample comments include;  
 
“No financial support for a business of my type.” 
  
“[bank] will not lend to 'Construction Industry.” 
 
When asked for the respondents‟ own views of the reasons for lack of success in obtaining finance 
from their preferred source, 31% (12 out of 38 responses) mentioned issues with bank sources.  
 
Three other reasons were each mentioned by 10% (4 out of 38) of respondents: 
 Business being young/high risk. 
 Business was misinformed or the information about finance was unclear. 
 Insufficient or no funding available.  
 
All reasons mentioned by respondents refer to the supply-side of finance, which may indicate either 
that the funding difficulties really do exist, due to a lack of finance provided from banks, or that the 
funding difficulties exist due to demand-side reasons, which the respondents did not reveal. 
Unfortunately, responses to this question alone cannot be used to provide any further explanations of 
the two possible meanings. Nevertheless, the fact that no respondent mentioned their own role in 
unsuccessful fundraising appears suspicious, particularly in comparison to the Business Angels‟ 
emphasis on a lack of investment readiness and otherwise low-quality investment proposals.  
 
Therefore, the survey respondents‟ focus on the supply-side issues might alternatively be 
explained due to respondents‟ subjective and potentially biased perception of the fundraising 
process; by the quality of their company; or possibly even the owner-managers‟ insufficient 
understanding of different funding sources and their requirements. 
 
This latter point is especially interesting in the context of comments about failed finance that refer 
almost exclusively to banks. While this emphasis on banks reflects the respondents‟ responses to 
previous questions, it might also suggest an over-reliance on bank finance to the detriment of 
other potentially suitable investors due to an insufficient understanding of finance sources and 
their suitability for the respondents‟ own businesses. 
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When asked about the impact on their business, 15% (five out of 33 respondents) indicated that it had 
„serious financial difficulties‟ for the business. 24% (eight out of 33 respondents) had to „put plans on 
hold‟ and 36% (12 out of 33 respondents) had to „defer plans‟. „Other‟ related comments include; 
 
“It could change to closing the company down.” 
 
“...had to … make staff redundant.” 
 
“Directors had to put in their own cash which is unsecured against business failure.” 
 
“We are extremely vulnerable …  it makes me angry that such a successful business cannot obtain 
financing.” 
 
Finally, 18% (six respondents) stated that they are yet to find out the extent to which the inability to 
raise capital is going to affect their businesses. 




Although only a small number of respondents were severely affected by unsuccessful fundraising, the 
others‟ needs to postpone or delay projects and growth plans could nevertheless influence the 
businesses substantially, as long-term implications of such „forced stagnation‟ may be severe and 
could ultimately lead to more SMEs being seriously affected by this need to postpone. This finding is 
particularly worrying if we consider the responses from a further question, which asked unsuccessful 
fundraisers whether they were able to obtain the required amounts through alternative funding 
sources: 
 71.1% (27 out of 38 respondents) said that they were unable to gain the required finance from 
alternative sources and 
 only 28.9% of respondents were successful in gaining finance from other, less preferred sources. 
 
Given that almost three quarters of SMEs were unable to raise required amounts of capital 
from their preferred or alternative sources of finance, a „forced stagnation‟ may be even more 
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dangerous for businesses as „the way out‟ (e.g. through seeking funding from sources other than 
the preferred one) seems to be also blocked. 
 
5.6 SMEs‟ Knowledge of Finance Providers 
 
The respondents were asked a variety of questions relating to their own views on finance for small 
businesses; they were asked to indicate their responses on a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 
„strongly agree‟ to „strongly disagree‟, with an option for „neither agree nor disagree‟ and one for „not 
applicable‟.  
 
First, respondents were asked about their own perceived level of knowledge around how suitable for 
their needs various finance providers are. 38% (36 out of 95 respondents) do not know which types of 
finance providers are most suitable for their business, although 31% (29 out of 95) do know. 
 
Since more than one third of respondents claimed to not know about the suitability of various funding 
providers, the previously suggested interpretation of the reasons for respondents‟ emphasis on bank 
lending seems to be valid:  It appears not surprising that business owner-managers are unable to 
obtain finance if they are approaching funders who may be clearly unsuitable to their needs. The fact 
that hardly any respondents indicated BAs or VCs as preferred sources of finance in a previous 
question further underlines this and also suggests that respondents possibly do not know 
enough about these funders to establish occasions when they are likely to be more suitable than 
banks – hence, when banks are approached, they are unwilling to lend because the proposal is 
unsuitable for bank debt. 
 
51% (48 out of 94 respondents) are confident that they know what the different funders require from 
them when they apply for finance; 30% (28 out of 94) are not confident about this. 
 
This finding, however, conflicts with some of the interpretations discussed above, while at the same 
time also conflicting with the comments made by the BAs as the latter suggested that entrepreneurs 
approaching them for funding often do not seem to completely understand what the investors are 
looking for. 
 
27% (26 out of 95 respondents) think that their type or size of business is of interest to Venture 
Capital/equity funders; 37% (35 out of 95) do not think this is the case. 
 
The 26 respondents who claimed that equity funders such as VCs or BAs should be interested in their 
type of business are in stark contrast to the very small number of only five participants who earlier 
claimed that their preferred source of capital is a VC or BA.  Although we were unable to probe the 
respondents to establish the reasons behind this, it is interesting to view this in the context of the 36 
respondents claiming they do not know which funders are most suitable for them as this may further 
support our proposition:  Many of the entrepreneurs struggle to obtain finance because they are 
approaching unsuitable investors. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that only a very 
small minority of potential high-growth businesses are in fact acceptable to VC investors – 
therefore, the proposition must still be viewed with caution. 




5.7 Respondents‟ Views about Current Finance for SMEs 
 
5.7.1 Lending Climate 
 
Only 15% (14 out of 95 respondents) think that the range of different financial products for business 
has improved in recent years.  
 
While this is clearly a finding based on perceptions from the SME owner-managers rather than a 
balanced view taking into account policy-makers‟ or funders‟ viewpoints and intentions, it suggests 
that either the range of products has not improved sufficiently or that any potentially intended 
improvements are not being viewed as such by the SME community – the former would be an issue 
on a much wider scale, as it would mean that the products currently available do not fulfil the need of 
the investees, whereas the latter may be more easily remedied by improved communication and 
promotion. 
 
53% (50 out of 95 respondents) believe that there has been a change in the policy or attitudes of 
lenders to their type of business.  This could corroborate the results from the focus group in which 
participants were of the view that banks had replaced „relationship management‟ with „credit teams‟. 
 
59% (56 out of 95 respondents) think that the relationship between a business owner and the bank 
should be relevant to success in obtaining finance.  Indeed one respondent in the bank interviews 
noted that as long as the business owner had a long-standing relationship with the bank, the bank 
would support them in „bad times‟. 
 
5.7.2 Impact on Business Owners 
 
51% (48 out of 94 respondents) think that obtaining finance for business takes more time/effort than it 
did two years ago. Furthermore, 53% (49 out of 93 respondents) are worried about meeting the future 
finance needs of their business, although 20% (18 out of 93) are not worried about this. While these 
figures are not absolute majorities, they still refer to more than half of SMEs believing that 
fundraising has become more problematic over the years. Given the time and resource 
constraints that SME owner-managers face in the day-to-day running of their businesses, this 
development makes it even more difficult for SMEs to continue running their business while 
trying to raise capital. 
 
However, despite SMEs believing that fundraising is more time-consuming now than two years ago, 
only 31% (29 out of 93 respondents) are pessimistic about meeting the future financial needs of their 
business. In contrast, 42% (39 out of 93 respondents) are optimistic about meeting the future financial 
needs of their business. The reasons behind this are not entirely clear and might refer to entrepreneurs‟ 
and SME owner-managers‟ generally optimistic nature or might suggest that the increase in time 
required for fundraising is not perceived as a trend that will continue. 
 
The findings relating to owner-managers‟ perceptions of raising finance and the impact that this may 
have on their businesses paint a bleak picture:  Not only do they feel that fundraising is becoming 
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increasingly difficult for them, but their anxious and medium-optimistic outlook and expectations 
for the future suggest low confidence in funding sources, and potentially even suggest low 
confidence in the country‟s ability to improve access to finance for their types of business. 
 
5.7.3 Future Needs 
 
42% (39 out of 94 respondents) would like further support or training to develop their skills in 
obtaining business finance. 
 
This figure is in line with some of the previous findings which had suggested that 38% of respondents 
are not sure which financiers are suitable for their business and also in line with the 30% who stated 
that they do not know what different financiers are looking for in a prospective investee business. At 
the same time, this might imply that the currently available types of fundraising support and training 
programmes are insufficient, either in quantity, quality and/or suitability. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to probe further in this study, therefore we cannot categorically state that the region does not 
provide sufficient fundraising training.  However, we can tentatively propose that this finding may 
derive from a real or perceived shortage of training opportunities (again, both in terms of quality, 
quantity and/or suitability).  
 
Considering the large amount of various finance-related training opportunities which we have 
identified leads us to tentatively conclude that it is merely a perceived shortage of opportunities. As 
the Business Angels element of this research specifically highlighted a very complex and confusing 
finance environment in the North East region, this perception is not entirely surprising.  
 
However, we can also put forward a potential alternative reason for almost half of owner-
managers wanting further training: It may be that there are sufficient training opportunities 
available, but there may be a scarcity of suitable, high-quality training programmes. Taking 
into account one comment from one of the Business Angel Network managers, we can 
tentatively propose the suggestion that it may be a shortage of suitable, high-quality training or 
of appropriate providers of such training.   
 
5.8 SMEs‟ Use of Business Support Services 
 
When asked how they keep informed about business support available, 95 respondents provided a 
total of 425 responses, which are presented in Figure 24.  
 
While this shows that personal contacts are the most often used source of information, Business Link 
and professional contacts, as well as membership of business organisations, are also used to a large 
extent. 
 
When asked whether they have sought external business support in the last year, 71% answered „yes‟ 
(67 respondents out of 94). 
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When asked what they were seeking the support for, generic support for business growth was 
mentioned most often, whereas actual financial support, including investment readiness and support 
regarding financial products, scored rather low. 
 




Figure 25 Support and Guidance Sought 
 
 
It may be that some respondents considered „financial support‟ as part of „support for business 
growth,‟ which may mean that many respondents, who have sought financial support for growth, did 
not explicitly indicate financial support – this may explain the low result for „financial products‟ and 
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„pitching for investment.‟ However, considering that so many respondents were unable to obtain the 
finance they had been looking for, it is slightly surprising that they have not been seeking more 
support specifically with regard to fundraising. Again, the actual reasons for this could not be 
established through a survey and may refer back to the confusing support environment. 
 
When asked about their use of different sources of business support, there were 68 respondents in 
total. The most used support sources were: 
1) Accountants (80% - 55 out of 66 respondents). 
2) Bank services (75% - 48 out of 64 respondents).  
3) Business Link local service (76% - 47 out of 62 respondents).  
4) Businesslink.gov.uk website (71% - 46 out of 65 respondents).  
 
The least used support sources were: 
1) Government department e.g. BIS (38% - 23 out of 60 respondents).  
2) Trade/business association (45% - 25 out of 56 respondents). 
3) Other specialists e.g. HR or marketing (45% - 27 out of 60 respondents).  
4) Enterprise agency or partnership (47% - 28 out of 60 respondents).  
 
5.9 SMEs‟ Opinions on Business Support Services 
5.9.1 Opinion on Usefulness 
 
Respondents were asked to rate the 17 support services on a five-point scale of usefulness, ranging 
from „very useful‟ to „not at all useful.‟ An option of „not used‟ was also available.  
 
Scores for „very useful‟ and „somewhat useful‟ were combined to give the „useful‟ score for each 
support service. According to the respondents who have used them, the top three most useful support 
sources are: 
1) Consultants (73% - 22 out of 30 respondents).  
2) Business mentors (68% - 23 out of 34 respondents). 
3) Other specialists e.g. HR or marketing (68% - 17 out of 25 respondents). 
 
Scores for „not very useful‟ and „not at all useful‟ were combined to give the „not useful‟ score for 
each support service. According to the respondents who have used them, the top three least useful 
support sources are: 
1) Bank services (54% - 25 out of 46 respondents).  
2) Local authority/council (53% - 15 out of 28 respondents).  
3) Enterprise agency or partnership (46% - 12 out of 26 respondents).   
 
5.9.2 Opinion on Access  
 
39% (34 out of 87 respondents) do not think that business support services are easy to find out about 
or access. 
 








24% (21 out of 87 respondents) think that the kind of business support they need is not available 
locally; 34% (30 out of 87 respondents) think that it is. 
 




The findings from this part of the survey seem to be rather inconclusive, given that no large majorities 
of respondents responded in one direction or another. 
5.9.3 Opinion on Providers 
 
61% (52 out of 86 respondents) agree that finding the right business support involves having to 
contact too many different organisations and only 15% disagree – the remaining have no opinion or 
consider this not applicable to their situation. 
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63% (55 out of 87 respondents) are of the view that only experienced business people can provide 
good business support. 
5.9.4 Opinion on Training 
 
69% (59 out of 85 respondents) agree that SMEs need better finance-related training. Only two 
respondents disagreed with this statement. 
 
45% (39 out of 87 respondents) believe that the business skills training that is available is not 
aimed at their type of business. 
5.9.5 Opinion on Quality 
 
50% (43 out of 86 respondents) would not describe their experience of business support services as 
excellent; only 9% (eight out of 86 respondents) agreed that it was.  
 
Overall, the findings from this part of the survey correspond strongly to one of the key findings 
from the Business Angel element of the study: There appears to be an overly complicated and 
confusing environment of financial service providers in the North East region. Comments about 
having to contact too many organisations underline this.  
 
Further important findings from this section refer to the fact that 69% of SMEs considered 
current finance-related training for SMEs as insufficient, thus requesting better training – this 
corroborates some of our previous conclusions relating to a potential perceived or actual 
scarcity of high-quality training opportunities suitable for specific types of businesses. 
 
The issue relating to who provides support emerges strongly in this section, given that 63% of 
respondents claimed that only experienced business people can provide suitable support; this is 
in line with one Business Angel Network manager‟s view that the current providers of support 
services (and investment readiness training in particular) may not be the most suitable people to 
actually provide such support. 
 
5.10 Business Development/Training Related to Obtaining Finance 
 
The respondents were asked how confident they are in different service providers‟ ability to 
communicate information about business development/training for finance; there were 82 respondents 






















The most selected sources were: 
 Accountant (22% - 18 respondents).  
 Business mentor (17.1% - 14 respondents). 
 Other businesses/contacts in the business‟ sector/industry (9.8% - eight respondents).  
 Business Link local service (8.5% - seven respondents).  
 
In terms of the least selected, two sources were not selected by any respondents: 
 Local authority/council. 
 Solicitor/lawyer . 
 
Two sources were selected by just one respondent each: 
 Other specialists (HR, marketing etc.). 
 Government department (e.g. BIS). 
 
When subsequently asked about how confident they are in the service providers‟ ability to deliver 
development/training for finance, there were 85 respondents. Each respondent could select up to three 
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The top three delivery agents ranked highest as first choice were: 
1. Accountant – 22 first-choice selections. 
2. Business owners in the participant‟s sector/industry – 13 first-choice selections. 
3. Business mentor/trainer – 11 first-choice selections. 
 
The top four delivery agents with the highest number of selections overall were: 
1. Accountant – 43 selections in total. 
2. Business owners in the participant‟s sector/industry - 26 selections in total. 
3. Business Link local service – 23 selections in total. 
4. Banks – 22 selections in total. 
 
Overall, the results from this section show that in relation to both information about finance training 
and actual delivery of such training, SME owner-managers appear to be most confident in the services 
provided by accountants, mentors and other business owners. This seems to be more or less in line 
with previous responses regarding the need for finance-related training to be delivered by experienced 
business people, rather than public sector workers or similar.  
 
 
                                                                      
141 
 
5.11 Any Other Comments 
 
When asked if they wished to make any other comments, 32 participants took the opportunity to 
comment. Overall, 47% (15 responses) included negative experiences or views and 16% (five 
responses) included positive experiences or views.  
 
 22% (seven responses) referred to their experience of banks; of these, five were negative, one was 
positive and one was an observation. 
o Three participants were of the impression that banks would not lend to SMEs as much as 
they promised and that the government needed to enforce more lending. 
o One participant claimed that banks should provide more support, rather than be seen as 
merely a lender. 
 
 Two referred to experiences with Venture Capital – both were negative. 
 
 16% (five responses) referred to Business Link (or government business services). Of these, three 
had negative experiences and one had been positive. 
 
 37.5% (12 responses) included tangible suggestions regarding improving the situation for SMEs 
with regard to finance, including the following: 
o There should be an organisation like a local Business Link, which is accessible in person, 
not through website or phone. 
o SMEs should be given support in working capital management and milestone delivery. 
o There needs to be more support for non-technological businesses, such as consultancy or 
interpretation services, which are micro businesses. 
o Local authorities should have a dedicated team to support local businesses. 
o The Government should provide more support for SMEs e.g. regarding Working Tax 
Credit, pensions, transport costs, mailing costs etc. 
o There is a need to reduce bureaucracy and thus reduce time required to obtain support. 
o Business rates for SMEs should be reduced. 
o SMEs should be given more financial support to employ apprentices thus reducing 
unemployment and the need for government to pay benefits. 
o Enterprise Made Simple and Understanding Finance cited as good practice examples of 
useful support. 
o Training on effective networking was asked for. 
o More established SMEs should also receive training and support. 
o Advisors are inappropriate in many cases. 
o Obtaining support or even information about support is complex and difficult. 
 
 Those people advising SMEs are often not well suited to provide advice: 
o Advice should not be delivered by people who have never been self-employed 
themselves. 
o Banks should be advising, not just lending. 
o Academics are not ideal in advising business owners – mentors who are actual business 
owners themselves are better. 
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o Mentors need to be directly relevant in terms of experience and they need to be 
innovative themselves. 
 
 Complex and confusing support and finance environment: 
o Very poor and very complex sourcing information. 
o SMEs do not have the time to search for information, to attend many sessions, write bids 
or to keep updated with websites etc. 
o SMEs need to be part of a network otherwise it is difficult to get access to any support. 
o There are too many consultants, mentors, coaches, etc. and the support provider area is 
highly confusing. 
o Make it easier. 
o Simplify it, for God‟s sake, simplify it!!! 
 
 One response was simply „Help‟ 
 
As a whole, some of these comments reflect the findings from previous questions, as well as from the 
other parts of this study. The issue of a complex finance environment has been discussed by the 
Business Angel investors and the notion of current advisors and service providers possessing 
inappropriate experience and irrelevant backgrounds has also been mentioned elsewhere. Comments 
about banks and their services and lending have tended to be negative, whereas hardly any comments 
about VCs or BAs were offered – all this seems to be in line with the findings from the remainder of 
the survey, which indicated that most respondents have not had much exposure to equity funders but 
instead tended to attempt to gain bank finance. 
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Appendix 1 - Ethical Procedures 
 
Newcastle Business School 
Staff Research and Consultancy 
Ethical Issues Form 
 
Staff Name: Dr Satish Sharma and Dr Steffi Macht under the oversight of 
Professor Jackie Harvey 
Portfolio Area: Research 
Title of Research / Consultancy 
Project: 
 
Exploration of the demand/supply-side of SME finance including 
Business Angels 
Please categorise your research 
as:  
 Learning & Pedagogical 
 Discipline based 
 Contribution to practice 
 A multiple of the above 
 
Discipline based; contribution to practice 
How does this research fit in with 
the NBS ADP? – Which area of  
excellence from the ADP does  
the research address? – i.e.: 
 
 Business & Management  
Practice   
 Leadership &  
Management  
Development 
 International Business 
 
Execution of grant funded project on SME access to finance 
financed by NEA2F. The results will be used to inform 
development interventions that will be delivered by CEDC 
commencing calendar year 2012.  Please see attached extract 
from funding proposal 
Start Date of Research /  
Consultancy project: 
May 2011  
 Comments 
Brief description of the proposed 
research methods including, in 
particular, whether human subjects 
will be involved and how  
 
 
Research will explore the Demand/Supply side of SME finance 
with an initial focus on the relationship between banks and SMEs 
and will offer an advisory service for Business Angels, 
establishing a pipeline that enables the flow of entrepreneurial 
ideas to them. 
This will involve (a) an initial pilot with one bank (interviews) to  
help develop a questionnaire to be sent electronically to a wide 
range of staff in banks in the NE region; (b) focus group of SMEs 
over access to finance to help develop a questionnaire to be sent 
electronically to the identified sample of SMEs; and (c) 10-20 
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interviews with a range of Business Angels 
Ethical issues that may arise (if none, 
state “None” and give reasons) 
 
Need to ensure anonymity of respondents contributing to each of 
the (a) to (c) above.  Funder will only receive generic information 
and will not receive information about individual responses. 
How will the ethical issues be 
addressed? (if none state n/a) 
 
Survey data will be anonymous and collated using survey 
monkey and analysed using SPSS.  Interviews and focus group 
data will be transcribed and stored securely in line with NBS 
guidelines.   
Has informed consent of research 
participants been considered? 
 
If appropriate, has an informed consent 
form been completed? 
All participants will receive and be asked to sign informed 
consent, and this will also be incorporated into the survey tool. 
Will be in place at each stage 
 
Has organisational consent been 
considered? 
 
If appropriate, has an organisational 
consent form been completed? 
This will be needed for the banks and SMEs.  Business Angels 
are likely to be individuals. 
 
Appropriate consents will be in place 
 
Please tick to confirm acceptance that it is your responsibility to store and destroy the data 
appropriately.    
 
Staff Signature (indicating that the research will be conducted in conformity with the above and agreeing 
that any significant change in the research project will be notified and a further “Ethical Issues Form” 
submitted. 






Line Manager:  
I confirm that I have read this form and I believe the proposed research will not breach University 
policies. 
Date:……………………………… Signature:…………………………………………. 




The appropriate completion of this form is a critical component of the University Policy on 
Ethical Issues in Research and Consultancy. If further advice is required, please contact the 
School Ethics Sub Committee through the Academic Support Office in the first instance. 
 
 
Organisational Consent Form for Bank Interviews 
RESEARCH ORGANISATION INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Newcastle Business School 
University of Northumbria 
 
Completion of this form is required whenever research is being undertaken by NBS staff or students 
within any organisation. This applies to research that is carried out on the premises, or is about an 
organisation, or members of that organisation or its customers, as specifically targeted as subjects of 
research. 
 
The researcher must supply an explanation to inform the organisation of the purpose of the study, who 
is carrying out the study, and who will eventually have access to the results.  In particular issues of 
anonymity and avenues of dissemination and publications of the findings should be brought to the 
organisations‟ attention. 
 
Researcher‟s Name : Dr. Satish Sharma and Dr. Angie Johnson 
 
Researcher‟s Statement: 
Access to Bank 
This research forms part of a wider project grant funded by NEA2F “Exploration of the 
demand/supply-side of SME finance” 
 
The overall purpose of this element of the research is to explore bank credit decision-making in 
relation to SME finance.   The research will be conducted in the North East geographic region.  
 
Our approach to the bank includes two parts: 
 
Part A: Understanding the credit decision-making process through an interview with senior manager 
within the identified bank. 
 
Part B: Participation in the survey (questionnaire). 
 
PART A 
Participants Part A 
 A senior credit manager from the bank from within the NE region  
 The interviews will be carried out by (either/or/both) Dr Satish Sharma (a full time member of 
academic staff) and Dr Angie Johnson (a research assistant contracted for this project).  Both have 
prior experience in this field and will be able to bring their knowledge to engage with participants 
during the data collection process. 
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Research methods Part A 
 Engagement in individual semi-structured interview.  The interviewee will be asked to sign an 
individual Informed Consent form at the commencement of the session.   Interviews will be 
recorded with a digital voice recorder (supported by note taking) and transcribed, and 
interviewees will be offered the opportunity to read and correct the transcriptions. 
 The purpose of the interview will be to ask questions about the credit lending process as it takes 
place from their perspective and level within the bank.  
Location Part A 
At the business premises of the control bank. 
Time Commitment 
We would expect each of the interviews to last for 1 to 1 ½ hours 
Anonymity Part A 
For the purposes of this research we will need to record the role of each participant.  Only generic 
information will be reported in any published documents arising from the study and will not be 
attributable to or identifiable against any individual or organisation. 
Confidentiality Part A 
All data will be stored securely either electronically on computer or in hard copy version in a locked 
cupboard. As part of the data analysis process, hard copies of the anonymised transcripts (raw data) 
will be discussed by the members of the research operational group and may be considered by 
research steering group as input into questionnaire. 
 
PART B 
Participants Part B 
As many individuals within the bank as possible across and range of levels and branches that are 
involved with credit decision-making.  We would request permission either for direct electronic or 
postal contact with respondents.  If this is not possible we would ask for an identified contact at each 
branch to cascade the survey instrument on our behalf. 
Research methods Part B 
Completion of the survey instrument will be via either an electronic questionnaire or word document.  
All participants will be asked to check a box on the questionnaire prior to completion providing their 
individual Informed Consent.  They will be asked to answer a range of questions in a variety of 
formats that will capture both quantitative and qualitative data.  We will also ask if individuals would 
be willing to take part in a follow up focus group session to discuss the research findings. 
Location Part B 
This work is not location specific. 
Timescale Part B 
Questionnaires to be distributed by the start of September and will remain open for 3 weeks. 
Time Commitment 
We would expect completion of the survey to take in the region of 15 minutes 
Anonymity Part B 
For the purposes of this research we will need to record the role of each participant.  Only generic 
information will be reported in any published documents arising from the study and will not be 
attributable to or identifiable against any individual or organisation. 
Confidentiality Part B 
All data will be stored securely either electronically on computer or in hard copy version in a locked 
cupboard. As part of the data analysis process, data will be entered into a suitable statistical package 
for analysis.  It is possible that hard copies of the anonymised raw data will be discussed by the 
members of the research operational group. 
 
Any organisation manager or representative who is empowered to give consent may do so here: 
 











Anonymity must be offered to the organisation if it does not wish to be identified in the research 
report. Confidentiality is more complex and cannot extend to the markers of student work or the 
reviewers of staff work, but can apply to the published outcomes. If confidentiality is required, what 
form applies? 
 
 [   ] No confidentiality required 
 [   ] Masking of organisation name in research report 
 [   ] No publication of the research results without specific organisational consent 









Individual Informed Consent Form for SME Research Focus Group Participants 
 
 
Title of Study: 
 
This research forms part of a wider project 
grant funded by NEA2F “Exploration of the 
demand/supply-side of SME finance” 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Dr. Stephanie Macht 
Dr. Satish Sharma 
Ms Sue Regan 




Newcastle Business School,  
Northumbria University 
City Campus East 1 




0191 243 7658 (Stephanie Macht) 
0191 227 3668 (Satish Sharma) 










The overall purpose of this element of the 
research is to explore the SME experience in 
accessing finance, including the finance 
decision-making process and associated 
challenges.  The research will be conducted in 
the North East geographic region. 
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Description of the involvement expected of 
participants including the broad nature of 
questions to be answered or events to be 
observed or activities to be undertaken, and the 
expected time commitment: 
 
 
Participants should be senior representatives of 
SMEs located in the North East of England. 
Together with 6-11 other SME representatives, 
participants will take part in a focus group to 
discuss their experiences of accessing finance 
and the associated challenges. Focus groups 
will be facilitated by (either/or/all) Dr Satish 
Sharma, Dr Stephanie Macht (both full time 
members of academic staff) and Ms Sue Regan 
(a research assistant contracted for this project). 
The focus group is expected to take between 
approximately one hour and 90 minutes of the 
participant‟s time. The session will be recorded 
with a digital voice recorder (supported by note 
taking) and transcribed. Participants will be 
given the opportunity to read and amend the 
typed transcripts. 
It is expected that the focus group findings will 
be shared with the funding organisation, and 
published in practitioner and academic outlets. 
However, participants will be guaranteed 
complete anonymity and confidentiality: The 
data will be disseminated in anonymised form 
(by changing the participants‟ names) and only 
the researchers will be able to identify the 
participants based on the interviews. 
Demographic information about each 
participant (e.g. previous sources of finance 
used) will be gathered but only generic 
information will be reported in any published 
documents arising from the study and will not 
be attributable to or identifiable against any 
individual. 
All data will be stored securely either 
electronically on the researchers‟ computers or 
in hard copy version in a locked cupboard. As 
part of the data analysis process, hard copies of 
the anonymised transcripts (raw data) will be 
discussed by the members of the research 
operational group and may be considered by 
research steering group. 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly confidential (i.e. 
will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and organisations will not be identified 
unless this is expressly excluded in the details given above). 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of forms and for a 
variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed above. It will not be used for 
purposes other than those outlined above without your permission.  
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Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above information and 
agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above information. 
 
Participant’s signature:                    Date: 
 
Researcher’s signature:                       Date: 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
 
 
Individual Informed Consent Form for Business Angel Research Participants 
 
Title of Study: 
 
This research forms part of a wider project 
grant funded by NEA2F “an advisory service 
for Business Angels to establish a pipeline that 
enables the flow of entrepreneurial ideas” 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Dr. Stephanie Macht 
Mr. Craig Wood 




Newcastle Business School, Northumbria 
University 
City Campus East 1 




0191 243 7658 (Stephanie Macht) 









The overall purpose of this element of the 
research is to explore the key drivers for 
Business Angels‟ investment decisions to gain 
a picture of the scope and availability of this 
source of funding; to understand their 
challenges; and to understand the types of 
projects that are attractive to them 
Description of the involvement expected of 
participants including the broad nature of 
questions to be answered or events to be 
observed or activities to be undertaken, and the 
expected time commitment: 
Engagement in an individual semi-structured 
interview, which will be recorded with a digital 
voice recorder (supported by note taking) and 
transcribed. Interviewees will be offered the 
opportunity to read and correct the 






The purpose of the interview will be to ask 
questions about participants‟ own experience of 
being a Business Angel around motivation for 
their investment decisions, challenges and 
identification of support.  
Interviews will be conducted by 
(either/or/both) Dr Stephanie Macht (a full time 
member of academic staff) and Mr Craig Wood 
(a research assistant contracted for this project).  
Both have prior experience in this field and 
will be able to bring their knowledge to engage 
with participants during the data collection 
process. 
The interview is expected to take between 
approximately one hour and 90 minutes of the 
participant‟s time.  
It is expected that the interview findings will be 
shared with the funding organisation, and 
published in practitioner and academic outlets. 
However, participants will be guaranteed 
complete anonymity and confidentiality: The 
data will be disseminated in anonymised form 
(by changing the participants‟ names) and only 
the researchers will be able to identify the 
participants based on the interviews. 
Demographic information about each 
participant (e.g. previous investment 
experience) will be gathered but only generic 
information will be reported in any published 
documents arising from the study and will not 
be attributable to or identifiable against any 
individual. 
All data will be stored securely either 
electronically on the researchers‟ computers or 
in hard copy version in a locked cupboard. As 
part of the data analysis process, hard copies of 
the anonymised transcripts (raw data) will be 
discussed by the members of the research 
operational group and may be considered by 
research steering group. 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly confidential (i.e. 
will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and organisations will not be identified 
unless this is expressly excluded in the details given above). 
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Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of forms and for a 
variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed above. It will not be used for 
purposes other than those outlined above without your permission.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above 
information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above information. 
 
Participant‟s signature:     Date: 
 
 
Researcher‟s signature:     Date: 
 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 




Appendix 2 - Bank Interview Question Prompts 
 
Interview Guide Questions 
 How are SME‟s classified within the northeast region? 
 Could you provide us a simplistic overview of SME lending from 2008 until the 
present time? 
 What are the general types and trends occurring in SME lending? 
 What challenges has SME lending provided most recently? 
 Have these impacted on your targets and resulted in the generation of new 
criteria/approaches to SME lending? 
 What are the products marketed to SME‟s in the NE region? 
 What is your opinion on the SME‟s reporting that Banks are replacing OD facilities 
with more expensive products? 
 How do you deal with the diversity and idiosyncratic nature of the SME‟s? 
 How do you describe the credit decision-making process for SME lending? 
 What is the decision-making process for the support in developing a proposal for 
acceptance? (Support for SME!) 
 In terms of Information Asymmetry, what measures do you adopt to obtain the 
accurate information and ensure that the decision-making process is not extended 
unnecessarily? For instance, costs in with relation to time for the bank. 
 How do you describe the importance and the role of inter-bank reference on your 
credit decision process? 
 Could you provide more information on the rejections? 
 What do you do with the rejected proposals? 
 Do you provide additional support on the rejected application so that the SME can 
develop their plan? 
 How do you handle NPAs within the credit appraisal process? If the NPA is high, 
what measures have you taken to improve the process? 
 What are the issues that bankers would be monitoring in the case of SMEs? 
 In situations when an SME account experience difficulty, what measures do you have 
to identify and resolve? 
 What is your distinctive advantage to encourage SME to bank with you?  
 What is your opinion concerning the future of SME access to finance? 
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Appendix 3 - Bank Questionnaire Survey 
 





















































Appendix 4 - Interview Prompts for Business Angels 
 
Question Possible Probes Rationale 
What is your career 
background? 
 Entrepreneurial?  
 How many businesses started up? How 
did you exit them? 
 And from that (e.g. IPO etc.) you are 
now using the gains to invest as a BA? 
 Do you still work full-time now? 
Should establish the BA‟s 
source of wealth and 
experience. 
How many 
investments have you 
made as a BA to date?  
 When (year) did these happen?  
 Geographically, whereabouts were these 
investee companies? 
 How much money invested? 
 Still involved with them? 
 What industries? 
 Did you have any experience in these 
sectors? 
 How many of these investments have 
you made in parallel? Or were they 
always one after the other? 
 Can you comment on the success of 
these businesses/investments? 
 Would you consider yourself a hands-on 
investor? (this may need further brief 
questioning around: what were your 
main duties?) 
Establishes the level of 
experience of the BA and 
maybe gives an overview of 
certain types of businesses 
they are more interested (e.g. 
technology etc.) 
Do you have any non-
BA-investments? 
 In terms of priorities for you personally, 
where would you place BA investments 
as opposed to the others you have? 
 In terms of money invested, which type 
of investment has received more 
investment?   
Gives an indication of the 
overall wealth, as well as the 
portfolio of the BA and any 
experience they have, which 
may be transferable to the BA 
world.  
How much money do 
you have currently 
available for 
investment in BA and 
non-BA 
opportunities?  
  Overall wealth 
Why did you become 
a BA investor?  
For experienced BAs: 
Is this still the reason 
why you remain a BA 
until now? 
 Financial reasons (ROI, EIS, portfolio, 
etc.) 
 Non-financial reasons (personal 
enjoyment or boredom; 
philanthropic/altruistic reasons) 
General motivation for BA 
investments 
Are you a member of 
any (other) BANs, BA 
 Why or why not? 
 What kind(s)? (International, regional, 
Should establish how formal 
they are in their approach to 
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groups etc?  
  
local, formal, informal, ad-hoc...) looking for investment and 
enables probing into deal flow 
later. 
This may help establish some 
of the (perceived??) 
weaknesses of BANs and 
groups, which we could use as 
recommendations to NEA2F. 
How many potential 
investments do you 
see per year?/have 
you seen this year? 
 Where do you see them?  
 Formally, i.e. in BAN-organised 
meetings etc. 
 Informally, i.e. through own contacts 
and personal networking? 
Should establish the amount 
of ideas they are being 
exposed to. 
Are you happy with 
that amount and 
nature of opportunities 
you see? 
 
 How many would you like to see?  
 What kind of investment opportunities 
would you like to see more of?  
 In an ideal world, what would you 
improve in terms of deal flow? 
Can be used to identify the 
amount of money available 
(?). 
Identifies what is most 
attractive to BAs. Also 
identifies whether BAs are 
generally happy with the 
nature of (maybe pre-
screened, maybe too early-
stage etc.) opportunities they 
see – recommendations 
possible. 
Before we move into 
discussing your 
experience in a bit 
more detail, I just 
want to ask about your 
KEY challenge as a 
BA. Does 
ANYTHING come to 
your mind here, which 
stands out? 
  A very open question, which 
may or may not result in BAs 
discussing where the most 
problems lie. Can be followed 
up with probing; can also be 
picked up again in the below, 
with regards to: e.g. 
challenges in finding 
opportunities etc. 
 




Specific Investment Qs: 
 
The following Qs are for EXPERIENCED BAs ONLY; they need to be tailored depending on the 
interviewee‟s experience: 
 VERY experienced BA: (if they have too many investments already, asking about all would be too 
time consuming, so the interviewer‟s judgment will determine if all or only 2 are being 
investigated)  
 The following questions will require you to talk about your specific experience in previous 
and/or current investments. Ideally, can you think about a memorable investment early on in 
your BA-career and a memorable investment recently?  
Or: 
 The following questions will require you to talk about your experience in relation to your 
specific investments that you have undertaken. Please feel free to let me know which 
investment you are referring to at any point in time. 
 Medium-experienced BA: The following questions will require you to talk about your experience 
in relation to your specific investments that you have undertaken. Please feel free to let me know 
which investment you are referring to at any point in time. 
 
For all your 
investments to date, 
where did you come 
across the investment 
opportunities? 
 Are any channels more/less 
successful for you to find Os? 
 Which did you favour and why? 
Should establish the „impact‟ of 
formal BANs and investment events 
etc. – or are more opportunities found 
elsewhere? 
When did you realise 
that you would 
definitely invest?  
 
(NB. This will depend 
on how they have 
found out about the 
opportunity) 
 
Use investment process model (Paul 
et al., 2007): 
 Probing needs to establish after 
what activity the BA made the 
ultimate decision; the following 
are not necessarily in the correct 
order: 
 Business plan (scanning; 
reading; analysing) 
 Pitch (see E; hear the idea; 
ask questions) 
 First face-to-face meeting 
with E (formal; informal; 
social environment) 
 Further due diligence (e.g. 
meet management team, 
employees, check out the 
premises etc.) 
 Negotiations (deal structuring 
and agreeing) 
 Contract itself (e.g. E won‟t 
budge on a certain point/BA is 
not flexible) 
May establish the level of detail that 
the BA goes into before actually 
making the decision, e.g. is it more 
intuitive and spontaneous based on 
gut feeling or is it more rational and 
based on analysis, etc.? 
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Probing and the way in which the above questions were answered will then lead to questions in 
more detail about the individual stages and the investment criteria within them. 
(Will depend on the answers above, e.g. if BA has not seen a pitch, asking about it will not 
make sense, etc.) 
Why did you invest 




 Why this and not an alternative 
one? 
 Lack of other options?  
 What within the business 
plan? 
 What about the E? 
 What about the E‟s 
personality? 
 Interest in post-investment 
involvement? Suitable 
involvement available? Did 
the E ask for involvement? 
Etc. 
 Exit strategy and timing? 
 Negotiations with the E? 
 Investment deal (debt vs. 
equity etc.)? 
 Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(tax benefits for BAs)? 
 Altruism? Philanthropy? Etc.? 
 Referral from trusted source?  
 Co-investor? 
Specific investment reasons, jockey 
vs. horse, management vs. idea etc. 
 
Should establish both: 
 Factual issues (e.g. business plan 
– what needs to be included etc.) 
and  
 Relational/social/interpersonal 
issues (e.g. swift trust, getting 
along, chemistry etc.) 
Have you ever 
provided follow-on 
investment for any 
investee companies? I 
don‟t mean initially 
agreed staged deals 
but actual follow-on? 
 What were the reasons for this 
decision to put more money into 
that business? 
This again is supposed to establish 
investment criteria and motivations 
(see above: jockey vs. horse or 
something irrational maybe?) 
If you compare your 
early investments to 
the later ones, what 
are the key things you 
have learned in terms 
of being a BA? 
 If you started your BA-career 
again from scratch, what would 
you do differently? 
 If a new BA came to ask you for 
just a few key tips, what would 
you say?  
 Has there ever been anything 
where you though: “I wish I had 
known that before!” or: “I wish 
someone had told me that 
before!” 
These should establish some sort of 
learning curve for the BA and may 
help us identify areas where BAs 
require 
teaching/education/development for 
NEA2F‟s BA Academy to run 
seminars on. 
Is there anything still 
now where you are 
unsure about or 
would prefer to have 
a bit more 
information about? 
 Have you recently thought: “I 
wish someone would tell me 
more about this!” etc.? 
 E.g. due diligence? Post-
investment issues? Valuation? 
Etc.? 
Training needs 
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If you do have 
questions like that, 
who/where would 
you go to for 
answers? 





Identifies support available. 
I am sure you have 
come across 
opportunities which 
you really did not 
want to back.  
What are your 
absolute deal-
breakers or no-go‟s?  
  
Use investment process model again: 
 Probing needs to establish after 
what activity the BA made the 
rejection-decision; the following 
are not necessarily in the correct 
order: 
 Business plan (scanning; 
reading; analysing) 
 Pitch (see E; hear the idea; 
ask questions) 
 First face-to-face meeting 
with E (formal; informal; 
social environment) 
 Further due diligence (e.g. 
meet management team, 
employees, check out the 
premises etc.) 
 Negotiations (deal structuring 
and agreeing) 
 Contract itself (e.g. E won‟t 
budge on a certain point/BA is 
not flexible) 
Probes into investment criteria as 
well and can be used to educate Es. 
 
The following Qs are for INEXPERIENCED BAs ONLY, i.e. only for those with money, who have 
seriously started to look into BA-investments, but who do not have any investments just yet. 
Inexperienced BA: The following questions are about your personal opinion regarding investment 
opportunities. Hypothetically, if an opportunity came in the door now and/or about Os they have 
rejected so far. 
Where did you come 
across the investment 
Os you have seen to 
date? 
 Are any channels more/less successful 
for you to find Os? 
Should establish the „impact‟ of 
formal BANs and investment 
events etc. – or are more 
opportunities found elsewhere? 
What was the furthest 
that you have gone 
when you had seen a 
suitable investment O? 
Use investment process model (Paul et 
al., 2007): business plan, pitch, meet E, 
etc.? 
 
When did you realise 
that you would 
definitely not invest?  
 
(NB. This will depend 
on how they have 
found out about the 
opportunity; how many 
of these will be probed 
 Probing needs to establish after what 
activity the BA made the ultimate 
rejection-decision; the following are 
not necessarily in the correct order: 
 Business plan (scanning; reading; 
analysing) 
 Pitch (see E; hear the idea; ask 
questions) 
 First face-to-face meeting with E 
May establish the level of detail 
that the BA goes into before 
actually making the decision, 
e.g. is it more intuitive and 
spontaneous based on gut 
feeling or is it more rational 
and based on analysis, etc.? 
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into will depend on the 
interviewer‟s judgment 
and how many Os the 
BA has rejected.) 
 
(formal; informal; social 
environment) 
 Further due diligence (e.g. meet 
management team, employees, 
check out the premises etc.) 
 Negotiations (deal structuring and 
agreeing) 
 Contract itself (e.g. E won‟t budge 
on a certain point/BA is not 
flexible) 
What are your absolute 
deal-breakers or no-
go‟s? 
Use investment process model again: 
 Probing needs to establish after what 
activity the BA made the ultimate 
decision; the following are not 
necessarily in the correct order: 
 Business plan (scanning; reading; 
analysing) 
 Pitch (see E; hear the idea; ask 
questions) 
 First face-to-face meeting with E 
(formal; informal; social 
environment) 
 Further due diligence (e.g. meet 
management team, employees, 
check out the premises etc.) 
 Negotiations (deal structuring and 
agreeing) 
 Contract itself (e.g. E won‟t budge 
on a certain point/BA is not 
flexible) 
 
In terms of you starting 
your BA-career, is 
there anything that you 
are uncomfortable with 
or feel that you don‟t 
know enough about 
yet?   
 Is there anything where you think: “I 
wish someone would just tell me 
about this!” 
 Or “... had just told me about this 
before!” 
This should establish the 
training needs etc. of novice 
BAs. Possible 
recommendations for NEA2F. 
If you do have 
questions like that, 
who would you go to 
for answers? 
 Identifies support available, 
what BAs are aware of and 
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Appendix 5 - Prompt Questions for SME Focus Group 
 
 Q.1 Your Fundraising Experience  
We‟re interested in your experience of trying to raise finance for the business in the recent past, say – 
the past two to three years.  
Who‟s had some success – and why? 
Who‟s got any unsuccessful experiences – and why? 
Q.2 Understanding your Fundraising  
Broadly, what sort of things did you want the money for ?  
Prompts: growth - new assets - new product development - new product launch/promotion - reaching 
new markets - new premises or location - existing commitments - other 
What sources have you tried? 
Prompts: banks - family/ friends - credit cards - equity - Business Angels - government grants  -
European - other 
What were the pros and cons ? 
Were there any particular challenges or difficulties? 
Was there anything that particularly helped the process from your point of view? 
(Were the funders‟ criteria / objectives clear? ) 
Q.3 Development Interventions  
What experience have you got of using support for your business particularly in relation to raising 
finance – e.g. for financial planning, forecasting, drawing up a business plan or forward strategy 
Prompts: business advice and support - signposting - networks, forums, etc - training courses or 
workshops - seminars – mentoring - other  
Who has provided this support? 
Prompts: local government teams - government agencies (e.g. Business Link) - development 
organisations - training providers - accountants - financial advisors - local business organisations (e.g. 
FSB)- other 
What have you found useful? Why was that? What is the added value to your business? 
What has not been useful? Why not? 
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How do you find out about this type of support/ these interventions? And how do you decide whether 
or not to use them? 
Are there any you‟d recommend?  
What other interventions do you think are needed? What would make them more likely to be 
successful? Who should be involved in providing these? Why? 
Q.4  Anything else?  
Is there anything else you‟d like to add? Anything related to the discussion that you haven‟t had a 
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Appendix 6 - SME Questionnaire 
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